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vPreface
In January 2007, a modestly-funded international policy think tank in Budapest  invited 
a small group of inventive researchers and civil society representatives from Central Asia 
and South East Europe to its headquarters for a short meeting. The idea of this gather-
ing was to bring together a group of reputable partners around one table to assess our 
initiatives to date and, through a moderated discussion, brainstorm on our potential 
“next steps” to improve governance in their ethnically-diverse communities. 
This event was a culmination of the Local Government and Public Service Reform 
Initiative’s long-term investment in promoting diversity management in post-socialist 
Central and South Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Led by its in-house 
Managing Multiethnic Communities Program (MMCP), LGI began to engage more 
actively in diversity issues in Central Asia in 2005, ﬁrst by identifying and forging 
relationships with potential partners. At their request, in 2006, LGI implemented a 
number of trainings with the Soros Foundation–Kyrgyzstan and the United Nations 
Development Program. These trainings in Kyrgyzstan provided an introduction to 
diversity management, its key concepts, issues, and tools, and were designed to meet 
the needs of trainers and civil society representatives who regularly encountered public 
authorities and decision-makers in their work. Concurrently, several individuals from 
Central Asia traveled to Budapest, and participated in MMCP trainings in a vibrant, 
international setting. 
These events were signiﬁcant in gathering support for an idea to support experience- 
and knowledge-sharing between Central Asia and South East Europe. In late summer 
of 2006, MMCP, working in concert with the Soros Foundation and UNDP oﬃces 
in Kyrgyzstan, invited members of the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South East 
Europe–Philia, based in Novi Sad, Serbia, to a short conference in Kyrgyzstan. This event 
brought together local experts and activists from communities throughout Kyrgyzstan, 
mayors, village heads, and members of central ministries, as well as colleagues from border 
areas in Tajikistan. Over two days, guided by representatives of Philia, participants engaged 
in an open dialogue about life at the local level in newly independent states, and the 
accompanying challenges of managing new national borders and of meeting the needs 
of diverse populations in the context of ongoing administrative reforms.
Shortly thereafter, a mixed team from Kyrgyzstan, including the mayor of the city of 
Uzgen, travelled to South Eastern Europe to learn more from the experiences of Philia. 
During this exchange, participants from Kyrgyzstan heard about Philia’s relentless eﬀorts 
to rebuild relations in a deeply traumatized region, following the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
and the outbreak of violent conﬂict. They explored the growth of strong, sustainable 
networks that bring together a mix of actors from multiethnic cities and regions to 
promote peaceful relations in South Eastern Europe. They discussed the establishment 
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of triangles of cities that carry out joint activities across new national borders: managing 
resources, building and maintaining infrastructure, supporting economic development, 
and facilitating interethnic, inter-municipal dialogue. They learned about the process 
of formulating policies and developing mechanisms to accommodate ethnically and 
linguistically diverse communities at diﬀerent levels of government. They visited regions 
that now are divided by new national borders, with particular ethnic compositions and 
histories, and investigated struggles to balance a degree of administrative autonomy with 
national cohesion. These experiences in South Eastern Europe not only piqued partici-
pants’ interest, but also reminded them of comparable contexts in Central Asia. 
During our January 2007 meeting in Budapest, which brought together partners 
from Central Asia and South Eastern Europe, we discussed the value of documenting the 
story of Philia and its related institutions and initiatives. We considered the usefulness 
of describing their eﬀorts to overcome divisions and re-build relations at the local level 
in a way that would provide guidance for others. Ultimately, we conceived a case-based 
approach to explore multiethnic community management in South Eastern Europe. 
We identiﬁed authors with in-depth and personal knowledge of the ﬁeld, who could 
compose rich case studies on alliances, institutions, and their initiatives. We also invited 
Gábor Péteri, an expert in a wide range of issues related to local government, to advise 
the development of the case studies.
The resulting publication is meant not only to elaborate on the eﬀorts of certain 
actors in South Eastern Europe, but also to contribute to an expanding, inter-regional 
movement devoted to realizing inclusive, responsive, and open governance in diverse 
communities. It includes a series of cases written by experts, activists, and policymak-
ers in South Eastern Europe that also reﬂect issues of concern expressed by partners in 
Central Asia. It is innovative, in that it presents a grass-roots story of actors determined 
to overcome interethnic conﬂict, social divisions, new political borders, and other up-
heavals in South Eastern Europe. The work is intended to be not only informative and 
inspiring, but also practical. The contributors provide their insights and tools that are 
meant to equip actors with the necessary knowledge and skills that will enable them to 
address the complex problems of diversity in diﬀerent, local contexts. We hope that this 
work will be a guide for policymakers, activists, and researchers, as well as politicians in 
city hall, and provide a solid basis for critically analyzing and formulating interventions 
and policies that will improve governance in diverse communities.
I would like to extend my congratulations to Gábor Péteri and Radomir Sovljanski 
and all the contributors, translators, reviewers, and colleagues who helped with this 
volume, and express my gratitude for the personal and professional stories that make 
this work complete.
Meghan Simpson
Research Associate
Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative–Open Society Institute
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1Introduction
Živorad Kovačević, Meghan Simpson, and Radomir Šovljanski
SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: A COMMON HISTORY IN BRIEF
There used to be a clever description of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY), indicating all of its complexity: one country, two scripts (Cyrillic and Latin); 
three basic religions (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, and Islam), four languages (Serbian, 
Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian); ﬁve major nationalities (Serbs, Croats, Slove-
nians, Macedonians, and Bosniaks) and several smaller national groups (Albanians, 
Hungarians, Turks, Roma, etc.); six Socialist Republics (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia), with seven neighbors (Italy, Austria, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania); and eight constitutive parts (six 
Socialist Republics and two Autonomous Provinces—Vojvodina and Kosovo).
A history of territory of South Eastern Europe might be best summed up in terms 
of the constant ﬂow of populations and changing regimes. In the center of what came to 
be the SRFY, across Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia, there stretched a line separating 
the Western and Eastern Roman Empire (later known as Byzantium); Roman Catholic 
and Orthodox religions (after the schism in 1054); the Habsburg and Ottoman Em-
pires; the West and the East. While Yugoslavia’s name was supposed to indicate that it 
was the country of the Southern Slavs, in fact, it was composed of signiﬁcant non-Slav 
minorities—among them, the largest in number being Albanians, Hungarians, and 
Germans—who had also inhabited the region for centuries.
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, established in 1946 (as the Federal 
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia), was a socialist state and not an actual democracy. 
Though leadership in Belgrade wielded a signiﬁcant amount of control over all the 
Republics, the country was much more liberal internally and more open to the world 
than other countries of the Eastern Bloc. For much of the socialist period, particularly 
from the 1960s, it enjoyed high living standards and access to international markets. 
When the SFRY refused to accept Soviet hegemony in 1948, it became, according to 
Warren Zimmerman, the last Ambassador of the United States to the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, the “protected and sometimes pampered child of the American 
and Western diplomacy.”1  
Any history of the recent conﬂicts that engulfed the region is contentious. Susan 
Woodward reminds us of a unique geopolitical conjecture in the 1980s that fueled the 
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break-up of the country and the onset of war.2 Troubles began a decade before the fall 
of the Berlin wall, when austerity measures and reforms required by Yugoslavia’s foreign 
debt crisis triggered a slide toward political disintegration. This crisis had developed as 
a function of Yugoslavia’s strategic signiﬁcance during the Cold War, which provided 
access to foreign credits and capital markets. The economic and structural weaknesses 
of the country, however, rendered the federation of republics vulnerable just as the 
Cold War came to an end. As the Eastern Bloc ceased to pose a threat to the West, the 
geopolitical signiﬁcance of Yugoslavia to the US also declined precipitously. Ambassador 
Zimmerman reﬂected on this change: 
  “...Yugoslavia and the Balkans remained important to US interests, but Yugosla-
via no longer enjoyed its former geopolitical signiﬁcance as a balance between 
[the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the Warsaw Pact. It was no longer 
unique, since both Poland and Hungary now had more open political and eco-
nomic systems... I would reassert... the traditional mantra of US policy toward 
Yugoslavia—our support of its unity, independence and territorial integrity. 
But I would add that we could only support the country’s unity in the context 
of progress toward democracy.”3 
Waning interest among policymakers in the US was paralleled by some troubling 
trends rippling across the region. As the SFRY began to crumble, nationalist leaders were 
becoming empowered, pursuing various avenues to bolster ethno-national divisions, 
and asserting their nations “right” to independence. Meanwhile, the “relay baton” of 
geopolitical interest was being passed from the US to Europe. However, preoccupied 
at the time with ongoing talks in Maastricht on the European integration process, the 
uniﬁcation of Germany, and the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) failed to take seriously the signs of conﬂict brewing in the Balkans. 
As war engulfed the region, fueled by the destructive energy of aggressive nationalism 
that was being fomented and instrumentalized by political leaders, the response of the 
EU and other actors to the onset of conﬂict was delayed, muddled, and at least initially 
unconvincing.
By 1991, the dissolution of the SFRY was set in motion with the unilateral separa-
tion of Slovenia and Croatia and their declarations of independence that year. There 
were no major armed conﬂicts in Slovenia. In Croatia, however, the declaration of in-
dependence initiated the process of separation of autonomous regions with a majority 
Serbian population. Soon, war broke out between Croats and Serbs.
That year, ethnic Serbs in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) organized 
a referendum in which they asserted their determination to stay in the common state 
of Yugoslavia. However, the referendum was declared invalid and BiH proceeded with 
its declaration of independence from Belgrade. Armed conﬂicts between the three larg-
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est ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks—started in 1992. On April 28, 1992, 
Serbia and Montenegro decided to stay in a common state. The Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) became the the successor of SFRY.
War ended with the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Agreement, in November 1995, 
which brought together the leadership of BiH, the Republic of Croatia, and the FRY. 
But, this did not “solve” the problems in the region. Another crisis erupted between 
ethnic Serbs and Albanians in the province of Kosovo in 1999. To put an end to the 
conﬂict, the international community intervened with force. NATO bombings of Serbia 
leveled many strategic and civilian sites. Large-scale violence ended, but these bomb-
ings were extremely destructive and continue to be viewed as a very poor method of 
resolving conﬂict in the region.
By June 2, 2006, Montenegro declared its independence and split peacefully from 
its union with Serbia. The last territorial unit of the former Yugoslavia, the Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo and Metohija, declared its independence on February 17, 2008, 
with strong support from the international community. Belgrade continues to oppose 
this move.
It should be emphasized that for much of its history, Yugoslavia was a multicultural 
society based on principles equality and unity. Explaining wars in the 1990s solely in 
terms of “ethnic conﬂict” or “ethnic hatreds” war devalues and discredits the region’s 
common history. Indeed, for much of the twentieth century, ethnic or ethno-religious 
identities were subordinate to a shared and essentially secular Yugoslav identity, and 
ethnic groups were hardly distinct categories. Yet, due to the conﬂuence of a number 
of factors, Yugoslavia disintegrated in a very short period of time. The eﬀects have 
been tremendous. The conﬂicts that rippled across the region were bloody, brutal, and 
psychological traumatizing. They caused many casualties, destroyed towns and infra-
structure, displaced families, and ruptured social networks. Over a million displaced 
people found refuge in neighboring countries, as well as abroad. Economies and liveli-
hoods were devastated and systems of governance dramatically altered. New geo-strategic 
realities and political boundaries were constructed. Divisions among previously ﬂuid, 
or at least less ardently-felt, ethnic and ethno-religious identities were re-created, and 
the histories of nations rewritten. Across the former Yugoslavia, hatreds that had not 
existed prior to this cataclysmic period become entrenched. These conditions have had 
long-term and pervasive aﬀects for South Eastern Europe, posing signiﬁcant obstacles 
to the rebuilding and normalizing of pre-war relations, democratization, economic 
growth, and European integration.
The “Balkan wars,” their many atrocities, and the rampant ethno-nationalisms 
they perpetuated left the newly established countries with a very poor heritage.  The 
greatest obstacles for the region as a whole have been to normalize relations among 
these new countries and their populations and to reestablish relations based on trust and 
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understanding. Indeed, dialogue and cooperation have been very slow to redevelop. Most 
new leaders, elected in democratic elections held after the wars, have lacked the courage 
and foresight to extend a hand of reconciliation to one another. To put it simply, where 
there is no trust, suspicion and insecurity prevail, and the threat of conﬂict remains. 
LEGACIES OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNANCE
This book focuses primarily on initiatives launched at the local level—within communi-
ties and cities and across national borders—to engage communities and governments 
in rebuilding normal, peaceful relations and pursuing robust democratic governance. 
To understand why and how local communities and cities ﬁgure so prominently in this 
book, as well as the obstacles and opportunities that have structured their eﬀorts recent 
decades, some historical context is needed. 
Strong local government—that is, local self-government (lokalna samouprava)—has 
had a long and vibrant history in the region of South Eastern Europe. In Serbia, for 
instance, under the Ottoman Empire, the self-government unit was a village. Each vil-
lage elected an elder, who acted as mayor. Local leaders were empowered to the extent 
that they led multiple uprisings against the rule of local Turkish oﬃcials.  When the 
Progressive Party government came to power (1880-1883) with the aim to create a 
modern state in Serbia, it encountered ﬁerce opposition: locally elected oﬃcials and 
rural village assemblies opposed its attempts at centralization on the state level.4 In 
Montenegro, which was never completely occupied, tribal organization prevailed. This 
self-governing tradition, which required wide people’s participation through “village 
assemblies,” continued well into the twentieth century. 
After 1945–1946, with the emergence of the centralized Yugoslav federation, 
the very nature of the state in the region changed. Strict centralization was exercised 
immediately after World War II, stripping the municipality of many of its local self-
government functions. Then, citizens encountered the ﬁrst layer of state power when 
submitting applications or requesting the recognition of their rights. By the 1950s, 
with the introduction of social self-management (društveno samoupravljanje), the situ-
ation was reversed yet again. Then, the tides shifted. The municipality regained many 
self-government functions, and its powers and authorities constantly increased until the 
dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That said, the very nature 
of self-government was in many ways undermined by the political supremacy of the 
Union of Communists, the only political party allowed, which was centralized up to 
the republican/provincial level.5 
With the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the newly independent countries followed 
diﬀerent paths, yet there were certain similarities.6 Namely, they pursued a process of 
intense centralization in the early 1990s, and many powers were consolidated by the 
I N T R O D U C T I O N
5
state. The municipality remained the main form of local government, but with very little 
formal authority (in contrast to other formerly socialist countries, which introduced 
decentralization programs as a component of overall transition). In fact, this process 
was viewed by all the former Yugoslav republics as part of a vital, post-independence 
nation-state building process. Consequently, national euphoria “supported the execu-
tion of centralization.”7 
More recently, new laws on local self-government have been adopted in countries 
across the region, often involving heated debates. Concerns about granting regions “too 
much” autonomy and calls for separation (along ethnic lines), insuﬃcient local revenues 
and tax bases, political maneuverings, and other factors have made the full roll-out of 
decentralization uneven across the countries in the region. Meanwhile, processes of 
democratization have opened—or reopened—channels for citizens’ involvement in lo-
cal decision-making.  It is thus the case that—to various degrees in diﬀerent national, 
sub-national, and cross-national contexts—local cities and communities are in many 
cases experiencing a “resurgence” of public participation by various actors, just as they 
are hindered by limited resources and authorities. In the following chapters, special at-
tention is given to areas and municipalities with ethnically diverse populations. There, 
particularly in the aftermath of ethno-national conﬂict, attracting diﬀerent groups and 
actors to cooperate in the consolidation of democracy at local levels has been a great 
challenge. 
NEW DIRECTIONS: CIVIL SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENTS ENGAGED
Since the mid-1990s, a number of activists and organizations in civil society have emerged 
as exceptional leaders in eﬀorts to overcome the intolerance and distrust that have been 
dominated social and political life in South Eastern Europe. It could even be said that 
continuous war and violent conﬂict, economic turbulence, and changes in the ways 
in which citizens are able to engage their governments contributed to development of 
a more robust civil society in countries in ther region. In the midst of conﬂict, many 
in civil society established strong personal relations with one another, even when their 
communities and countries were at war and their political leaders perpetuated animosi-
ties and quashed dissent. They never insisted that the question “What have they done 
to us?” be the most important, and they often criticized their own regimes. 
The Center for Regionalism, based in Novi Sad, Serbia, was one of the ﬁrst civil 
society initiatives that focused on problems of stabilization and democratization in the 
context of an altered social, political, and economic landscape. Initiatives launched 
by the Center soon led to the emergence of three regional networks. Members of the 
networks include prominent political ﬁgures, local leaders, civil society representatives, 
and experts in various ﬁelds. This unique basis has been the source of creativity, mobil-
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ity, and provided great opportunities to act in diﬀerent areas, ranging from territories 
aﬀected by the war to the ones where peace has never been violated.
One of these networks is the Igman Initiative, the strongest and most inﬂuential joint 
project of civil societies in South Eastern Europe. Since its inception, it has focused on 
overcoming the recent conﬂicts, normalizing relations, opening borders, and developing 
of cross-border inter-municipal cooperation. As a measure of the achievements of this 
network, it is worth emphasizing how rarely—in the Balkans and elsewhere—an initiative 
of civil society successfully impacts policy-making at the central level of government. 
The Igman Initiative managed to bring together leaders of newly independent states 
in South Eastern Europe, and even helped them reach agreements in various areas of 
regional cooperation and development. 
The success of the Igman Initiative, as a platform for reconciliation and good 
governance, made way for the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern 
Europe–Philia, a network made up of representatives of over sixty cities and NGOs. 
How this association and others struggled in the aftermath of war to overcome conﬂict 
and re-build relations across the dramatically-changed social, political, and economic 
landscape of the former Yugoslav Republics and South Eastern Europe forms the basis 
of this book. 
OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS
This book maps out major initiatives in South Eastern Europe that were launched in 
response to region’s turbulence. It is a logical step following cooperation with partners 
in comparable contexts in Central Asia, who have struggled with similar issues related 
to administrative reform, new national borders, resource management, and the accomo-
dation of heterogenous populations. Through several cases, the book oﬀers contextual 
background as well as detailed information on speciﬁc activities undertaken to deal with 
such issues. The authors draw from their own experiences, elucidating conﬂict situations 
and the tools they have used to mitigate these situations. 
The book is divided into three major sections. First, it presents aspects of the origins, 
institutionalization, and development of the Center for Regionalism. Two chapters 
provide two details on major initiatives of the Center that have become regional move-
ments: the Igman Initiative and the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern 
Europe–Philia. 
The second section deals with the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, which re-
sulted in an initiative to establish triangles and circles of cooperation among multiethnic 
cities. The actors involved in the program are the cities oriented towards the harmoni-
zation of interethnic relations. And they all have common interests that may help to 
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achieve regional beneﬁts with their counterparts, the municipalities and cities across the 
newly-created borders. This part presents four city triangles of cooperation: 
 • Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) – Osijek (Croatia) –  Novi Sad (Serbia)
 • Srebrenica (Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina) – Bajina Bašta (Serbia)
 • Baja (Hungary) – Sombor (Serbia) – Osijek (Croatia)
 • Herceg Novi (Montenegro) – Trebinje (Bosnia and Herzegovnia, Republika 
Srpska) – Dubrovnik (Croatia)
The third section is dedicated to Local Policies in Multiethnic Community man-
agement, an initiative launched by the Center for Regionalism and supported by the 
Fund for an Open Society–Serbia (FOSS). The outcomes and results of this initiative 
are relevant to other parts of South Eastern Europe, such as Kosovo and Montenegro, 
as well as Central Asia, indeed to any region that may experience an extended period of 
violent civil wars and economic turmoil. Finally, the book oﬀers supplementary materials 
that provide background information on the initaitives discussed.
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Republic of Serbia
The Republic of Serbia became an independent country in 2006, after its peaceful 
separation with Montenegro. From 1992–2003, it was part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). In 2002, Serbia and Montenegro came to a new agreement regard-
ing continued cooperation and entered into negotiations regarding the future status 
of the FRY. By 2003, the Yugoslav federation was replaced in favor of the looser State 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro. As of 2009, Serbia had two autonomous provinces: 
Vojvodina in the country’s north, and Kosovo and Metohija in the southwest. Kosovo 
declared independence on February 17, 2008, despite opposition from Belgrade. Serbia 
has a multiparty system of government, with a prime minister as the head of state. 
According to the 2002 Census, 82 percent of the population of Serbia (excluding the 
Albanian majority in Kosovo) declared their nationality as Serbian. Most are adherents 
of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Belgrade is the largest city and the country’s capital.
Republic of Croatia 
The Republic of Croatia declared independence 1991 and was internationally recognized 
as a sovereign state on January 15, 1992 by the European Union and the United Nations. 
During that time, Croatia controlled less than two-thirds of its legal territory. The vast 
majority of the population is ethnic Croat and follows Catholicism. Other large groups 
include ethnic Serbs, though their numbers have declined dramatically since Croatia’s 
independence, particularly in the former Serb-dominated territory of Srpska Krajina. 
Between 1990 and 2000, Croatia had a semi-presidential system, and since 2000, a 
parliamentary system. It is a high-income country with a robust tourist industry, and a 
strong industrial sector dominated by shipbuilding, food processing, and the chemical 
industry. Croatia’s capital city is Zagreb.
5 In the Yugoslav concept of federalism, there was very little, if any, formal diﬀerence between 
republics and provinces; even from 1974, provinces were constituent parts of the federation.
6 See Emilia Kandeva, Stabilization of Local Governments: Local Governments in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2001.
7 Zeljko Sevic, Local Government in Yugoslavia, in Emilia Kandeva, ed. Stabilization of Local Gov-
ernments: Local Governments in Central and Eastern Europe, Budapest: OSI/LGI, 2001, 422.
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Montenegro
Montenegro (Crna Gora) became an independent country in 2006, on the basis of a 
referendum held on 21 May 2006. From 2003–2006, it was part of a union with Serbia, 
within the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, the successor state of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The majority of citizens identify themselves as ethnic Mon-
tenegrins. However, estimates on the ethnic composition of the country vary, reﬂecting 
changes in the ways in which census data has been collected and how people experience 
their ethnicity. Podgorica is the capital city of Montenegro.
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) gained independence 1992, as war in the region escalated. 
It is home to three ethnic “constituent peoples”: Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims), the most 
numerous population group of three, Serbs, and Croats. (Regardless of ethnicity, a 
citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina is often identiﬁed in English as a Bosnian.) BiH is 
politically decentralized and comprises two governing entities, the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, with District Brcˇko as a de facto third entity. 
It is further divided into 10 cantons (županija): 4 Bosniak, 4 Croat, and 2 of mixed 
ethnicity. Devastated by war, the country has been grappling to develop as a uniﬁed 
state. Sarajevo is its capital city.
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Introduction
Aleksandar Popov
The ﬁrst section of this book tells the story of a set of actors that have worked for the 
normalization of troubled relations, stability, and the entrenchment of democracy in 
South Eastern Europe. This story begins with the Center for Regionalism (Centar za 
Regionalizm) which, since its establishment in October 1998, has played an important 
role in creating a favorable environment for cooperation within and across communities, 
cities, and regions of the former Yugoslavia. The Center has been involved in several 
initiatives that have had wide-reaching eﬀects, from local to inter-regional levels. 
To understand the expansion of the Center and its engagements, it is important to 
identify a number of important elements that surrounded its establishment: 
 • The Center was founded in the province of Vojvodina—a territory with a 
long history of autonomy and identiﬁcation as a speciﬁc multicultural region. 
These legacies made it logical for the Center to be oriented towards the issues 
of regionalism and interregional cooperation—not only in name, but also in 
mission.
 • In their previous professional and political engagements, the individuals who 
initiated the establishment of the Center had worked on issues of decentraliza-
tion, human and minority rights, cross-border cooperation as well as anti-war 
activities. They were committed to these issues, even after war severed many of 
their connections and caused social, political, and economic turbulence in the 
region.
 • In the period during which the Center for Regionalism was founded, the regime 
of Slobodan Miloševic´ was at its peak. Nationalism in Serbia was the dominant 
ideology, and power and resources were shored up in the capital city of Belgrade. 
Serbia was isolated from the rest of the world. It no longer had normal relations 
established with its neighbors, particularly those that emerged after the dissolu-
tion of the former Yugoslavia. 
One year after its founding, the Center for Regionalism played a pivotal role in the 
launching of the Igman Initiative. With the aim to re-build and normalize post-war 
relations, the Igman Initiative brought together the signatory countries of the Dayton 
Agreement—Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Re-
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public of Yugoslavia (subsequently named the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 
and by 2006, the independent states of Serbia and Montenegro). Years later, the Center 
continues to coordinate this project. Owing to the moral and intellectual credibility 
of the people it gathers, the Igman Initiative has implemented a range of projects. 
Their implementation and related advocacy and lobbying eﬀorts have made signiﬁcant 
contributions to accomplishing its original mission. Through its activities, the Igman 
Initiative’s reputation increased to such an extent that, as of mid-2009, it managed to 
gather the leaders of several states in the region of SEE on four occasions. Representa-
tives of international institutions have gone on to recognize the success of the Initiative 
on many occasions.
Another project of the Center concerns the establishment of triangles of cooperation 
that connect cities in newly independent and neighboring states. These city triangles are 
based on the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance and implemented under the auspices 
of the Igman Initiative. The expansion of triangles and circles in the region ultimately 
gave birth to the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia, 
the Secretariat of which is based in the Center for Regionalism. During its four-year 
existence, Philia has managed to bring almost all national capital cities, regional centers, 
and other multiethnic cities, along with partner non-governmental organizations from 
eight countries of the region, to implement projects across new borders.  This “city di-
plomacy” contributes to the reestablishment of broken relations, particularly between 
cities situated in what had very recently been a war zone. In this manner, contributes 
to the improvement of overall relations in the region.  
All projects implemented by the Center for Regionalism, as well as regional projects 
launched with other partner organizations, are intertwined with the same idea. Their 
common denominator is to enhance the democratization process, and in doing so protect 
human and minority rights and reestablish communication and other linkages in South 
Eastern Europe. Eﬀorts in pursuit of these goals can and do transform the region from 
a zone of instability to one of stability, peace, and cooperation. The chapters in this 
section are meant to provide detailed information on a set of actors—the Center for 
Reginalism, the Igman Initiatiave, and the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South 
Eastern Europe–Philia—and their work toward these goals. 
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The Center for Regionalism 
Aleksandar Popov
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Center for Regionalism was established by a group of intellectuals from Novi Sad, in 
the northern province of Vojvodina, Serbia in October 1998, with the aim to promote 
and spread the idea of regionalism in accordance with modern European trends and 
experiences. The circumstances under which the Center for Regionalism was established 
at the end of the 1990s determined the basic trends of its activities. On the one hand, 
there existed a need, despite the strict centralization and undemocratic nature of the 
Milošević’s regime, to create new perspectives for decentralization and democratization in 
Serbia. As it later turned out, this task was not short-term. Almost ten years after its 
ﬁrst project and its hard-fought eﬀorts for constitutional reform, by 2008, the Center 
began to promote decentralization in Serbia more actively and publicly than ever before, 
initiating public debates and oﬀering concrete expert recommendations. The Center 
also initiated a nearly impossible mission to re-establish understanding and trust in the 
region. Though the scars of war were still tangible, the Center played a lead role in a 
strong movement of non-governmental organizations and other actors, including the 
Igman Initiative, Philia, Civic Vojvodina, and Civil Dialogue (between NGOs in Serbia 
proper and in Kosovo). These initiatives helped rebuild relations that had been severed 
during the wars of the 1990s and overcome psychological and other barriers. 
INTRODUCTION
The Center for Regionalism was established by a group of intellectuals from Novi Sad, in 
the northern province of Vojvodina, Serbia in October 1998, with the aim to promote 
and spread the idea of “regionalism” in accordance with modern European trends and 
experiences.1 This non-governmental organization was established when Serbia—as with 
South Eastern Europe as a whole—were facing the consequences of Slobodan Milošević 
and his destructive rule.
At that time, the 1990 Constitution of Serbia continued to set the terms of adminis-
trative reform. The Consitution dictated a policy of strict decentralization, concetrating 
power in Belgrade. The autonomy of two historically autonomous provinces—Vojvodina 
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and Kosovo and Metohija—was suspended, resulting in long-term consequences for 
both, as well as for the entirety of Serbia. 
In Kosovo and Metohija, the suspension of autonomy strengthened the separatist 
desires of the ethnic Albanian population, the majority group in the region. As political 
and interethnic tensions grew into armed conﬂict in the region, communities and cities 
were divded along ethnic lines and thousands of people were displaced. The situation 
reached its climax in 1998 and 1999, during extensive military and police actions. In 
the spring of 1999, seeking to bring the conﬂict to a halt, NATO carried out a massive 
bombardment of Serbia, destroying infrastructure in Belgrade, Novi Sad, and other areas. 
These events preceded the establishment of Kosovo as an international protectorate, and 
later, its declaration of independent statehood. 
The suspension of autonomy was also signiﬁcant for Vojvodina, though for dif-
ferent reasons. With a unique set of historical condjtions and an extremely diverse, 
multiethnic population, Vojvodina was known as a region of innovation and prosperity. 
Administrative reforms introduced by the Constitution of 1990, however, meant that 
the region no longer had the power to administer its resources. It became less prosper-
ous and no longer represented the “driving force of development,” as it was once called. 
Vojvodina was deprived of the perspective to grow rapidly, as had once been the case, 
prior to Milošević’s coming into power, and its development was abruptly tied to the 
other parts of Serbia. 
Such strict centralism caused a lot of anger not only in Vojvodina, but in other 
parts of Serbia as well. Šumadija or a region of Niš also demanded a higer degree of 
decentralization. The overall non-democratic environment, reﬂected in suppression of 
the opposition’s actions and ideas, lead to the decline of all social values and destruction 
of democratic institutions. Nationalism, which was becoming a dominant ideology 
at the time, caused a feeling of insecurity among all minority communities, as well as 
among all democracy-oriented citizens of Serbia. Vojvodina, with its vibrant and diverse 
population, was no exception.
In 1998, Serbia was an isolated country—a consequence of sanctions imposed by 
the international community because of the role of the Milošević regime in provok-
ing and expanding violent conﬂicts across the territory of former Yugoslavia. Three 
years had passed since the signing of the Dayton Agreement, yet relations between the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (of Serbia and Montenegro), Croatia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) were still not normalized. Conﬂict in Kosovo continued, and life 
across Serbia remained uncertain and unstable. Relations and economic contacts with 
neighbors, as well as with European countries and the US, were at a very low level. This 
was the background gainst which the Center for Regionalism was established.
17
T H E  C E N T E R  F O R  R E G I O N A L I S M
LAUNCHING THE CENTER
The inaugural assembly of the Center for Regionalism was held on October 12, 1998 in 
Novi Sad. During this assembly, the mission of the Center was formulated, its structure 
created, its Statute adopted, and members of its govering bodies were elected. After 
submitting all necessary documents to the competent ministry, the Center was oﬃcially 
registered on October 29, 1998. 
In large part, the initial momentum driving the establishment of the Center came 
from the individuals it attracted: a group of well-known public ﬁgures, activists, and 
respected intellectuals from Novi Sad and Belgrade. This collection of personalities gave 
the organization and a degree of credibility that was signiﬁcant in numerous respects, 
not least in its search for funding or when attracting experts for particular projects. That 
said, until March 7, 2000, the Center did not have its own premises and even lacked 
technical and other oﬃce equipment. During its the ﬁrst few years of its operation, it 
used the facilities of the Aeronautical Union of Vojvodina and Humanitarian Center 
for Integration and Tolerance. 
International organizations and other actors from abroad played an important role 
in sustaining the early eﬀorts of the Center. With its mission to promote democratiza-
tion processes, the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia found synergies with the Center, 
and provided initial support that was crucial for its growth. As the number of active 
non-governmental organizations in Serbia was very low at that time, the Fund played 
the role of an incubator, providing ﬁnancial and technical support for the establishment 
and initial operations of many civic groups in the country. The Fund also ﬁnanced one 
of the ﬁrst projects of the Center for Regionalism, which was aimed at facilitating the 
organized return of refugees from Vojvodina to Tuzla, a city in northeastern Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The Fund continued to provide assistance in a range of respects, allowing 
for the Center to expand and develop.
The internal political environment, including the general postwar situation in the 
region, shaped the orientation of the Center for Regionalism and its engagements. 
Therefore, in the ﬁrst few years of operation, it performed two basic activities:
 (i)  At the domestic level, the Center started developing projects on decentraliza-
tion and democratization, with particular emphasis on the reform of local 
self-government, the improvement of interethnic relations, and the protection 
of national minority rights in Serbia. 
 (ii) At the international level, the Center focused on the promotion of regionalism as 
a dominant European trend at that time, as well as interregional networking. 
The postwar environment across the countries of the former Yugoslavia was marked 
by severed relations and deep psychological barriers. Undeterred by these challenges, 
the Center for Regionalism focused on reestablishing and normalization connections 
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among the signatories of the Dayton Agreement, as well as across the entire region of 
South Eastern Europe. It set out to establish several regional networks, including alli-
ances of cities that worked across new national borders. The ﬁrst example of this kind 
involved the city triangle of Tuzla in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Osijek in Croatia, and 
Novi Sad in Serbia.
Mission and Objectives
The work of the Center is based upon the notion of “regionalism.” That is, many ter-
ritories within and across states—such as in South Eastern Europe—are united by 
historical, geographic, economic, cultural, and other ties. For instance, the province of 
Vojvodina takes pride in its unique and complex mix of historical factors that continue 
to shape contemporary conditions and innovations in social, cultural, economic, and 
political spheres. While Vojvodina is located within Serbia, there are numerous examples 
of regions in South Eastern Europe and elsewhere that exist across national borders. The 
triangles of cities presented later in this book are examples such cases.
There are two main aspects of the Center’s focus on regionalism. First, the Center 
explores the ways in which, during processes of democratization, decentralization, and 
the devolution of state power, regions can become stronger units, with speciﬁc functions 
and capacities. Second, the Center promotes the European-wide trend toward empow-
ered regions, or Euroregions, that exist across national borders. Along these lines, the 
Center works to support the political, social, and economic growth of regions in South 
Eastern Europe, necessary legislative changes that might accompany this process, and 
cooperation among regions. In pursuit of the notion of regionalism, the Statue of the 
Center speciﬁes six main areas of operation:
 • Learning about the practice of interregional networking as practiced elsewhere in 
Europe, and ways to include regions in South Eastern Europe in these trends; 
 • Engaging experts and study groups to examine speciﬁc topics in the ﬁeld of 
regionalism; 
 • Organizing expert and public discussions in the form of open fora, conferences, 
symposia, seminars, and others events on topics in the ﬁeld of regionalism; 
 • Implementing cross-border cooperation within particular regions, based on 
joint projects of NGOs, and local self-governments; 
 • Establishing links with other NGOs in Serbia and abroad along the lines speci-
ﬁed above; and
 • Disemminating information through various media and public relations cam-
paigns on topics related to regionalism.
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Organization and Structure 
The Statute of the Center for Regionalism lays out the organization’s structure and gov-
ernance. It stipulates in detail the main bodies overseeing the Center’s activities—the 
Assembly, Steering Committee, and Supervisory Committee—as well as the roles of 
the Center’s director and other members of the staﬀ. 
 • Pursuant to the Statute, the Assembly is the supreme body of the Center and 
is composed of all its members, except the honorary members. The Assembly 
is entitled to convene once per year, though an extraordinary session may be 
scheduled (on the basis of a justiﬁed proposal by the Steering Committee and 
on a written initiative supported by at least one-third of all its members). 
 • The Steering Committee is the executive body of the Center responsible for 
implementation of the goals of the Center that have been established in the 
Statute and the Assembly decisions. The Steering Committee has ﬁve members 
who are elected and relieved of duty by the Assembly. The Steering Committee 
elects a President and Secretary from among its members and also appoints 
the Director of the Center. The mandate of the Steering Committee members 
lasts four years and members may be re-elected for the same position. Among 
the members of the Steering Committee are individuals from various profes-
sions, who share the principles of Center. They include the vice-president of 
the Chamber of Economy of Vojvodina, the Director of Ljubljanska Banka in 
Novi Sad, and the Editor-in-Chief of Ruske Slovo, a newspaper published in 
Ruthernian, a minority language in the region.
 • The Supervisory Committee controls the regularity of material and ﬁnancial 
operations and submit a report on ﬁnancial operations to the Assembly once 
per year.
The Director of the Center, appointed by the Steering Committee for the period of 
four years (with the right to be re-elected) represents and acts for the Center. He or she 
has the rights and duties of the ﬁnancial ordering party and is authorized to sign all 
ﬁnancial and monetary documents on behalf of the Center. The ﬁrst director, a politi-
cal scientist by training, worked for many years as a journalist and as the director of 
the Dnevnik newspaper publishing house. He was an aide to the provincial Minister 
of Information for four years, but resigned from this oﬃce after Milošević’s coalition 
took power in the province. He was one of the founders and leaders of the Reformist 
Democratic Party of Vojvodina, which opposed the breaking up of Yugoslavia and the 
war. His entire professional and political experience helped him in founding and steer-
ing the Center for Regionalism those ﬁrst four years. 
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The Director also manages the work of the Secretariat, which conducts the operative 
activities of the Center. The Secretariat consists of six internal and two external associ-
ates, four of which are full-time employees. The Secretariat is shared with the that of 
the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia. 
In terms of staﬀ, in addition to permanently employed personnel, the Center has 
two regular external associates, namely: (i) the Coordinator of the Igman Initiative and 
(ii) the Program Director of Philia. For the implementation of concrete projects, the 
Center for Regionalism also engages a range of experts and other external associates on 
a part-time basis.
Financing the Center for Regionalism
As previously mentioned, the Center for Regionalism ﬁrst obtained ﬁnancial support for 
the establishment and operation of its oﬃce and early activities from the Fund for an 
Open Society in Serbia. Since then, a great amount of eﬀort has been put into securing 
the ﬁnancial resources needed to maintain a degre of continuity in the Center’s work 
and staﬀ while expanding its activities. 
 From 2002, the James Stewart Mott Foundation and the Rockefeller Broth-
ers Foundation have provided much-needed institutional support. This provides the 
Center with a solid base from which to maintain its regularly operations. Over the 
years, the Center has also established good relationships with other organizations and 
donors that are active in the region, and has attracted funding from multiple sources. 
The Center’s dedication to its mission, its proven ability to prove concrete results, and 
personal relations have been important in these eﬀorts. Various projects of the Center 
have been supported: 
 • The Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marchsll Fund (US) has funded 
activities of the Center within the Igman Initiative and Civic Dialogue.
 • The Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) of the Open 
Society Institute, Budapest has supported projects within the Association of 
Multiethnic Cities of the South Eastern Europe (Philia). In particular, it as-
sists the Center develop and transfer its knowledge to areas outside of Europe, 
including Kosovo and Central Asia.
 • Freedom House has provided assistance for the launching of the Igman Initia-
tive and projects realized within it. 
 • Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in 
Kosovo has ﬁnancially and organizationally supported the launching of the 
Civil Dialogue and projects realized within it. 
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 • The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has ﬁnanced 
a great number of projects within the Igman Initiative, as well as other projects 
aimed at democratization of Serbia.
The Center regularly updates information on its partners and donors on its websites 
and other publications. 
ACTIVITIES AND PROGRAMS
The Center has been involved in many initatives over the years, over both the long- and 
short-term. Because of their scope, unique interesting, and important impacts, some 
of these, like the Igman Initiative and the Association of Multiethnic Cities—Philia, 
deserve attention and are discussed separately in this book (as well as brieﬂy here). A 
selection of major initiatives, including background information, main activities, and 
outcomes, are presented in this section to show the breadth of initiatives as well as focus 
of the Center over the years.
Promoting Decentralization
One of the ﬁrst projects of the Center that contributed to its promotion in the public 
eye in Serbia addressed the constitutional and legal framework of decentralization and 
the autonomy of Vojvodina. Initiated in mid-1999, the Center successfully gathered a 
group of prominent experts from Novi Sad and Belgrade, who drew up a concept for 
the new Constitution, in which Serbia, as a decentralized and democratized state, was 
perceived as a country that is part of the region. This was a precedent: a nongovermental 
organization took the lead in spelling out a key concept for the new Constitution of 
Serbia. 
Other signiﬁcant concepts from expert groups at non-governmental organizations 
were developed in the early 2000s, with the beginning of the democratic changes in 
Serbia. By the second half of 1999 and the ﬁrst half of 2000, opposition to Milošević in 
Serbia continued to grow, culminating in a joint campaign to defeat Milošević’s regime. 
Democratization in Serbia appeared to be in motion. These processes intensiﬁed after 
the tragic events in Kosovo and the bombardment of Serbia by NATO. 
At that time, it was essential to draw the attention of the public to a particular is-
sue essential to the democratization of Serbia, that of decentralization. In this respect, 
at the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000, the Center organized a range of open fora 
in almost all large towns in Serbia, taking the opportunity to present the concept of 
a new constitution of a democratized and decentralized Serbia. These open fora and 
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other public presentations aimed to explain to citizens the essence and advantages of 
decentralization. It is worth emphasizing that many ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
minority groups are concentrated in particular territories of the country. Encouraged 
by political rhetoric in that period, therefore, the majority of the public was inclined to 
treat any demand for decentralization as separatism, and it was widely considered that 
that a strong state is only a state with strong centralized power. These fora opened the 
door to new thinking about how Serbia could democratize. 
A range of other projects later developed out of this project, pertaining to decen-
tralization, the development of local self-government, and the exercise of human and 
minority rights.
The Center for Regionalism, together with the Democratic Alternative Forum 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Sarajevo, organized a conference on perspectives of 
bilateral relations between FRY (that later became two states, Serbia and Montenegro) 
and BiH in February 2000 in the city of Banja Luka, BiH. This conference opened a 
new ﬁeld of activities of the Center for Regionalism. Attention was focused on cross-
border cooperation in the region, namely by facilitating normalization of bilateral 
relations after the wars waged in the 1990s. The conference also marked the launch of 
the Igman Initiative.
Igman Initiative
The Igman Initiative is a movement of non-governmental organizations from the Day-
ton Agreement signatory countries. It is focused on the normalizing and rebuilding of 
relations based on mutual understanding and trust in the region after the wars of the 
1990s. The movement’s activities include around 140 non-governmental organizations 
from the countries of the so-called Dayton Triangle: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was founded by the Center for Regionalism 
from Novi Sad, the Democratic Alternative Forum from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and 
the Citizens’ Committee on Human Rights from Zagreb. When it ceased to operate, the 
Democratic Alternative Forum was subsequently replaced by the Citizens Forum from 
Tuzla. After Montenegro declared independence from the State Union of Serbia and 
Montenegro (the successor of FRY) in 2006, the Center for Democracy from Podgorica 
became the fourth partner. 
The Igman Initiative acts through expert groups that oﬀer concrete proposals and 
recommendations to decision-makers, as well as to the public at large, on a range of 
topics related to the normalization of post-Yugoslavia and post-war relations in the 
region. The positions of experts are presented at the Igman Initiative’s sessions that are 
held twice or more a year. These sessions are also an opportunity to analyze the state 
of aﬀairs in each country of the Dayton Agreement and submit proposals that may 
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accelerate the normalization process—that is, on the identiﬁcation and elimination of 
speciﬁc impediments to this process. Recommendations to governments of the signa-
tories of the Dayton Agreement were adopted at several sessions, particularly related 
to confronting the recent past more openly, resolving the issue of common borders, 
re-establishing freedom of movement, abolishing the visa regime, and resolving the 
problem of refugees and their return.
The Igman Initiative is a special network of non-governmental organizations, gath-
ering under its auspices the heads of states—until the present, the heads of state of the 
Dayton Agreement signatory countries have met four times and on two occasions signed 
a joint statement prepared by Igman Initiative experts. The Igman Initiative also has 
organized various types of activities through its members, contributing to dealing with 
the past and overcoming the psychological and other barriers that hinder a more rapid 
normalization of relations between these countries, as well as in the entire region.
Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia
The Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia has its roots in 
the Igman Initiative. In 2002, a panel of experts carried our research on the conditions 
of interethnic relations in the cities of Tuzla, Osijek, and Novi Sad. This research formed 
the basis of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance. Signed initially by the oﬃcials of the 
three city administrations, as well as by NGO representatives, this document was dedi-
cated to the improvement of interethnic relations in these cities and in the region they 
share. Speciﬁcally, it provided the basis for the establishment of the ﬁrst city triangle.2
Having expanded and experienced some notable successes since this inception, the 
Center and its allies soon engaged in a regional campaign, with the aim to establish a 
dozen new triangles or circles of cooperation in South Eastern Europe on the basis of 
the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance. This initiative grew rapidly from its incep-
tion, bringing together capital cities, regional centers, major towns, and civil society 
organization from the region of South Eastern Europe, namely: Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia (FYROM), Montenegro, Romania 
and Serbia. The Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe was founded 
on the basis of this agreement. Members may have the status of standing (founders) 
members or associated members. The Association’s activities are coordinated and ad-
ministered by the General Secretariat located in Novi Sad.
Like the Igman Initiative, Philia is speciﬁc in that it is a self-developed network based 
on the bottom-up approach, meaning that the initiative was launched by local non-
governmental organizations, experts, and professionals, as well as elected representatives 
of local and regional authorities. Its model for city triangles includes partners from city 
administrations and one or several local non-governmental organizations. 
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Mutual cooperation and exchange of experience within the Association is part of 
city diplomacy, which contributes to the improvement of the overall atmosphere and 
re-establishment of understanding and trust in the region of the South Eastern Europe. 
The essential aim of the Association is the enhancement and coordination of cooperation 
between its members and implementation of concrete, collaborative projects in various 
ﬁelds, such as education, economic development, culture, resource management, and 
infrastructure. 
Civil Dialogue 
Civil Dialogue was established on the basis of the Igman Initiative’s experiences related 
to the networking of non-governmental organizations around a single common aim—to 
reestablish understanding and trust in divided communities and create an environment 
for normal communication and dialogue. The Center for Regionalism found a partner 
in Mother Theresa, a charitable organization (NGO) from Priština, Kosovo, in its eﬀorts 
to engage three target groups: youth, women, and the mass media. 
The initiative was born from the ashes of the tragic events in 1999, when links and 
cooperation among civil society organizations from Serbia and Kosovo were almost 
completely suspended. Antiwar non-governmental organizations from Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia and Montenegro had been cooperating actively during 
this time. With the cessation of full-scale conﬂict, they had the chance to make their 
greatest contribution to the rehabilitation and elimination of psychological and other 
barriers put in place by the wars of the 1990s. 
The ﬁrst meeting of partners of Civil Dialogue was held in March 2002 at the 
head oﬃce of the OSCE Mission in Priština. At the meeting, participants established 
that there was a need and willingness on both sides to join forces. The initial actions 
and projects were fully supported by the OSCE Mission to Kosovo and the Freedom 
House Foundation. 
Civil Dialogue is oriented toward: 
 • facilitating open dialogues between diﬀerent ethnic groups in Kosovo, as well 
as between Kosovo and Serbia; 
 • joining people across ethnic divisions in good will; 
 • opposing publically oﬃcial policies that violate human rights and diminish the 
possibility of establishing the rule of law; and
 • establishing a region of peace, cooperation, and tolerance, where responsibility 
is accepted and freedoms are guaranteed. 
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The Civil Dialogue Board was founded and composed of ﬁve members from each 
side, Kosovo and Serbia. The ﬁrst co-presidents of the Civil Dialogue were Mr. Živorad 
Kovačević, President of the European Movement in Serbia, and Don Lush Gjergji, 
President of the NGO Mother Theresa. 
By conducting political surveys and organizing regional and international round-
tables, workshops, conferences, public discussions, and cultural events, Civil Dialogue 
created, executed, and promoted civil society projects that have been of interest to all 
ethnic groups in Kosovo and Serbia. These include, among others, projects concerned 
with reconciling the past, youth issues, gender issues, freedom of the media, freedom 
of movement, and free trade. 
In drawing up the concept for their strategy, the founders of Civil Dialogue agreed 
that the future status of Kosovo would not be the topic of the discussions, nor would the 
participants in this network of non-governmental organizations take sides in this respect. 
This issue, inevitably, would be decided on by politicians, together with the international 
community as a mediator. The aim of Civil Dialogue, irrespective of Kosovo’s future, 
was to turn this area into a zone of peace, tolerance, and security. 
A number of events and activities have been organized in the frame of this initiative, 
with the essential aim to establish connections and joint actions among Albanian and 
non-Albanian non-governmental organizations from Kosovo, as well as their connec-
tions and actions with organizations from Serbia. These include: 
 • Seminars for members of the Youth Congress, a network of youth from multi-
ethnic local communities, established by the OSCE Mission to Kosovo;
 • An inter-faiths forum of young community leaders;
 • A youth forum addressing political radicalism;
 • Opportunities for Kosovar youth to attend the EXIT music festival, an inter-
national, week-long event in Novi Sad;
 • A regional conference on educational and university reform within the Bologna 
process; 
 • Support for “media dialogue” between Belgrade and Priština;
 • Training courses for project proposal writing;
 • A regional (and multiethnic) conference of women’s organizations;
 • An exhibition of contemporary Serbian art at the National Gallery of Kosovo 
in Priština;
 • Local policy development to accomodate multiethnic communities in Kosovo; 
and
 • A youth campaign around the idea of peaceful coexistence.
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Other Projects
In addition to the projects implemented within its three regional networks—namely, the 
Igman Initiative, Philia, and Civil Dialogue—the Center has been involved in numer-
ous activities that ﬁt within its six main areas of operation (learning about the practice 
of interregional networking as practiced elsewhere in Europe; engaging study groups; 
organizing expert discussions; implementing cross-border cooperation; establishing 
links among NGOs; and disemminating information). Additionally, the Center has 
organized or been a part of a number of initiatives, including social activism and public 
relations campaigns, to build support for its eﬀorts and work against some troubling 
local and regional trends. 
A number of the most signiﬁcant projects are presented brieﬂy.
Campaign for Local Self-government Reform
In May and June 2002, USAID, in cooperation with the Serbian Ministry of Justice and 
Local Self-government, organized a campaign on the reform of local self-government in 
Vojvodina, with the Center for Regionalism as the executive organizer of the campaign. 
Fourteen municipalities in Vojvodina were covered by this campaign. The campaign 
included the organization of expert seminars for councilors and representatives of local 
authorities, in order to learn about the basic goals of reforms of local self-government, 
novelties in the new Law on Local Self-government, as well as the obligations of local 
authorities thereof. Lecturers in the seminar included leading experts in this ﬁeld. Their 
involvement was arranged by the Center for Regionalism. 
Decentralization in the Context of the New Constitution and the EU 
Integration
This project, realized in 2007–2008, was aimed at elucidating and rectifying shortcom-
ings of the new Constitution of Serbia from 2006, specﬁcally related to the territorial 
organization of state power. The project also entailed a public campaign, organized 
in 22 large towns in Serbia, which attracted attention to and support for the need for 
legislative changes. On an expert basis, the Center took part in both amending existing 
laws and adopting new ones: 
 • In 2007, the Center drew up a set of amendments to the Law on Local Self-
government, which concerned institutions for protection of minority rights in 
local self-government. Some of these amendments were included in the new 
Law on Local Self-Government, which was passed in December 2007. 
 • When passing the Statute of Vojvodina, the Assembly of the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina accepted several amendments drawn up by experts of 
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the Center, which improved the deﬁning of Vojvodina as a modern, European 
region.
 • The Center also played a central role in passing the Law on Regional Develop-
ment. Moreover, the Center provided recommendations and ammendents that 
were ultimately adopted by the competent ministry.
Civic Vojvodina 
The Center for Regionalism is one of the founders of Civic Vojvodina, a Vojvodinian 
NGO network that includes seven NGOs from this province: the Independent Jour-
nalists Association of Vojvodina; the Helsinki Committee in Serbia oﬃce in Novi Sad; 
the Youth Initiative oﬃce in Novi Sad; NGO Panonija; Open Lycee from Sombor; the 
Center for Development of Civil Society from Zrenjanin; and the Center for Region-
alism. Civic Vojvodina was established with a joint action of NGOs, which aimed at 
boycotting a referendum on the new Constitution of Serbia of 2006. 
As part of this alliance, the Center for Regionalism has initiated and participated 
in several campaigns at the regional level, across South Eastern Europe. With partner 
NGOs in Vojvodina, the Center participated in a campaign entitled “Serbia in the EU: 
What is in it for me, What is it in for my city?” This campaign was carried out in the 
spring of 2008, before the general elections in Serbia, held on 11 May 2008. In involved 
a number of debates, involving a number of experts and prominent members of political 
and social life answering the question what Serbian integration into EU actually means. 
In addition, a series of accompanying interactive events were organized, aiming to open 
a number of topics on real and concrete beneﬁts that EU membership will bring to 
citizens and local communities in Serbia. 
Additionally, the Center was a central ﬁgure in a major campaign to build public 
support for visa cancellation was carried out in all countries of the region in cooperation 
with the Civic Stability Pact. 
Local Policies in Multiethnic Communities 
This project, in which the Center for Regionalism was involved in 2005–2008, aimed 
at the improvement of laws and local regulations relating to the protection of rights of 
minorities and interethnic relations. Through trainings provided to members of local 
authority bodies in Serbia, it aimed to foster their capacities and sensitivity to the issues 
of interethnic relations. 
Civil Dialogue in the South of Serbia
The Center sought to make use of its very positive experiences in the municipalities of 
Sombor, Senta and Zrenjanin in Vojvodina during the pilot project on Local Policies 
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in Multiethnic Communities. The municipalities of Bujanovac, Preševo, and Med-
vedja in the south of Serbia, where a smaller-scale armed conﬂict took place in 2000 
and 2001, are among the least developed municipalities in the country in economic, 
infrastructural, and other respects. Civil society is these areas is also very weak. Thus, 
buiding on its expertise, the Center sought to improve the capacities of NGOs and 
other civic groups from this area, and link them with local authorities in joint projects 
that would be signiﬁcant for the entire community. After extensive research, insights 
and technologies from this project would be transfered to municipalities in Kosovo via 
a number of targetted trainings.
The trainings, intended for representatives of local governments and NGOs, provided 
an introduction to local diversity management. They also addressed legal and local regula-
tions and activities of the institutions tasked with protecting of minority rights in local 
communities. Capacity-building trainings were delivered speciﬁcally for representativs 
of non-governmental organisations to enhance their skills as relevant policy actors. 
Media and Publicity
The success of the Igman Initiative to bring together the heads of states of the signatory 
countries of the Dayton Agreement on four occasions was the highlight of widespread 
media coverage that also touched on the activities of the Association of Multiethnic Cities 
of South Eastern Europe–Philia and the Center for Regionalism. This extensive media 
attention exposed the general public to the core ideas of the Center, as well as numer-
ous initiatives launched in pursuit of the Center’s mission—relating to civil dialogue in 
Kosovo, the improvement of interethnic relations, and decentralization and democra-
tization in Serbia. In addition, the Center strives to dessiminate information about its 
activities regularly, and support publications by aﬃliated experts and associates. 
Inter-regional Collaboration
The Center for Regionalism has also “gone global.” With support from the Local Gov-
ernment and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society Institute, the Center 
has partnered with local NGOs and international organizations operating in Central 
Asia. The Center, LGI, and partners have recognized many similarities between Central 
Asia and South Eastern Europe, including new and contentious borders that divide 
communities and create problems for the “usual” ﬂow of people and goods and the 
management of resources, ethnically, linguistically, and religiously diverse populations, 
and territoritally concentrated ethnic minorities. The Center, along with the extensive 
network of the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia (as 
will be discussed), have been involved in a number of professional exchanges between 
Central Asia and South Eastern Europe. 
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These exchanges have taken place in both regions, and have introduced local policy-
makers and leaders, civil society representatives, activists, experts, and central authorities 
their counterparts abroad. The idea is to share technologies to manage new borders and 
diverse populations, particularly at the local level. For instance, in the summer of 2009, a 
group of community mediators from southern Kyrgyzstan, where the ethnic composition 
of the population is quite diﬀerent from northern areas and the cpital city, travelled to 
Kosovo as part of the Center’s “Local Policies” project. There, they delivered a training 
on community mediation as a tool for mitigating interethnic conﬂict, and discussed 
the opportunities and limitations of this type of technology in diﬀerent contexts. The 
Center has also used inter-regional exchanges to share its experiences as an important 
instition, or player, in aﬀecting social attitudes and policies in South Eastern Europe. 
Anti-Fascist Rally 
In autumn 2007, National Alignment, a neo-Nazi organization, announced a gathering 
for October 7, 2007, to be followed by a march down the streets of Novi Sad. The oﬃcial 
response to this announcement was mild. However, Civic Vojvodina decided to call upon 
the citizens of Novi Sad to gather, at the same place and on the same day, to prevent 
the neo-Nazis from organizing their rally and march. Responding to Civic Vojvodina’s 
invitation, approximately 5,000 citizens of Novi Sad gathered on the main square and 
were addressed from the assembled stage by Aleksandar Popov, Director of the Center 
for Regionalism. This was a powerful response to troubling trends in the region.
The Burek of Solidarity 
After the self-declared independence of Kosovo, in Sombor, Vojvodina, a group of 
nationalists broke the shop windows of a bakery run by Albanians, and they started to 
distribute free burek—a type of baked or fried ﬁlled pastry popular in the region—to 
dissuade citizens from buying the burek sold there. Upon an initiative by the Center 
for Regionalism, Civic Vojvodina organized a visit to the bakery to have a “solidarity 
burek.” The mayor of Sombor and local ombudsman joined this act of solidarity. 
Anti-Fascist Encounters
The Center for Regionalism celebrates every May 9 as the Day of Victory over Fascism 
and the Day of Europe. On this date every year, the Center organizes a gathering of all 
its associates and friends from the entire region. These are quite informal encounters, 
as they take place at a cottage in Fruška Gora—the mountain range bordering Novi 
Sad—which belongs to the president of the Center. This kind of get-together has become 
a kind of tradition, contributing to fostering and strengthening the friendly relations 
that are the key ingredient for the eﬀectiveness of joint activities within the regional 
network of the Center. 
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SUMMARY: THE VALUE OF REGIONAL NETWORKS
The circumstances under which the Center for Regionalism was established at the end of 
the 1990s determined the basic trends of its activities. On the one hand, there existed a 
need, despite the strict centralization and undemocratic nature of the Milošević’s regime, 
to create new perspectives for decentralization and democratization in Serbia. As it turned 
out later, this task was not short-term. In September 2000, opposition parties, claiming 
that Milošević committed fraud in routine federal elections, took to the streets. Protests 
and rallies throughout Serbia eventually forced Milošević to concede and hand over 
power to the recently formed Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska opozicija 
Srbije, or DOS). Yet, even after these democratic changes, the main political factors 
continued to support a centralized system of government. This was veriﬁed in the new 
2006 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, which pursue decentralization. Therefore, 
almost ten years after its ﬁrst project and its hard-fought eﬀorts for constitutional reform, 
by 2008, the Center started to promote decentralization in Serbia more actively and 
publicly than ever before, supporting public debate on the issue and oﬀering concrete 
expert recommendations. 
At the level of foreign policy, the Center initiated a nearly impossible mission to 
re-establish understanding and trust. Though the scars of war were still tangible, the 
Center played a lead role in a strong movement of non-governmental organizations 
and other actors, including the Igman Initiative and Philia. These initiatives helped 
rebuild relations that had been severed during the wars of the 1990s and overcome 
psychological and other barriers. After an initially favorable period of détente, however, 
the possibilities for cooperation deteriorated. Strong nationalist political leadership and 
popular sentiments in Serbia continued to fuel instability in the region, particularly 
around unresolved claims for independence in disputed areas like Kosovo. 
To ameliorate this instability, the Center for Regionalism and its allies continued to 
pursue interregional networking, with the hope that such alliances will act on a long-
term basis, inﬂuencing political actors the general populace and keeping normalization 
of relations in the region on course. 
The Center for Regionalism has conﬁrmed that NGOs need to support their expert 
activities with advocacy. This can mobilize public opinion toward support for experts’ 
proposals. Such actions rely on the engagement of as many respectable independent 
intellectuals as possible, who could provide the basis for establishing the expert teams, 
as well as be a part of the team responsible for public advocacy. The case of the Center 
for Regionalism additionally indicates that, although things develop rapidly in this area, 
a long-term action strategy is required, which, if necessary, may be adapted to ﬁt with 
current circumstances and needs. 
Clearly, NGOs should not compete among themselves or hoard resources or in-
formation. Rather, for the sake of the wider community, they should work together. 
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Strategically, collaboration can increase the range of opportunities available to all 
members of a partnership, enhance their knowledge and capacities, expand the ﬁeld of 
their activities, and achieve a greater level of self-suﬃciency and sustainability. Positive 
examples in this respect, may be found in the Igman Initiative, Philia, Civil Dialogue, 
and Civic Vojvodina, all sharing a partnership that has resulted in actual beneﬁts for 
all involved. 
NOTES
1 The homepage of the Center for Regionalism can be found at: http://www.centarzaregionalizam.
org.rs/.
2 The text of the Agreement can be found in Annex 2 of this book. All members of Philia as of 
August 2009 are listed in Annex 3.
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ANNEX
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The Igman Initiative 
Živorad Kovačević
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Igman Initiative is a joint, permanent project of well over one hundred non-gov-
ernmental organizations from the countries of the so-called Dayton Triangle (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
which, after a referendum in Montenegro in 2006, was dissolved into the independent 
states of Serbia and Montenegro, transforming Triangle into a Quadrangle). The Igman 
Initiative was created from the bottom up and achieved a regional ownership of its proj-
ects. From the very beginning, it had clear objectives that remained unchanged in the 
course of a few subsequent years: overcoming the consequences of war; encouraging any 
form of cooperation among various actors and across communities, cities, regions, and 
countries. These goals also reﬂected aspirations towards European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. The acceptance of the authority of the Igman Initiative was made easier 
by its manifestation as a joint project—a process—rather than a centralized, formalized 
NGO. The ﬂexible structure of this form necessitated respect and equality among all 
members, who ultimately shared a common vision. Through its activities, the Igman 
Initiative established a great reputation among the public in the region and attracted the 
desired media attention. The reputation of the Igman Initiative was also built to a great 
extent through the active participation of very prominent public ﬁgures (heads of states 
among others) from the three, and later four, countries of the region. 
The Igman Initiative and its Objectives
The Igman Initiative, a joint and permanent project of well over one hundred non-
governmental organizations from the countries of the so-called Dayton Triangle,1 was 
named for an event that occurred when war gripped the region. In April 1995, a group 
of thirty-eight intellectuals and antiwar activists from Serbia and Montenegro made 
a forty-eight hour journey (through Hungary and Croatia) over Mount Igman and 
through an improvised tunnel, and ﬁnally arrived to Sarajevo in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Sarajevo was under siege. 
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Heavy artillery and sniper ﬁre from military forces gathered in Republika Srpska, 
a political-territorial division of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), dev-
astated the city. Thousands of lives were lost. With no other avenues of formal political 
participation through which to make their voices heard, those who made the trek openly 
contested their leadership at the time. They putting their lives at risk to demonstrate 
their solidarity with Sarajevo’s citizens, and expressed their feelings publicly at an As-
sembly of the Sarajevo Serbian Civic Council. This gesture in a time of war was a great 
encouragement to the citizens of Sarajevo, as it proved there were some in Serbia who 
condemned the siege and shelling of their city. 
The objective of the Igman Initiative is to normalize and rebuild relations of mutual 
understanding and trust between the states of Dayton triangle after the devastating wars 
of the 1990s. In doing so, it encourages cooperation among the countries, regions, and 
municipalities, in political and civic life, across all areas of the media, business, culture, 
education and sports. It work to restore the ﬂow of information and ideas across diverse 
people and institutions, and support normal diplomatic relations among the newly 
independent countries. 
The Igman Initiative is a joint project of more than 140 non-governmental orga-
nizations from Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), and Croatia, 
working toward renewing cooperation and normalizing inter-state relations within 
the Dayton Triangle. This project is named “The Igman Initiative” after an extraordi-
nary event which took place in 1995 during siege of Sarajevo by forces of the Bosnian 
Serb Army. Risking their lives from sniper and heavy artillery ﬁre from surrounding 
hills, a group of respected Serbian intellectuals from Serbia and Montenegro, after 
travelling for 48 hours through Hungary, and Dalmatia, although Sarajevo is only 
some 400 kilometres far from Belgrade, entered Sarajevo after passing over the 
mountain of Igman and gave support to the founding session of the Serbian Civic 
Forum in February 1995.
MOTIVES OF ORGANIZING
Throughout much of the 1990s, the situation across the former Yugoslav republics 
was dire: those in power were encouraging and spreading hatred among citizens and 
communities who, until very recently, had lived peacefully in a common state. These 
same leaders—or war lords, in fact—and their proxies attempted to prevent free com-
munication and access to information, in order to prolong their wars. They fought 
and colluded with one another to shore up their power, particularly at the expense of 
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ethno-cultural groups like Bosniaks, Albanians, and Roma that lacked political voice. 
The most notorious of their cooperation is the example of a secret agreement between 
the presidents of Serbia and Croatia, Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, to divide 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. These wartime leaders did not object, upon signing the Dayton 
Peace Accords, to the normalization of relations among their governments and countries. 
However, through tools ranging from propaganda to administrative measures, they strove 
to divide and prevent communication among the region’s inhabitants. In doing so, they 
halted cultural, media, economic, sports, and any other form of cooperation.
The only voice of reason that could be heard at that time—a voice that often seemed 
lost in a landscape of lies, hatred, and intolerance—was that of a growing movement of 
non-governmental actors. Those involved were united by two positions. 
One was taking a stand against—against the senseless violence and wars that had 
subsumed their communities. They were against and condemned the ruling political 
leaders and regimes who initiated, organized, and encouraged aggressive nationalism, 
divisions, armed conﬂicts, battles for people territory, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. 
They were against the intellectual elites who had supported these leaders, adding weight 
to their claims. Antiwar activists within non-governmental organizations were clearly 
and boldly against, which made them equivalent to national traitors. Instead of crying 
“Looking what they are doing to us!” they directed their condemnation primarily to those 
responsible for perpetuating hatreds and divisions, particularly within their own ethno-
national communities, and they anticipated that others would follow their lead. 
The stand against also implied a stand for—for democratic change, for the “European 
option,” for free communication among citizens, ethnic groups, and newly independent 
states, and for diversiﬁed bilateral and regional cooperation. 
 
BEGINNINGS 
The immediate predecessor of the Igman Initiative was a conference on the Perspectives of 
Bilateral Relations between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
held in Banja Luka, BiH, on February 11–13, 2000. The participation of numerous 
NGOs united by their basic positions and numerous requests for the establishment 
of permanent forms of cooperation naturally led to the idea of creating a common 
“umbrella” network. This network include NGOs from all countries of the so-called 
Dayton Triangle. 
The Dayton Triangle lies in the heart of the former Yugoslavia and was also, in the 
1990s, the center of conﬂict. It has been one of two critical spots of persistent instability 
in South Eastern Europe; the other is Kosovo. Within the triangle, there are two key 
hubs of regional stability, and thus, two potential sources of instability. 
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One is Bosnia and Herzegovina. Without a strong, cohesive, sovereign, and indepen-
dent BiH, free from any interference from its powerful neighbors of Serbia and Croatia, 
there is no credible and lasting stability, peace, safety, and all-inclusive cooperation in 
the region. Part of the reason for this is historical, related to centers of power; part is 
also connected to division of ethno-national communities within the newly indepen-
dent state. 
The other hub is Serbo-Croat relations—relations between two large groups that 
cannot be divided simply, despite new statehood and ethno-national identiﬁcation. These 
relations are either an apple of discord and a source of regional instability, or a backbone 
of cooperation and trust. For some in the center of these relations, it makes sense to 
draw parallels with and learn lessons from Germany and France. Thanks to the visionary 
abilities and responsibility of some leaders, these countries have their troubled relations 
and become the initiators and most important pillars of European integration. 
Created on the basis of anti-war engagement of NGOs from three countries, the 
Igman Initiative is one of the few networks that gathers NGOs which initiated the 
creation of the body, instead of being induced from the outside.
MANNER OF ORGANIZATION
Founders of the Igman Initiative debated the institutionalization of civil society coop-
eration within Dayton Triangle. They did not believe that it would not be valuable to 
form yet another non-governmental organization. Rather, they envisioned a kind of 
a permanent, casual dialogue as a common project of existing organizations, through 
which each was to give its creative contribution to a free and multi-form cooperation. 
Three NGOs served as the organizers and activity leaders, responsible for realizing 
the agreement within the Igman Initiative: the Democratic Alternative Forum from 
Sarajevo, BiH (to be succeeded by the Tuzla Citizens’ Forum), the Human Rights Civic 
Committee from Zagreb, Croatia and the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad, Serbia. 
It was agreed to have a co-president for the Igman Initiative from each country. Upon 
the independence of Montenegro in 2006, the initiative got a fourth co-president. 
In each of the four countries there are Igman Initiative councils, comprised of 
prominent writers, scientists, and other respectable cultural and public ﬁgures. All con-
clusions of the Igman Initiative are made after a free debate, resulting in a consensus. 
Final decisions have not been made by a majority vote or by the leadership imposing 
their positions. So far, there have been few problems in this regard. In fact, this method 
has reinforced participants’ engagement.
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The Igman Initiative holds its sessions two times a year, alternately in each country, 
and hosted a country’s co-president. These meetings are attended by several hundred 
participants, including representatives of member NGOs and others who are well-versed 
in the issues on the agenda. Typically, the agenda involves both plenary meetings and 
smaller meetings with working groups. The sessions are covered by media outlets from 
throughout the region. 
In accordance with decisions or conclusions reached during the sessions (and other 
gatherings), representatives of the Igman Initiative present themselves to the oﬃcials of 
the four countries—Presidents, Prime Ministers, Ministers of Foreign Aﬀairs, and other 
ministers in charge of speciﬁc issues. Their support is sought and the involvement of 
competent state bodies is required to take those issues into consideration and seek an 
appropriate solution. 
Thus, within the projects like Mini-Schengen, an initiative for the liberalization of 
visa regimes in the region, or the Single Free-Trade Zone, representatives of the Igman 
Initiative had an opportunity to meet current Presidents of their countries, Ministers of 
Foreign Aﬀairs, and other decision-makers who, after discussions and debate, promised 
their full support. The Igman Initiative also employs other means to exert pressure on 
governments, engaged in advocacy campaigns, lobbies parliaments, and inﬂuences the 
public agenda in the realization of its views, initiatives, and requests.
FUNDING
The Igman Initiative funds its activities primarily on a project-to project basis. As its 
engagements grow more rich in substance and complex in detail and garner more and 
more recognition, there has been a greater readiness among Igman Initative members 
to both provide ﬁnancial support for activities and meetings and, as part of coalitions, 
join in major proposals for funding.
A number of institutions have oﬀered a great amount of support over the 
years. These include, among others, USAID, Freedom House, the Fund for an Open 
Society–Serbia, the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 
the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the Rockefeller Brothers Foundation, and the James 
Stewart Mott Foundation. 
INITIATIVE TO ORGANIZE A SUMMIT
At its meeting held in Kotor, Montenegro in 2002, in the early days of the Igman 
Initiative, members formulated and sent a letter to the heads of state of the three 
countries (BiH, Croatia, and FRY). This letter invited the Presidents to promptly hold 
38
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
a tripartite summit and introduce this as a regular practice. Rather surprisingly, the 
response was swift. Only two weeks later, the initiative was accepted by the President 
of BiH, and invitations were also accepted by Stjepan Mesić, President of Croatia, and 
Vojislav Koštunica, Prime Minister of FRY. The ﬁrst summit was held that very summer 
in Sarajevo. Unfortunately, despite optimism at this even, no new tripartite summits 
were held for a few years after, although there were a plethora of mutual problems to 
be resolved in mutual interest. 
The Igman Initiative then launched a new initiative and proposed that the heads of 
state meet again, this time at a session of the Igman Initiative, held in Zagreb in Sep-
tember 2004. They agreed, though FRY leadership was unable to attend. They leaders 
did in a historic tenth session in 2005, and again in subsequent years.
Joint declarations of the leadership of the countries contain views on the achieved 
level of cooperation in the region, barriers to be eliminated, and their common inter-
ests and aims. The most frequently mentioned issues that must be addressed are the 
following: 
 • Intensive regional cooperation and mutual understanding as signiﬁcant accelera-
tors of the process of the European integration.
 • Developing an atmosphere of tolerance in mutual relations on all levels.
 • Economic cooperation, particularly through an increase of mutual foreign direct 
investment and joint appearance in third markets.
 • General political, cultural and sports cooperation.
 • A border regime that enables people to communicate smoothly with their 
regions.
 • Full and unconditioned cooperation with the Hague Tribunal. 
 • Facilitating, within the shortest possible period of time, the return and integra-
tion refugees and expelled persons. 
 • Institutionalizing a visa-free travel regime through bilateral agreements.
 • Creating conditions under which national minorities are enabled to express 
freely and cherish their national and cultural heritage and be an integral and 
equal part of society. 
 • Air and bus lines through joint plans and investments to create a higher level 
of regional, cross-border travel. 
 • Joint actions to prevent and eradicate any form of organized crime and 
terrorism. 
Igman Initiative sessions attended by heads of state consist of two parts. First, presi-
dents (or prime ministers) state their views regarding current issues in their relations, 
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upon which, a joint declaration is oﬃcially signed. Second, in their absence, current 
topics of interest are discussed.
The practice of holding high-level summits within a civic society project is unique 
in Europe and in the world. Understandably, the active participation of heads of state 
and other prominent political ﬁgures attracts greater public attention than do the un-
derlying values and activities of the Igman Initiative itself. Thus, the involvement of key 
decision-makers has been important not only in terms of carrying out activities, but also 
in building public support around the normalization of post-war relations. 
PROJECTS
The Igman Initiative has set up expert groups in various ﬁelds of work and for speciﬁc 
projects. These groups prepare project proposals and other documents that are to be 
submitted to competent bodies of the states in the region. Projects frequently are ac-
companied by draft regulations, which are to be passed if the projects are accepted. 
In addition to experts from within civil society, including members of policy centers, 
activist groups, and academia, experts from state bodies often take part in the work of 
such groups. This joint civil society-government cooperation creates strong linkages at 
early in a project’s preparatory phase. 
In keeping with the Initiative’s aim to normalize relations in the region, expert 
groups formed by the Igman Initiative have prepared a range of concrete projects to 
address problems in the ﬁelds of citizenship, property, and the ﬂow of commodities, 
persons, and capital. Solutions to these problems were proposed to the governments of 
the three states in May 2001, and in meetings thereafter, and have included legislative 
changes and intergovernmental agreements. This section presents, in brief, several areas 
in which projects of the Igman Initiative have been developed. 
Citizenship
Issues of citizenship create a complicated set of problems, related to the creation of newly 
independent states based around ethno-national identities, families divided by new 
national boundaries, the dislocation of people by war, and the ownership of property, 
among others. The expert team in charge of citizenship issues stressed in particular that 
any solution had to take into account: ﬁrst, the principle of the protection of the unity 
of a family and property; and the second, the will of the individual whose status was 
equal to that of all others on the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia, despite new 
states and borders. 
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Expert groups formulated very practical recommendations and encouraged openness 
and ﬂexibility from policy-makers. They proposed the introduction of dual citizenship 
whenever possible in order to eliminate numerous negative consequences that the dis-
solution of Yugoslavia had on citizens.
Property
After extensive research, an expert team concluded that citizen’s rights can be jeopardized 
by the on-going, rapid changes in regulations and legal practice. This was particularly 
the case in the realm of proprietary rights. Many people had left or been moved from 
their homes during the war or, for various reasons, had been stripped over their right 
to own property within the altered political landscape. Therefore, the expert team 
recommended that it was necessary to promptly conclude bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, as well as to change internal regulations and practice. The team submitted 
draft legislative changes ad resolutions along these lines. 
Free-Trade Zone 
One major project of the Igman Initiative related to the establishment of a free-
trade regime in the region. One of the starting points of this project was the general 
recognition that economic activity between the countries of the region was far behind 
actual needs, interests, and capacities. Economic activity could be and needed to be 
increased dramatically. Measures to enhance economic activity were being adopted 
only slowly, and were not meeting needs and interests in the region. Experts argued that 
a signiﬁcant acceleration of cross-border economic development and exchange would 
have wide-reaching eﬀects for the region as a whole. After a careful review, they oﬀered 
a set of concrete recommendations that included both continuing along the current 
course of economic development in some areas, and adopting several new measures i
n others.
 One major event in this ﬁeld was the signing of a Memorandum on Liberalization 
and Facilitation of Conditions of Trade in Brussels on June 27, 2001 by key decision-
makers of the countries of South Eastern Europe. All countries of the region committed 
to concluding bilateral agreements on free trade by the end of 2002. The Igman Initiative 
oﬀered the competent ministries of the three countries expert assistance in drawing up 
draft bilateral agreements and monitoring their ratiﬁcation and implementation. 
However, a bilateral agreement is only one important step in the process of estab-
lishing a single and complete free-trade zone in South Eastern Europe and in creating 
economic linkages across the region. A number of speciﬁc measures were also needed 
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to stimulate cross-bordered trade, and particularly among the three countries of the 
Dayton Triangle. 
Thus, an expert team developed a project, which was submitted to the governments 
of BiH, Croatia, and FRY. The project prioritized work in the following areas: 
 • harmonizing the three bilateral agreements on free trade and creating mecha-
nisms to monitor the realization of these agreements in the triangle of BiH, 
Croatia, and FRY;
 • abolishing possible non-tariﬀ barriers to trade; 
 • identifying possible practical problems for mutual trade and promptly address-
ing the problems; 
 • setting up special mechanisms for consultations on the free-trade agreement 
realization with other countries; 
 • establishing periodic consultations on experiences in trade cooperation with the 
European Union, as well as on activities of the World Trade Organization; 
 • working actively and consistently to improve mechanisms for technical coopera-
tion among the competent bodies of the three countries in the following spheres: 
standards and technical regulations, regulations on the quality of accreditation 
systems, mutual recognition of standards, harmonization of regulations with EU 
rules, passing veterinary and sanitary regulations, customs cooperation, rules on 
competition and intellectual property, cooperation of agencies for promotion 
of export and foreign investment; 
 • setting up mechanisms for regular cooperation and consultations of economic 
representatives (chambers of commerce, associations of employers, trade as-
sociations, etc.); and
 • holding periodic joint meetings of the three mixed committees for trade co-
operation (provided for by free trade agreements), as well as periodic regular 
meetings of ministers of trade. 
Representatives of the Igman Initiative paid separate visits to the heads of state of 
the three countries and Ministers of Foreign Aﬀairs. All welcomed the initiative and 
proposals, and promised to lend their full support to the project. Igman representatives 
stressed that the full cooperation of the three countries of the Dayton Triangle was an 
important, but only partial step in promoting economic development and trade. The 
initiative must include all countries of South Eastern Europe, resulting in the establish-
ment of a free-trade zone for the entire region—a market of 55 million consumers. 
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Mini-Schengen
The Mini-Schengen project has been in the focus of Igman Initiative since its found-
ing. First, the Initiative launched a campaign “No to Visas in the Region, No Visas in 
the Region!” The basic idea of this campaign was that countries of the region would 
gradually approach the borderless “Schengen regime” that brings together countries 
of Europe. As in the Schengen zone, visa regimes in South Eastern Europe would be 
liberalized and eventually completely abolished. 
The Igman Initiative was active on two fronts. First, expert groups developed proj-
ects to soften the visa regimes established in the aftermath of the war and gradually 
abolish visas. In doing so, they also launched concrete initiatives to eliminate diﬀerent 
forms of discrimination that were accompanying the existing regimes. Second, the Ig-
man Initiative proposed the unilateral suspension of visas for Croatians by Serbia and 
Montenegro and the abolishment of various restrictions and forms of discrimination 
that were widely documented at border crossing between BiH and FRY. Speciﬁcally, 
the relevant authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were requested to change 
their discriminatory practice toward citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were not 
being aﬀorded the same treatment as citizens of the Republika Srpska when entering 
and staying in the FRY.
Though still part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (with Serbia), Montenegro 
abolished visas to neighboring countries as early as 2001. At the end of 2003, at a meeting 
in Sarajevo, the leadership of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina signed an agreement 
that enabled citizens to travel between the two countries with ID cards only—a step 
lauded by the Igman Initiative. Finally, Serbia accepted the Igman Initiative’s proposal 
to suspend visas for citizens of Croatia; in response, Croatia suspended visas for citizens 
of Serbia (of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). Persistent lobbying and public pres-
sure proved fruitful, and the visa regime across what is now Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Montenegro, and Serbia was liberalized fully.
Legal Rights of Workers and Retired Persons 
At the ﬁfth Igman Initiative session in Kotor, Montenegro, in the summer of 2002, 
members proposed the uniﬁcation of all legal rights of workers and retired persons in the 
countries of the region in accordance with European standards. Nezavisnost, an umbrella 
of uniﬁed industrial unions in Serbia, was the project leader. All support in the realiza-
tion of the project was given by the International Trade Union Confederation.
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Bilateral Agreements in the Dayton Triangle
This project was launched at the sixth session held in Sarajevo in October 2003. The 
Igman Initiative oﬀered its experts to help draw up draft regulations. It was concluded 
that, in spite of signiﬁcant progress in the conclusion of bilateral agreements over the 
preceding three years, the pace of their conclusion and ratiﬁcation was far behind the 
expectations and demands. Inadequate personnel in the competent ministries could 
be improved partially by the engagement of Igman Initiative experts. Additionally, six 
more draft bilateral agreements were drawn up by Igman Initiative experts at the tenth 
session of the Initiative held in Belgrade in June 2005. These agreements were submit-
ted to the heads of state.
Resolving the Problem of Water Supply of Herceg Novi 
At the ﬁfth session of the Igman Initiative in Kotor in 2002 project to address the 
problem of water supply and sharing across the cities of Trebinje (BiH), Dubrovnik 
(Croatia), and Herceg Novi (Montenegro). The project included a proposal to seek as-
sistance, with the support of the OSCE, of a prominent European expert in this ﬁeld, 
who would draw up an expert analysis with recommendations on how to resolve that 
issue in the area. The project moved quickly into the implementation stage, involving a 
high-level donor conference in Herceg Novi on February 28, 2003. Research and other 
activities to ﬁnd concrete solutions to the issue of water supply in the area continued 
at least until late 2009.
Restoring Conﬁdence among the Peoples of the Region 
One of the most sensitive and most signiﬁcant problems common to the three countries 
of this study is how to discuss and confront the regions common, recent history. This 
has been a precondition for restoring conﬁdence among the peoples of the region. There 
were many initiatives to commence the process of truth and reconciliation, such as by 
setting up committees as in South Africa that would create a basis for tackling the past 
fairly. Yet, experiences of the countries of the Dayton Triangle were disappointing in 
this respect. Various committees set up in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina achieved practically no results for two years. No such committee was 
set up in Croatia. 
The Igman Initiative, too, had the idea to set up a tripartite civic committee for 
truth and reconciliation, but this was abandoned. Finally, another model of restoring 
understanding and conﬁdence was embraced. Built patiently and seriously, this model 
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was conceived to avoid another compromise of what was in essence noble and needed 
idea. Participants in these discussions disagreed with the notion of “reconciliation” as a 
collectivistic connotation that, in a way, could not go beyond the past wars, for distrust 
and hatred have occurred over a much longer term in South Eastern Europe. 
For that reason, the Igman Initiative chose to build a model to restore mutual un-
derstanding and renew conﬁdence. A prominent joint expert group was chosen from a 
pool of respectable and honorable persons from all four countries. It was accompanied 
by discussions led by Alex Borein, the author of the rather successful South-African 
model. By inviting Borein, the idea was not merely to replicate under entirely diﬀerent 
local circumstances. Rather, he was meant to inspire, share his experiences, and inform 
the process in the former Yugoslavia. That is, aim was not to follow a one-size-ﬁts-all 
approach, but to develop an appropriate model for the region. This model was to be 
constructed patiently and conscientiously, through public discussions and round tables 
and research, and by engaging and pressuring governments.
All the activities of the Igman Initiative are, inevitably, linked to the idea of restoring 
conﬁdence and trust. One particularly important event, though, was the tenth session 
of the Igman Initiative, held in Belgrade in June 2005. This was only the second time 
since the signature of the Dayton Accords that the three heads of state came together 
for a summit meeting. This was also the ﬁrst time that they had met at the invitation 
of a group of non-governmental organizations.
Particularly signiﬁcant was the signing of the Tripartite Position Towards the Pres-
ent and the Future.2 This joint statement, drafted by the experts of the Igman Initiative 
and signed by signed by the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, provided an overview of situation in the region at the time. It also 
oﬀered a general outline for future cooperation between three states. This was the ﬁrst 
joint document signed by the three heads of state since the Dayton Accords almost ten 
years prior.
In the joint statement, it was emphasized that full cooperation with the Hague 
Tribunal—the international court on war crimes committed during the Yugoslav 
wars—was necessary. This statement also pointed out that it is necessary for political 
leaders to be honest about the past, promote good within their communities and coun-
tries; they must also take the play a lead role in enabling persons expelled and displaced 
during the war to return to their homes, to protecting national minorities, as well as 
to institutionalizing a visa-free regime among the three countries. The full text of the 
Tripartite View of the Present and Future was published in at least a dozen news dailies 
throughout the region.
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Interethnic Tolerance
In 2001, a mixed team of experts conducted in-depth research on the state of inter-
ethnic relations in Tuzla (BiH), Osijek (Croatia), and Novi Sad (Serbia). Three NGOs 
in these cities put this research to work: the Center for Regionalism, Citizens’ Forum 
from Tuzla, and the Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights from Osijek. 
Over the course of several months, these NGOs engaged their respective local authori-
ties and communities in public discussions, negotiations, roundtables, and working 
meetings about improving cooperation and communication among their cities. These 
eﬀorts culminated in an agreement that obliged the local governments of the three cit-
ies to carry out joint activities in ﬁelds of economic development, education, exchange 
of information, sports and others, with the understanding that this cooperation would 
contribute to the improvement of interethnic relations. 
This Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, signed on January 21, 2002 in Tuzla, 
represented the nucleus for a new movement for regional integration. Truly, previous 
eﬀorts had been made and projects carried out to improve interethnic relations in the 
region. However, the agreement was envisioned to make cooperation across cities and 
borders more formal and consistent, by providing a principled, thematic framework for 
their interaction. This Agreement created the basis for city triangles of cooperation, and 
for the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia. At regional 
conferences and other events, cities and non-governmental organizations from across 
the region have accepted the Agreement for Interethnic Tolerance. 
SUMMARY
Several elements came together to make Igman Initiative a powerful played in South 
Eastern Europe. These elements can be unpacked and summarized as a basis for move-
ments elsewhere.
First, the Igman Initiative was created from the bottom up and achieved a regional 
ownership of projects. Firm links among antiwar NGOs were established during the wars 
of the 1990s. Through such cooperation, under the extreme circumstances of war and 
hatred, personal friendships were forged. These friendships enabled agreement about 
joint goals, made with the full conﬁdence of all involved on the basis of equality and 
mutual respect, and without insistence on issues of prestige and precedence. 
Second, the reputation of the Igman Initiative was built to a great extent through 
the active participation of very prominent public ﬁgures from the three, and later four, 
countries of the region. These participation of these leaders facilitated cooperation in a 
range of ﬁelds and activities.
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Third, from the very beginning, the Igman Initiative had clear objectives that remained 
unchanged in the course of a few subsequent years: overcoming the consequences of war; 
encouraging any form of cooperation among various actors and across communities, cit-
ies, regions, and countries; and promoting free communication of people and ideas. These 
goals were pursued as part of the process of democratization and establishing normalized 
political, economic, and social relations, based on trust and mutual understanding. They 
also reﬂected aspirations towards European and Euro-Atlantic integration. 
Fourth, the acceptance of the authority of the Igman Initiative was made easier by 
its manifestation as a joint project—a process—rather than a centralized, formal NGO. 
The ﬂexible structure of this form necessitated respect and equality among all members, 
who ultimately shared a common vision. 
Fifth, the Igman Initiative, through its activities, established a great reputation among 
the public in the region and attracted the desired media attention. At the same time, 
it also managed to foster greater openness among state bodies and oﬃcials—although 
they have not always been pleased with what the Igman Initiative says or demands. 
Sixth, major priorities of the Igman Initiative has been to overcome impediments to 
the normalization of relations, re- establish cooperation, and restore conﬁdence among 
peoples. Simultaneously, the Igman Initiative puts on the agenda of its sessions3 complex 
social and economic themes, such as consequences of neo-liberal economic reforms, 
administrative reforms, and various unexpected “speed bumps” on the road towards 
democratization.
Finally, it should be noted that one of the primary ramiﬁcations of the Igman 
Initiative, both territorially and functionally, has been the creation of new forms of 
civic society interaction and engagement with the government. Those involved in the 
Initiative had powerful demands, and pursued these demands with great intensity. 
But, they were also open to discussions and ﬂexible in their eﬀorts. As a result, many 
of the original objectives of the Igman Initiative have been met, and the results have 
reverberated across South Eastern Europe and other critical areas outside the Dayton 
Triangle, such as Kosovo. 
NOTES
1 In 1995, a peace agreement was made in Dayton, Ohio, which eﬀectively led to an end to war 
in the Balkans. The Agreement was signed by the heads of state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. (As previously noted, in 2003, the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was named the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In 2006, 
after a referendum in Montenegro, it peacefully dissolved into the independent states of Serbia 
and Montenegro.) 
2 The full text of the Tripartite View can be found in Annex 1 at the end of this book.
3 More on Igman Initiative sessions can be found at: www.igman-initiative.org/sessions.pdf.
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ANNEX
Figure A1
The Structure and the Working Process of the Igman Initiative
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48
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
Figure A2
Igman Initiative Organizational Structure
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Figure A3
Signing of the Tripartite View of the Present and Future, Tenth Session of the Igman 
Initiative, Belgrade, Serbia, June 27, 2005
The Tenth Session of the Igman Initiative was historic. This was the second time 
since the signature of the Dayton Accords that the three heads of state came together 
for a meeting, and ﬁrst time ever that they met at the invitation of a group of non-
governmental organizations. Even more signiﬁcant was the signing of the 
“Tripartite View of the Present and Future.” 
Pictured (seated): President Stjepan Mesić (Croatia), President Svetozar Marović 
(Serbia and Montenegro), President Borislav Paravac (Bosnia and Herzegovina)
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The Association of Multiethnic Cities of 
South Eastern Europe–Philia 
Jovan Komšić
“This initiative conﬁrms that the dark side of the region’s recent past has ended forever [...].
It shows how people of this region can overcome the legacy of the past through the 
regional cooperation”
—Ambassador Maurizio Massari
Chief of the OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro
These meritorious but daring words were oﬀered by Ambassador Maurizio Massari, Head 
of the OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro during a speech at a regional conference 
on “Tolerance and Understanding, Above All,” July 6, 2004 in Belgrade. With an audi-
ence of representatives from almost every capital, regional center, and other cities in the 
region, his remarks represented a new optimism in the region, still referred to as a “risky 
European neighborhood.” This conference made was a break-through in relations in the 
region. At the event, 37 representatives of local governments and 38 NGOs from seven 
countries of the region signed the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, thus committing 
themselves to tolerance, communication and cooperation, mutual respect, the celebra-
tion of cultural diﬀerences, protection of human and minority rights, as well as to the 
improvement of local and regional self government in accordance with the democratic 
standards of Europe (see Annex 2). It was the ﬁrst event after the wars of the 1990s 
that brought together representatives of a large number of cities, including capitals and 
regional centers, from the region. It was also a crucial step in the establishment of the 
Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia. 
This conference took place when the reminders of war were still fresh in the minds of 
all participants. Only a few years had passed since the disintegration of the multiethnic 
Yugoslav federation and the ensuing wars that “froze” relations in the region. A cautious 
thaw in relationships had begun, but with frequent disturbances in communication 
among citizens, local self-governments, and newly established countries in the Western 
Balkans. Nevertheless, Ambassador Massari spoke about his support for what appeared 
to be signiﬁcantly and new approach in confronting the ongoing stereotypes, divisions, 
and intolerance: 
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  “Under such circumstances, while the wounds still hurt, it took great courage 
and inventiveness to launch the initiatives to gather the cities from neighboring 
countries that used to be conﬂicted, and involve them in the project aimed at 
promotion of tolerance. All credit for this goes to activists of civil society, such as 
the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad and its partners from other cities.”1
Ambassador Massari referred to two signiﬁcant events initiated by the Center for 
Regionalism from Novi Sad and its allies. The ﬁrst was the signing of the Agreement 
on Interethnic Cooperation between the cities of Osijek (Croatia), Tuzla (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), and Novi Sad (Serbia) on January 21, 2001. This act attracted interest 
from several institutions, including such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE. With 
others, they provided the moral and ﬁnancial support to this initiative and the numer-
ous projects it inspired. 
The second event was a successful regional initiative that resulted in a meeting of 
mayors from all the capital cities of the successor states of Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRY): Ljubljana, Zagreb, Sarajevo, Podgorica, Skopje, and Belgrade. This 
was the ﬁrst time representatives of cities and urban centers of these countries had come 
together since war had ended. 
*
The establishment of the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia 
is one of the most signiﬁcant forms of implementation of the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance, signed by representatives of, at that time, seven countries: Bosnia and Herze-
govina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia and Montenegro.2 
The essential aim of this Agreement was to overcome the burden of the recent wars and 
interethnic conﬂicts on the territory of the former SFRY and increase the “density” of 
cross-border communications via city triangles and circles of cooperation. Now, members 
include cities, local self-governments, and non-governmental organizations from these 
countries. Collectively, they are from countries oriented towards European integra-
tion—candidate countries and those which have signed or are in the preparation process 
for signing the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement—as well as those that have 
already joined the European Union (Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria). In addition to com-
mitting to common values through their membership in Philia, they take part in various 
concrete regional activities, several of which are discussed in this book.3
As an umbrella of permanent dialogue and activities, Philia has adopted a consen-
sual framework to improve human and minority rights, in compliance with European 
standards. It has promoted the implementation of good practices in the areas of toler-
ance, multiculturalism, and cooperation among the civil sector and local authorities, 
as well as contributing to the stabilization of the overall prerequisites of integration of 
all countries in the region with the European Union. 
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WHY PHILIA?
“Interethnic tolerance and understanding are the basic postulate of European 
Union and they represent, just like the EU Constitution, unity in diversity.”
—Stefan Lehne
Advisor to the EU High Representative for Foreign Policy and Security
In the early 2000s, some years after all-out war had ceased, scientiﬁc research and public 
opinion polls on the perception of citizens in the region still registered a more or less 
worrying level of ethnic distance, prejudice, and lack of trust towards persons belonging 
to other ethno-national groups. These elements were bolstered by feelings of being post-
Yugoslav “transitional losers,” particularly in those states that were to engage seriously 
in democratic reforms. At the turn of the twenty-ﬁrst century, these states continued 
to be areas of nationalist tensions and conﬂicts, and struggled with economic recovery 
and democratization. 
However, in former SFRY countries, powerful parochial and ethnocentric trends 
prevailed throughout the 1990s, and tensions between ethno-national groups, among 
minorities and majorities within states, were apparent. Surrounding the period of the 
Balkan wars, so-called “political entrepreneurs” of the ethno-national majorities did not 
support either the stabilization or the normalization of interethnic relations within and 
across states in the region. Some of them supported a centralized nation-state and the 
slow normalization of relations with the neighbors. Others supported high autonomy, 
including forms of ethnic political autonomy on territories where they constituted the 
majority. 
In particular, early members of Philia were particularly concerned about troubling 
trends among the region’s youth. Many secondary school and university youth had been, 
in the decade of wars and nationalist transitions, deprived of communication among 
themselves and any personal positive experiences with others. Youth were growing up 
and entering political processes at a time of extreme polarization: on the one hand, those 
who stood for xenophobia, intolerance, aggression, and isolation with respect to their 
neighbors and the EU; on the other hand, protagonists of tolerance, peace, democracy, 
cooperation, openness, and European integration.
Clearly, at the time of Philia’s founding, the powerful guarantors of stabilization 
of security conditions in the region—the UN and EU—proved to be unable eliminate 
the reasons why South Eastern Europe, particularly some countries in the Western 
Balkans, are still regarded as a “risky EU neighborhood.” These institutions, acting 
alone, could not normalize relations among communities and states or consolidation 
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European living standards in the region. Nor could drastic reforms of economy, law, and 
policy in favor of market democracy lead to consolidated democracies. In a typical crisis 
surrounding such changes and a traumatized postwar situation, these processes must 
happen in parallel with the enhancement of a strong, capable civil society. The overall 
“moral infrastructure” had to be changed and patterns of social interaction have to be 
adjusted to facilitate the involvement and accommodation of diverse values, interests, 
and goals in political processes. Divisive ideas about “us,” “ours,” or “us versus them” 
needed to be questioned. Guiding this sort of “cultural transformation” was not an easy 
task. It was vulnerable to political distortions and manipulation, which were typically 
underpinned by intolerant forms nationalism and fears about the destiny of one’s own 
ethno-national community and state.
In this context, Philia’s establishment was seen as crucial. Early allies of Philia and 
the movement they represented argued that democracy and stability necessitate the 
full participation and integration of all groups in political processes, particularly at the 
local level of government. Moves in this direction entailed the delicate act of balancing 
a degree of national and regional cohesion with the administrative reforms needed to 
decentralize and empower local governments to accommodate their diverse communi-
ties. Working in concert with members of local governments, civil society, and many 
others, the founders of Philia hoped to make a signiﬁcant contribution to long-lasting 
peace and sustainable human development. They believed their eﬀorts were seen as a 
vital step in securing peace, re-integrating the states and region of South Eastern Europe 
with the rest of the Europe, and facilitating the process of EU accession.  
Philia turned to existing legal and political norms within to substantiate its argu-
ments: the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 
European Charter of Local Self-government, the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, the draft Constitu-
tion of the EU, and the Lisbon Treaty. In short, irrespective of their many diﬀerences 
in ethnicity, mission, and experiences, all the actors involved in Philia have agreed with 
European standards for human rights, interethnic tolerance, protection of fundamental 
freedoms and national minority rights.
Philia’s founders also understood the need to facilitate and conﬁrm democratization 
in the diverse, urban environments of the region, focusing on the local level of gover-
nance. They saw that political stabilization in South Eastern Europe clearly relies on the 
restoration of citizens’ belief in the unfolding of democratic processes. In this respect, a 
“bottom-up” initiative like Philia—made up of prominent individuals and organizations 
and matched with the support of local authorities—can enhance the internal legitimacy 
of public institutions. By linking local demands and action to international normative 
frameworks, Philia has helped strengthen citizens’ trust in government. Broadly speaking, 
civil society-government engagement is key. Participation in Philia’s initiatives has helped 
cultivate citizens’ loyalty and patriotism; strengthen governance capacities in diverse 
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communities; accelerate the processes normalizing interregional and intergovernmental 
relations, and contribute to the implementation of national policies of stabilization and 
accession to the European Union for countries in South Eastern Europe. 
Integration with the European Union for these countries represents not only the 
most preferable framework to represent their special interests, but also the most compre-
hensive formula for cooperation with their neighbors and for development of common 
interests. In ratifying the goals, forms, and methods of implementation of the Agreement 
on Interethnic Tolerance, local assemblies and NGOs as governing bodies and signatories 
have underlined that it would be best be to merge their interests around the platform 
Europe-oriented development across their region. 
 The story has been an uphill battle. Generally, majority and minority groups—eth-
no-national, linguistic, religious, and others—in the countries of South Eastern Europe, 
while seeking political and institutional recognition in their newly independent states, 
lean in favor of democracy, the normalization of domestic and international political 
relations, and European integration. Yet, around a decade after all-out war has ceased, 
and many years after Philia’s founding, democratic institutions and a stable pro-European 
course remain unconsolidated, and the residual eﬀects of conﬂict remain. During every 
new election, there is a chance that the protagonists of ethno-nationalist conﬂicts and 
human rights violations will mobilize citizens around various grievances and return to 
power at the local, regional, and central levels. Thus, progressive, democratically-minded 
actors must be unrelenting in their pursuits, and work to constantly to broaden and 
expand their alliances. The Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance has come to be a powerful 
tool for uniting actors around a common cause. 
STAGES OF ESTABLISHMENT 
The founding of Philia is one of the most signiﬁcant aspects of the realization 
of the Protocol on Interethnic Tolerance, signed in Belgrade, on 6 July 2004, by 
representatives of 38 local government bodies and 37 NGOs from seven countries 
of the region: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Macedonia, 
Romania and Serbia and Montenegro. Currently the Association has over 60 member 
communities. The main goal of the Agreement is to overcome the burdensome 
legacy of war and interethnic conﬂicts on the territory of the former SFRY and to 
increase the “density” of cross border communications within triangles and circles 
of cooperation.
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The Association was established in several phases. First, in-depth research on the 
state of interethnic relations in Tuzla, BiH, Osijek, Croatia, and Novi Sad, Serbia, was 
conducted by a mixed team of experts. On the basis of the research, non-governmental 
organizations from the region, namely the Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human 
Rights from Osijek, the Citizens’ Forum of Tuzla, and the Center for Regionalism from 
Novi Sad were the main drivers of this initiative. Bringing together local authorities, 
community groups, and others, they facilitated the drafting of Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance. This Agreement, ﬁrst presented at a roundtable in Novi Sad in July 2001, 
provided a basis for the ﬁrst triangle of cross-border cooperation. The agreement, rati-
ﬁed on January 21, 2002 in Tuzla, represented the nucleus for a new movement for 
regional integration. 
Phase two started with the launch of a campaign for new members, which was 
concluded by the conference on “Tolerance and Understanding, Above All,” held in 
Belgrade in 2004. In the period that followed, the eﬀorts to grow the network expanded, 
managing bodies were established, and ﬁnally, at a conference held in Zagreb in 2005, 
the establishment of the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe 
was formalized. During 2006 and 2007, Philia was registered, the campaign for more 
members continued, along with the establishment of regular regional communication. 
The period of stabilization of the organization began in 2007, including the implemen-
tation of regular activities and creation of new initiatives. Since then. Philia has been 
supported technically and ﬁnancially by several donors, including: Konrad Adenauer 
Stiftung (Germany); the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the German Marshall Fund 
(US); the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative of the Open Society 
Institute (Hungary); Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; and city administrations 
and the Assembly of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
“After a decade of wars and bad mutual relations, this conference will provide a 
strong impetus in transformation of Balkans into a zone of peace, security and 
cooperation”
—Svetozar Marovic, President of Serbia and Montenegro
Belgrade,  July 6, 2004
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AIMS AND EFFORTS: AN OVERVIEW
Principles of Work
 • Free will 
 • Autonomy
 • Openness
 • Public transparency
 • Mutual respect 
 • Recognition of realistic interests and possibilities of every protagonist 
 • Consensus 
Broadly speaking, Philia aims to: promote European and international legal and 
political standards regarding the protection of human rights, national minority rights, 
and freedoms; increase and enhance active citizen engagement in local governance, and 
combat hate speech, xenophobia, and all other forms of ethnic and religious intolerance. 
Philia encourages citizens, local governments, NGOs, and others to join eﬀorts to con-
solidate liberal democracy in multiethnic environments and preserve cultural diversity. 
Toward these ends, Philia promotes the European tradition of “open cities,” and the free 
ﬂow of goods, people, ideas, and information within and across these cities. 
Philia’s membership only comprises municipalities and communities that have 
expressed their dedication to ethnic tolerance and actively worked to improve 
interethnic relations through their ratiﬁcation of the Agreement.
 
Philia’s eﬀorts along these lines includes, for instance, creating conditions that sup-
port the minority languages in both public and private life. Joint activities across cities 
have been designed to provide support to the media to promote cultural traditions 
and languages of national and ethnic minorities, thereby facilitating the full societal 
integration of diverse members of society. Philia has also worked to integrate diversity 
issues into national education. This has involved ensuring that education accommodates 
the local speciﬁcities of diverse communities, and monitoring the implementation of 
education programs and reforms. 
The development of small- and medium-sized enterprises and cooperation between 
the private and public sectors is another important area of activity. Philia has worked 
to develop communication and cooperation among citizens, NGOs, and authorities 
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of local and regional self-government in all countries of the region. In accordance with 
the ratiﬁed international treaties, as well as multilateral and bilateral agreements, the 
association has shaped networks of NGOs and local authorities into triangles and circles 
of cross-border cooperation. In this manner, cooperation has been reestablished and 
new forms are created between the capitals and other regional, university, cultural, and 
information centers of these countries. 
Philia has been a frame from which to launch joint projects. The Association pursues 
cooperation with other NGOs, national associations, and local self-governments to en-
hance the eﬀective participation of national minorities in decision-making on all issues 
relevant for the local community. Citizens’ initiatives to soften borders and enhance 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation are coordinated by Philia, too, meshing with the 
larger aim to establish a new Euroregion for cooperation in South Eastern Europe. In 
short, the Association has sought to bring together the civil sector and local authorities 
to conduct joint actions that aim to improve public opinion and the cultural, legal, 
political, and economic prerequisites of interethnic tolerance and cooperation. 
Philia oﬀers a number of novel ideas in its approach. The ﬁrst of these is the manda-
tory inclusion of the NGO sector into the processes and projects of the Association. 
Every participating municipality must enter to the Association with its partner local 
NGO.
ALLIES AND TARGET GROUPS
At its core, Philia deals with local authorities (municipal and city) and NGOs. In particu-
lar, it targets multi-ethnic communities. But, its reach is much larger than this. Philia’s 
activities span regional multicultural communities; political parties and Parliament 
members; cultural and educational institutions; school and university students; sports 
clubs and associations for the promotion of the cultural and technical achievements of 
youth; local, regional, and national media; chambers of commerce; associations for the 
development of small- and medium-sized businesses; and Euroregional associations. 
Philia’s focus on local authorities and NGOs is justiﬁed as follows: 
 1) In general, central authorities are not positioned to address consistently and 
eﬃciently the speciﬁc circumstances and needs of citizens at the local level.
 2) Collaboration among local authorities (cities) and civil society actors can 
expand the range of channels for cross-border, inter-municipal cooperation. 
That is, once agreements on certain aspects of cross-border cooperation have 
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been made, city and civil society engagement can help make this “high policy” 
responsive to needs and interests “on the ground”—from the management of 
shared resources, to the free ﬂow of people and information. Involving civil 
society in inter-municipal cooperation is key.
 3) In the consolidation of democracy, this collaboration requires facilitation in 
order to become a common practice. 
The Importance of Civil Society-Government Engagement
On two occasions, nationalist parties came to power in Philia members cities. 
This happened through local elections held in Novi Sad in 2004, as well as in 
Osijek in 2005. These parties were not willing to cooperate with certain Philia 
members; they were also not considered to be acceptable partners by other 
Philia members. In these circumstances, the Steering Committee of Philia 
made a decision to temporarily “freeze” the cities’ membership Philia. In such 
situations, the principle according to which Philia members comprise not only 
cities, but also local non-governmental organizations, was important. In both 
cases, NGOs in Novi Sad (the Center for Regionalism) and Osijek (the Center 
for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights) became the crucial link between 
the Philia network and wide range of local economic, cultural, educational and 
other institutions in Novi Sad and Osijek. Thus, though nationalist parties were 
in power, these two NGOs represented Philia and continued cooperation with 
members of the network. 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Philia, as an association of diﬀerent societal actors, was founded on the principles of 
equality and mutual respect, volunteerism and openness, ﬂexibility and process. Deci-
sion-making within Philia is ﬂexible, reached by consensus; there is also no illusion that 
everyone can and will take part in every action. It is understood that steps are taken 
gradually and are responsive to changes in the environment. Along these lines, Philia 
has used some of the following slogans to publicize its cooperative process: “Step by 
step—Action!” “Word by word—Tolerance,” “City by City—Region,” “Region by Re-
gion—Europe without Frontiers,” and “Tolerance and Understanding—Above All.” 
Though ﬂexible and collaborative, decision-making in Philia does follow a certain 
logic. Its organizational structure is comprised of the following bodies: the Assembly, 
the President, the Steering and Supervisory Committees, the Council and the General 
Secretariat seated at the Center for Regionalism.
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 • The Assembly is the highest body of the association and it is composed of all 
its members. It is called by the President at least once in two years, upon the 
proposal of the Steering Committee or if initiated by at least one-quarter of the 
Association’s members. The Assembly decides on all the issues within the scope 
of Philia’s activities and responsibilities: adopting statutes, deﬁning the program 
guidelines for the association’s work, approval of ﬁnancial reports and reports 
on the association’s work, elections to the association’s bodies, committees, 
and commissions, decisions on joining international organizations, establish-
ing institutions of interest for its members and deciding on the termination of 
the association’s activities. In the Assembly, quorum is achieved if more than 
a half of the association’ members have been present. Decisions are made by 
public voting, on the basis of majority votes, unless otherwise speciﬁed by the 
Assembly.
 • The President represents Philia before other bodies and organizations and 
convenes and chairs Assembly sessions. He or she is accompanied by two Vice-
Presidents, who can stand in for the President when needed. The term of oﬃce 
of the President and Vice-presidents is four years. 
 • The Steering Committee is an executive body of the Assembly and comprises 11 
members elected by the Assembly. It coordinates the association’s activities in 
the period between two sessions. The mandate of this body is four years. 
 • The Supervisory Committee comprises ﬁve members and the term of oﬃce is 
four years. The role of the Supervisory Committee is to control the material 
and ﬁnancial transactions. 
 • The Council is an advisory body of the association. Its members tend to be 
well-respected public ﬁgures, including intellectuals, political leaders, and vari-
ous advocates for human and minority rights, democracy, tolerance, mutual 
understanding, and cooperation among nations and countries. The Council 
discusses the strategic issues concerning the association’s activities and make 
recommendations to the Assembly and other bodies of the association. When-
ever needed, the Council addresses the authorities and the overall public in the 
region, expressing its positions and initiatives as regards improving the culture 
of peace, democracy, tolerance and interethnic cooperation in the region and 
the entire Europe. The Council is chaired by the President of the Association. 
 • The Center for Regionalism in Novi Sad serves as the General Secretariat of the 
Association. The Secretariat is, essentially, the executive body of Philia. It man-
ages and coordinates activities among all Philia members, sometimes initiating 
projects, and sometimes responding to initiatives proposed by members. 
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Figure 1
Organizational Chart of Philia
PHILIA ENGAGED: PROJECTS AND ACTIVITIES
Expectations about the direct beneﬁts of the cooperation process within the Associa-
tion of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia were numerous. Of many 
projected results, the most important has been the movement’s longevity and growth: 
communication, contacts, and new forms of cooperation among local communities in 
the region have only expanded over the years. Philia has helped ensure the institution-
alization of regional cooperation, particularly by establishing intensive partnerships 
among non-governmental organizations and local authorities and facilitating “city di-
plomacy.” Indeed, as will be discussed in great detail through a series of case studies in 
this book, Philia has been integral in overcoming diplomatic stalemates and facilitating 
cross-border cooperation, particularly among ethnically divided communities, by way of 
city triangles. Additionally, Philia has enlisted and established project teams and expert 
groups to address issues of local concern. 
Despite its rather modest ﬁnancial resources, Philia’s activities have been wide-rang-
ing. Some initiatives have had a short lifespan; others have been continued and even 
expanded. Philia has developed projects to support dialogue and understanding among 
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minority and majority groups, formulate policies that accommodate diverse populations 
at the local level, and support more eﬀective participation of minorities in public life. 
These projects have entailed enlisting expert groups and conducting research, carrying out 
lobbying, advocacy, and extensive public relations campaigns, implementing educational 
events and trainings, personal communication, and organizing various open events to 
discuss and debate issues related to interethnic relations. Philia has also engaged in net-
working and capacity-building in and across the civil society and government sectors to 
support the accommodation of diversity, and provided small grants for concrete projects. 
It has addressed active resistance to hate speech and other forms of discrimination and 
ethnic and religious intolerance. Along these lines, an important indirect impact of Philia’s 
work has can be seen in the creation of a constructive approach towards interethnic 
relations, civic initiatives, and civil society-government engagement. 
Several areas of activity are featured below.
Exchanges of Experiences 
Philia members and the General Secretariat communicate regularly, including by way 
of personal visits, meetings and other events. Thematic conferences and round tables 
are organized for representatives of multiethnic municipalities (NGOs and self-govern-
ments), members of Euroregions, as well as triangles and circles of cooperation within 
them. 
Additionally, since 2007, the General Secretariat of Philia has envisioned itself as 
a center of information exchange and education. It has organized several study visits 
for students, youth, NGO activists, and other interested parties to oﬃces of the EU, 
local and central authorities, international organizations, and others. Making use of its 
extensive professional network, Philia has also supported students’ research in the ﬁeld 
of human and minority rights and democratization of society. In cooperation with the 
Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies from Sarajevo, students from Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia have used the Secretariat’s services. 
Finally, Philia members have arranged regional cultural events, including events for 
diverse secondary school and university students, as well as sport competitions.
Cooperation of Philia with Pro-European Civic Organizations 
As the seat of the General Secretariat of Philia and one of the key actors of the Igman 
Initiative, the Center for Regionalism in Novi Sad has been engaged permanently in 
facilitating cooperation among more than one hundred civil society organizations around 
the promotion of human and minority rights, democracy, and the normalization of rela-
T H E  A S S O C I A T I O N  O F  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  O F  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E – P H I L I A
63
tions in the region on the basis of European living standards. Philia has been invited to 
join a consultative group of the National Convent, oﬀering expertise on various aspects 
of regional cooperation. The National Convent is a state institution that deals with the 
complex and multifaceted process of Serbia’s accession to the EU.. 
Training, Seminars, and Local Capacity Development
Multiple events have been organized aimed to raise awareness and build capacity in 
certain issue areas, from political participation, to local economic development, to 
human rights. Participants in educational seminars have included Philia members, as 
well as members of target groups, like students and youth or representatives of political 
parties. 
With ﬁnancial and technical support from LGI, Philia participated in the training 
of local authorities for eﬃcient governance and the provision of high-quality services 
provision. Seminars and trainings were focused on strengthening the capacities in the 
ﬁeld of minority rights and public administration. In February 2007, a training on 
diversity management included the participation of representatives of local authorities 
from Zrenjanin, Senta, and Sombor in Serbia.
With the support of the Balkan Trust for Democracy, the NGO Partners for Local 
Development Foundation (FPDL) from Bucharest, Romania organized two trainings 
for Philia members, one in September and another in November 2007. The aim of 
these trainings was capacity development for the employees of local administrations 
and NGOs in the participatory decision-making process; to learn mediation skills in 
crisis resolution, and to ensure quality in conﬂict management. FPDL provided several 
small grants, which were allocated to most successful participants in the seminar, to be 
implemented in these local environments. 
City Triangles of Cooperation 
Philia has been integral in facilitating cross-border cooperation, particularly among eth-
nically divided communities, by way of city triangles. (This area of activity is discussed 
later in this book.) Through public relations and publications, public meetings, oﬃcial 
visits, and other avenues, Philia has facilitated the establishment and expansion of city 
triangles. With the hope to engage more civil society and government participation, a 
great amount of eﬀort is put into raising awareness about city triangles. For instance, 
publications of the General Secretariat of the Association, the Philia Reports, are used 
to present Philia’s eﬀorts to promote city triangles. 
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Philia Conferences: Highlights 
 • The founding assembly of Philia was at a conference entitled “Tolerance and 
Understanding—Above All Belgrade, July 6, 2004.”
 • A conference on “Cooperation in the Tri-border Zone between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro,” held in the coastal city of Neum, BiH, 
April 27–28, 2007, resulted in establishing the triangles of cooperation. 
 • The enhancement of cooperation among the respective capitals was discussed 
at the conference “Reform of Authorities and Cooperation of Capitals in South 
Eastern Europe,” organized in Belgrade, April 17–18, 2007. 
Research, Publishing, and Public Relations
Philia places great emphasis on sharing and publicizing its work. A great number of 
thematic conferences and roundtables have been organized for representatives of mul-
tiethnic municipalities (NGOs and self-governments), members of Euroregions, as well 
as triangles and circles of cooperation within them. Philia has also organized a large 
number of public discussions as part of the thematic unit titled “Communication and 
Cooperation in South Eastern Europe with the Association of Multiethnic Cities.”
In addition to events, Philia puts a great amount of eﬀorts into publishing—to 
share basic information, for educational purposes, and to support targeted lobbying and 
advocacy campaigns. The electronic version of monthly Philia Newsletter is regularly 
published and distributed, containing relevant information about the activities of the 
Association and its members. The newsletter is distributed to members of Philia, inter-
national organizations and institutions, as well as other relevant entities in the region. 
Often, such as when carrying out scientiﬁc research and public polls, Philia cooperates 
with universities and other educational and cultural institutions. Philia’s eﬀorts have 
also been recognized and publicized by other actors in the ﬁeld. For instance, its activi-
ties have been presented as a “success story” by the Balkan Trust for Democracy of the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States.
Major publications include the book Decentralization in the Light of the New Con-
stitution of Serbia was published with contributions from the most competent experts in 
the ﬁeld of decentralization and regionalization in Serbia. Through diﬀerent initiatives 
to improve minority rights in local communities—empirical research, expert analyses, 
and public debates—the Center for Regionalism, too, has published several books and 
expert brochures, which have been distributed throughout South Eastern Europe.
Independently, many Philia members engage in research and publish on themes 
related to good governance and democracy. As part of its publishing activities, Philia 
has published two books written by Professor Jovan Komšić. Dilemmas of the Democratic 
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Nation and Autonomy was published in cooperation with the Oﬃcial Gazette from Bel-
grade (the publisher of the year in 2006). Later, Principles of European Regionalism was 
published in English and Serbian, both electronically and in printed versions, for the 
conference and annual assembly of Philia held in Novi Sad in November 2007. Beyond 
the introductory study by Professor Komšić and several other authors’ analyses, the book 
contains all the relevant documents of Council of Europe pertaining to regionalism. 
For this reason, it forms part of the basic literature at the interdisciplinary EU Master 
Studies of the University of Novi Sad, for the course on EU Regional Policy. 
 
Charter of Interethnic Tolerance
Philia has developed an award, its Charter of Interethnic Tolerance that has been granted 
to several distinguished individuals at the association’s meetings in Zagreb in 2005, in 
Podgorica in 2006, and in Novi Sad in 2007. Recipients are awarded for their eﬀorts 
to improve relations interethnic relations and the position of ethnic communities in 
municipalities, to encourage these individuals to continue their work, and to stimulate 
others to follow their lead. 
Recipients of the Charter of Interethnic Tolerance 
 • 2nd Assembly Meeting, Podgorica, Montenegro, July 4, 2006
  — Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe
  — Jasmin Imamović, Mayor of Tuzla, Bosnia and Herzegovina
  — George Ciuhandu, Mayor of Timisoara, Romania
  — Ilona Mihaes, Director of the Euroregional Center for Democracy, Timisoara, 
Romania
  — Vehid Šehić, Director of the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
 • 3rd Assembly, Novi Sad, November 29, 2007 
  — Boris Miletić, Mayor of Pula, Croatia
  — Mirjana Galo, President of the NGO Homo, Pula, Croatia
  — Trifun Kostovski, Mayor of Skopje, Macedonia
  — Vlado Dimovski, Director of the NGO Center for Interethnic Tolerance 
and Refugees in Macedonia 
  — Bojan Kostreš, past President of the Assembly of AP Vojvodina, Serbia
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 • 4th Assembly, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, July 3, 2009
  — Alija Behmen, Mayor of city of Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
  — Lidija Živanović, President of Helsinki Citizens Parliament of Banja Luka, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina
  — Ivan Cenov, past Mayor of City of Vidin, Bulgaria
  — Petra Kovacs, Program Manager, Local Government and Public Service 
Reform Initiative, Open Society Institute, Budapest
Figure 2
Charter of Interethnic Tolerance
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Small Grants
Philia has organized small grants competitions. After designing and circulating a call for 
proposals, the Association supported seven regional projects (in BiH, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Hungary, Romania, Montenegro, and Serbia) that addressed cross-border and regional 
cooperation, youth issues, and the capacities of local self-governments.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
In accordance with its program goals and through its network of members, Philia has 
established contacts and cooperation with a large number of similar associations, such as 
the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, the Assembly 
of European Regions, the Association of Local Democracy Agencies (ALDA), and the 
Network of Associations of Local Authorities in South Eastern Europe (NALAS), and 
others. 
In 2006, Philia, oﬃcially become a part of a task force of the Stability Pact for 
South Eastern Europe, which is political declaration of commitment and a frame-
work agreement on international cooperation to develop a shared strategy among all 
partners for stability and growth in the region. A part of this expert and consultative 
body, Philia has made a substantial contribution to deliberations on local democracy 
and cross-border cooperation in South Eastern Europe. Engagement with the Stability 
Pact has been mutual: support provided by the Stability Pact, with the guidance of its 
Special Coordinator, Mr. Erhard Busek, and his close associates, has been signiﬁcant 
for the establishment and aﬃrmation of Philia as a prominent actor in the regional 
public environment 
Philia actively cultivates its regional expert base, with the aim to share and exchange 
experiences within South Eastern Europe and beyond. Among others, LGI, as an im-
portant advisor and funder for the network, has supported these eﬀorts. Speciﬁcally, it 
has encouraged Philia to share its knowledge and innovations in improving relations 
in multiethnic communities. The unique value of Philia in its consultative role lies in 
its emphasis on promoting the principles of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance as 
a model for resolving conﬂicts. Beyond South Eastern Europe, Philia’s messages have 
been shared among local experts, oﬃcials, and civil society representatives in Central 
Asia, as well.
68
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
Inter-regional Dialogue
Philia representatives have also shared their experiences with colleagues from other re-
gions, to support the spreading of good practices, build professional linkages, and create 
a more robust understanding of local practices to multiethnic community management. 
With the Center for Regionalism, Philia has received ﬁnancial and technical support 
from the Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative (LGI) for a range of 
activities with post-Soviet Central Asia. 
Inter-regional cooperation was underpinned by the understanding that countries 
of both regions—the former Yugoslavia and post-Soviet Central Asia—share numerous 
similarities. Both were members of large, multiethnic, multi-cultural, multi-lingual, 
and multi-confessional unions or federations, and continue to struggle with process of 
rebuilding national identities, economies, and systems of government. In both regions, 
new—and at times contentious—national borders have divided communities, resources, 
and the ﬂow of information, goods, and people. Certainly, there are diﬀerences, too: 
it has become clear that levels economic development, institutions, political will, 
administrative systems, socio-cultural factors, and geopolitical issues (including EU 
integration), among others, must be taken into account in the transfer of knowledge 
experiences across regions.
Since 2006, joint activities between Central Asia and South Eastern Europe have 
focused issues of cross-border cooperation, local policies in multiethnic communities, 
regionalism, and various issues of local governance and administrative reform. These 
issues have been explored through professional exchanges, or study trips, in both re-
gions, conferences and workshops, resource development and translation, mentoring, 
informal discussions. 
In the summer of 2006, Philia representative traveled to Kyrgyzstan for an introduc-
tory forum on inter-regional cooperation. This was followed by a study tour of partners 
from Kyrgyzstan to the General Secretariat of the association, as a continuation of 
professional cooperation among Philia, the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) in Kyrgyzstan, and the Soros Foundation–Kyrgyzstan. In November 2006, a 
group consisting of the mayor of the city of Uzgen city in southern Kyrgyzstan, repre-
sentatives of the UNDP, experts of the Soros Foundation–Kyrgyzstan, and the head of 
the Association of Cities from Kyrgyzstan visited South Eastern Europe. The participants 
attended several regional conferences and round tables, such as the ones held in Miločer 
and Novi Sad. The group visited the municipalities of Herceg Novi (Montenegro), 
Tuzla and Srebrenica (Bosnia and Herzegovina), and Sombor (Serbia), where they had 
an opportunity to learn about the problems and good practices of the local administra-
tions. In November 2008, Philia representatives traveled to Kyrgyzstan to meet with a 
range of stakeholders, visit local sites, and participate in a regional conference to present 
and discuss the range of local practices that have been developed to manage ethnically 
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diverse communities. In November 2009, a group of Philia representatives participated 
in a conference with local leaders from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, organized by UNDP 
oﬃces in these countries with support from LGI/OSI, on cross-border municipal or 
community cooperation. Using Philia as an example, this area of work is helping to 
formalize cooperation among communities in border areas in the region, potentially 
toward an Association of Multiethnic Cities of the Central Asia.
These initiatives are part of a constant learning process. They have revealed both 
similarities and diﬀerences across the regions: that help support on-going professional 
exchanges and mentoring. Moreover, they have helped build and expanding network 
of actors in both regions dedicated to common goals of peace, democratization, and 
regional stability. 
TRANSPARENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY 
Media attention focused on Philia’s activities4 indicate just how much the general public 
is the “soul brain, and power” of the organization. In this framework, Philia has pooled 
together and enabled reputable persons to show their moral virtues during an “era 
of evil.” Its members are ready to stand up against hatred and violence and use their 
knowledge and organizational skills in the struggle for change toward the rule of law 
and democracy for all citizens. 
Philia and many of its members previously were part of the antiwar struggle for 
human rights in the region; it represents a civil initiative or movement to achieve 
multiculturalism within Philia and among its members. Philia has since provided 
the prerequisites for the synergy in competencies and inﬂuences of a great number of 
respectable individuals, civil organizations, and public institutions. It wants to ensure 
that European values of peace, tolerance, democracy, social justice, and transparency 
receive a substantial support in transitional societies, especially those still burdened by 
past frustrations and fears for the future.
The advantage of Philia in comparison to many other civil organizations is primarily 
found in the diversity of its members, in a network comprised of many types of civil 
organizations, with experts from the entire region of South Eastern Europe, who have 
a great variety of available information, experiences, and practices. Therefore, as an 
organization Philia has thought and acted both locally and regionally to bring about 
a change in public discourse in the region. Some important European organizations 
have recognized Philia’s contribution as a credible and eﬃcient partner in the processes 
of improving the social and political prerequisites of Euro-Atlantic integration of all 
countries in the region. Members of Philia have certainly become signiﬁcant partners of 
central authorities in the process of decentralization and public administration reforms 
at local and regional level. 
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 The very diversity of the association’s members—be it individuals, cities, or organiza-
tions—has ensured that its members could maximize their potential to free themselves 
while contributing their wisdom and skills to the eﬀort to narrow the gap between 
minority and majority groups, eliminate discrimination, and reopen old trade routes 
that are essential to their economies in the many years of peace to come. 
NOTES
1 M. Massari, Which Way for Serbia and Montenegro to Europe? OSCE Mission to Serbia and 
Montenegro, Belgrade, 2005, p. 60.
2 The text of the Agreement can be found in Annex 2 of this book. All members of Philia as of 
August 2009 are listed in Annex 3.
3 The names of some of these initiatives are: Danube–Sava–Drava, Danube–Kris–Mures–Tisza 
(DKMT), Drina–Sava–Majevica, Adriatic-Ionic Region, EuroBalkan (Niš–Soﬁa–Skopje), Danube 
21, Stara Planina Region, and Alpe–Adria–Panonia.
4 The evidence for this may be found in a media portfolio featuring Philia and its announcements, 
projects, members, and partner organizations.
Cross-border Cooperation: 
City Triangles
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Introduction: 
Municipal Triangles in 
South Eastern Europe 
Gábor Péteri
TRIANGLES OF COOPERATION: PROCESS AS RESULT
This section of Managing Multiethnic Cities in South Eastern Europe presents the tech-
nical aspects of inter-municipal cooperation within triangles of cities across the newly 
created borders of the former Yugoslavia. However, it tries to go beyond standard issues 
of the local government analysis, like:  What sources of funding and sustainability were 
procured? Which organizational forms and management techniques were the most ef-
ﬁcient? During our research for this book, we sought to answer why and how, in the 
aftermath of violent conﬂict, local governments have been able to institutionalize their 
cooperation. This introductory chapter discusses how, despite the legacy and conse-
quences of the Balkan wars, these cities  formalized their contacts in order to resolve 
their common problems and managed to  remain home to ethnically diverse and recently 
divided populations. Their joint activities ranged widely, from “soft issues” like cultural 
and sport events, to business development and questions of water supply. 
These various forms of cooperation began in extremely trying times. After the war, 
in the period when memories of the ﬁghts and hostilities were still very much alive, 
some members of the ﬁrst, new generation of leaders took the risk of opening towards 
their former enemies. Often, they had just enough suﬃcient public and political sup-
port to initiate the contacts with their neighbors, but in a rapidly-changing political 
environment, they soon either had to resign or change tact and cooperation then slowed. 
Perhaps this ﬂuctuation in joint programs, the constant negotiations, and the dynamics 
of collaborative actions—rather than the model of city triangles itself—characterize 
inter-municipal cooperation best. 
This introductory chapter provides an overview of inter-municipal cooperation, by 
synthesizing several key points that are explored in-depth through the four case studies 
of city triangles presented in this section of the book. Among other issues, these cases 
expose how diﬃcult and risky it was to initiate contacts and to launch any type of 
cooperation with a city on the other side of the border. Local leaders had to ﬁnd their 
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local counterparts in neighboring communities and also allies at the national level. They 
had to create the legal forms of cooperation and constantly had to solve newly emerging 
problems in a hardly-supportive, if not deliberately obstructive, legal, administrative, 
and political environment. One of the starting points was the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance, developed partly by experts and others from these cities. Later, after being 
ratiﬁed by the cities’ assemblies, it opened the prospects for concrete cooperation.
 All these struggles to develop, implement, and re-establish diplomacy, trade, and 
cooperation among triangles of cities prove that the maintenance of the process of coop-
eration itself is as important as the intended results of the joint activities. Laying down 
the foundations of cooperation proved to citizens in these municipalities that—after 
the recent war and interethnic conﬂicts, and the emergence of new national borders 
and independent states—there were actually chances to rebuild connections and return 
to the earlier, relatively peaceful forms of cohabitation. The case studies in this section 
and this brief summary intend to focus on the factors of this process, laying down the 
conditions of future tangible results of cooperation in the triangles of cities.
FACTORS OF SUCCESS: CIVIC GROUPS, POLITICS, AND DONORS
Launching Cooperation: The Role of NGOs
A decentralized response to the problems caused by the war and the newly created 
national borders originates partly from the political history of the Socialist Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia. Even under the single-party rule in the former Yugoslavia, special 
forms of self-governance created important counterpoints to the central state. During 
the late 1990s, cities and municipalities also played a signiﬁcant role in initiating po-
litical changes in Serbia. The “diplomacy of cities” was the basis of the ﬁrst triangle of 
cooperation in the Baja-Osijek-Sombor region. 
Civic initiatives and non-governmental organizations worked to build the triangles 
of cities on two diﬀerent levels. Firstly, they were strong allies of those innovative may-
ors and local leaders who launched the cooperation. These projects were initiated from 
below; as grass-roots movements they were close to ordinary people. Consequently, they 
could recognize their needs and interests.
In most of the triangles of cities, non-governmental organiyations (NGOs) 
guaranteed continuity in cooperation. When the local leadership was changed or the 
composition of the elected councils was modiﬁed and institutional support evaporated, 
these civic groups then kept their contacts alive. NGOs, being the formal founding 
members of the agreements, had the right to continue the cooperation in their own 
ﬁelds (e.g., in the case of Bajina Bašta/Srebrenica after 2004). 
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Secondly, the civic organizations behind the triangles of cities movement were able 
to promote this cooperation at the national and international levels. The group of activ-
ists and former politicians around the Center for Regionalism had various initiatives, 
which helped to launch and to formalize these joint actions. The best example is the 
case of the triangle in Herceg Novi–Dubrovnik–Trebinje. Here, the local partners were 
rather divided, but there was some willingness to solve their common problems. It was 
communicated to the national level (Ministries of Foreign Aﬀairs) by the local consul-
tants and representative of the Igman Initiative. Building on their informal contacts to 
the central government oﬃcials, the local partners received support (and “directives”) 
to build their solutions through cooperation. Here, NGO leaders worked as interlocu-
tors. They were able to inﬂuence the reluctant local governments through the national 
political party mechanisms and the administrative channels from the top. 
Politics Matters—But Individuals Count
In the over-politicized public sector and centralized local government system, the 
political parties deﬁned the scope and speed of cooperation between the cities. When 
immediately after the war, progressive political forces were in power on both sides of 
the border, then they could more easily ﬁnd their counterparts at the municipalities 
in the other countries. In the cases of Bajina Bašta–Srebrenica and Tuzla–Osijek–Novi 
Sad, the mayors representing local liberal and democratic parties were more open to 
cooperation. In the latter case the regional authorities (the Okrug and the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina) were also supportive. 
In local politics, where individuals tend to matter more than members of the national 
party machinery, the mayors and municipal elected oﬃcials had room to maneuver 
and cooperate. However, when there is a nationwide shift in political preferences, these 
progressive actors might not be supported by their own parties. When local elections 
are primarily based on party lists, political parties supporting cooperation may feat that 
they will lose votes because of cooperation-minded candidates. 
The political inﬂuence was very visible in those cases where nationalist or conser-
vative forces were elected. The triangle of Herceg Novi–Dubrovnik–Trebinje is a clear 
example of how local conservative party representatives could block cooperation, even 
when there was a ﬁrm support for cooperation from the national level. 
Political inﬂuence might be also helpful, as it was very much visible in the case of 
the Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle. Here, there are personal networks and informal 
organizations behind the triangles of cities. The Center for Regionalism and the 
movement initiated by its management had a democratic-reformist political party 
aﬃliation. These political forces ﬁghting against the disintegration of Yugoslavia actively 
promoted cross-border cooperation. Through their own personal contacts, they were 
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able to mobilize local and national leaders in the new countries, once all being part of 
Yugoslavia. 
Historical Roots 
Traditional contacts and the former legacies of interaction in a relatively peaceful 
multiethnic environment contributed to the development of diplomacy by using the 
triangles of cities approach. Traditional contacts cultivated over the centuries were good 
bases for cooperation, especially in those regions that had once belonged to the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy and that also were part of the Ottoman Empire for a shorter 
period. The cities of Baja, Osijek, and Sombor were important fortresses and later became 
leading, autonomous centers of the Austrian Monarchy at the Ottoman border region. 
Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad also used to belong to the well-organized Habsburg state, which 
helped to establish thriving economic and cultural contacts.
More recent historical developments also might inﬂuence the cooperation of cities 
in the diﬀerent countries included in this report. For example, Srebrenica is located in 
Republika Srpska, an entity of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which helps to establish good 
international contacts with the municipality of Bajina Bašta in Serbia. The contacts are 
further strengthened by the fact that the large municipalities in these countries have 
mixed ethnic groups. So there are villages with a Serbian population in the territory of 
predominantly Muslim (Bosniak) Srebrenica. This is one reason why the cooperation 
here focuses primarily on education and healthcare services.
History has not only connected but more recently divided these cities. Reports from 
the triangles of cities during the wars of the 1990s often refer to the attacks launched 
from a neighboring city, that is, from Novi Sad army headquarters to Osijek; from 
Podgorica to Dubrovnik. The very names of military units (Novi Sad Corps, Podgorica 
Corps) suggested that the attacks on cities in Slavonia, such as Osijek, or in Dalmatia, 
such as Dubrovnik, were launched from those cities with the army barracks. Although 
a very small percentage of Novi Sad and Podgorica populations were actually part of 
these corps, only the military units were named after them.
Economic Decline 
Cities establishing new forms of cooperation often belonged to the same economic area. 
Regional power plants provided energy through the common grid, former state-owned 
enterprises were built on raw materials of a broader area, markets for agricultural products 
were available in the neighboring cities, tourism was developed in a complementary way 
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for a larger region. Cities of the triangles were sometimes centers of smaller economic 
regions, also cut by the new borders (e.g., the Tuzla basin, Eastern Slavonia (Osijek), 
and Vojvodina (Novi Sad).
Most of these economic contacts were destroyed by the war and the businesses 
were separated by the new boundaries. Restructuring of the ailing national economies 
was an additional burden, especially in the triangles located on the new peripheries, far 
from the capital cities. Poorly managed privatization also increased the economic and 
social problems in these regions. Unemployment was an important motivating factor 
of cooperation for the local leaders. 
Yet slowly the economic contacts were re-established. In 2007, all the countries of the 
former Yugoslavia joined the Central European Trade Agreement (CEFTA). Traditional 
local businesses, like fruits and dairy products reached the regional markets. Tourism 
was developed with simpliﬁed border crossing. 
Development Assistance
Many international organizations and various donor-funded development programs were 
active in the region. An emerging group of NGOs were obvious partners for programs 
dealing with humanitarian relief, reconciliation, capacity development and technical 
assistance issues. Donor funding re-connected these organizations, especially when joint 
programs and training events were organized on a regional basis.
As the European Commission became the major international organization in the 
region, its goals and priorities primarily deﬁne future international assistance to the 
triangle of cities program. In the present budgeting period till 2013, as the European 
Agency of Reconstruction programs were replaced by the Instruments of Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA) programs, the importance of cross-border cooperation has increased. 
This component supporting cooperation among the beneﬁciary countries and with 
the Member States is available for all the candidate (Croatia and Macedonia) and the 
potential candidate countries (Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro, and condition-
ally, Serbia ). 
In South Eastern Europe and within this larger region in the Western Balkans, 
cross-border cooperation is a high priority. And there also are transnational coopera-
tion programs. Some of the larger, more developed areas already wanted to create an 
Euroregion (Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad). This shift in the EU policies towards supporting 
cross-border cooperation might be a positive side-eﬀect of the previous eﬀorts to connect 
the neighboring cities. But it will be a new opportunity also for the triangles, because 
these funds open up new possibilities for cooperation.
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COOPERATION MECHANISMS: WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED?
The cooperation of autonomous local governments in a market economy has several 
advantages, especially for those municipalities that are located relatively far from the 
national capitals and isolated in rural, border regions. Cross-border cooperation increases 
the signiﬁcance of the horizontal linkages between local governments, because it also 
strengthens the international relations with neighboring countries. 
In South Eastern Europe, traditional contacts were cut by the newly created borders. 
Here the primary beneﬁt of cross-border cooperation is to give an institutional, formal 
framework of dialogue through twinning or administrative, cultural exchange programs. 
This political dimension of cooperation is usually the starting point for establishing 
contacts in other areas, too. In countries of the Western Balkans, legislation allows for 
local governments to openly establish international contacts; however, they are usually 
reported to central authorities. 
Local governments, even in the most centralized systems, have some responsibilities 
for promoting economic development. Support to businesses through city marketing, open-
ing new market opportunities, assisting to create direct contacts between entrepreneurs, 
and demolishing administrative barriers to businesses are the most typical actions. The 
economic rationale behind these eﬀorts is that they create agglomeration eﬀects. Or 
potential beneﬁts from larger markets and more diverse business contacts create added 
value for companies and entrepreneurs. Within the European Union these activities are 
also part of regional development programs.
In the area of local government service provision, cooperation could improve eﬃ-
ciency through decreasing the unit costs of public service delivery in larger service areas. 
Economies-of-scale in service provision are present primarily in the case of network-based 
utility and infrastructure services. Larger local water systems or bigger catchment areas 
for waste collection and connected energy systems could decrease the costs of services. 
Beyond these ﬁnancial beneﬁts, cooperation in environmental protection or risk preven-
tion also could be valuable for local governments. 
Most of these beneﬁts from cross-border cooperation are present in the triangles 
of cities. During the past few years some of these advantages of municipal cooperation 
have been realized and the forms of collaboration have been gradually developed. They 
will be summarized in the following sections. 
Typical Projects
Areas for municipal cooperation are very much deﬁned by the characteristics, competen-
cies, and powers of the local governments. In countries of the former Yugoslavia usually 
there are one-tier local government systems, with relatively large municipalities. These 
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municipalities with a population of 30,000–50,000 usually cover several villages (on 
average, 16–18 sub-municipal governments). Croatia is an exception, because it has an 
intermediary level of government and the average size of municipalities is only 8,800. 
These typically large local governments are mostly responsible for basic urban and 
administrative services. The scope of local functions is limited: the share of local expen-
ditures in ﬁve to seven percent of GDP. The funding of local governments is primarily 
based on categorical grants and the sectoral ministries are deeply involved in service 
management. All these factors partly explain why the typical areas of cooperation in the 
triangles of cities are the utility services, environmental protection, regional cooperation 
in tourism, and economic development. 
The actual forms and areas of cooperation within the triangles of cities were diverse. 
One typical motive was to overcome the problems caused by the war and the new country 
boundaries. For example, in the case of Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad the general problems 
of returning refugees, settling the disputes over their former properties, the future of 
their pensions, and the status of missing citizens were targeted by the triangles. But in 
the case of Dubrovnik (Konavlje)–Herceg Novi–Trebinje, a connected water network 
was the main issue. 
In this very complicated case, water ﬂows originate in Bosnia and Hercegovina, the 
network crosses Croatia to Herceg Novi, which, as a major user, has no access to major 
alternative water sources. The water system was built under the Yugoslav period, so all 
the municipal leaders reasonably claim that the capital investment was ﬁnanced by their 
citizens. Being in a monopolistic position, the water was rationed by Croatia in the dry 
summer periods. Under these new circumstances, Herceg Novi did not pay the full price 
of transporting the water through Croatia, so a court case was initiated. 
The negotiations between local leaders was supported by the respective national 
government oﬃcials. But a dialogue at both national and local levels was orchestrated 
by the Igman Initiative and various international actors to dissolve the wall between the 
hostile municipal leaders. Presently new forms of cooperation are being designed. They 
are mostly driven by international donor programs, for example, establishing a regional 
center for ﬁre protection, opening small border crossing points, etc.
Environmental protection is another typical area of cross-border cooperation. The 
bay at Dubrovnik is easily polluted by the currents from the south, where city of Herceg 
Novi is located. In the cases of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica, cleaning the banks of the 
Drina River is a common task. There are plans in Bosnia and Hercegovina to join the 
regional landﬁll under construction in Serbia (in the city of Uzice). Flood protection 
also has been a common task for some cities (e.g., Baja–Osijek–Sombor).
Another motivation for cooperation is to help minorities on the other side of the new 
borders. In Srebrenica, which became a Muslim municipality, there are Serb minorities 
in some villages. They always have used the healthcare services (hospitals), the second-
ary schools, and the kindergartens on the Serbian-majority territories. So now, when 
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the new bordercrossing was established, the commuters keep coming. The services are 
ﬁnanced by the Serbian national and local budgets, regardless of the fact that the users 
are citizens of another state (Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Hercegovina).
Forms of Cooperation
The new countries of the former Yugoslavia tend to be centralized. Some of them are 
in the process of building national states and real decentralization was started with 
signiﬁcant delay, only from 2000. In Serbia under Milosevic, even regional autonomy 
was taken away and local government property was nationalized. The management 
structures of cross-border local level cooperation are being built gradually under these 
circumstances. 
In the case of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica, where the cooperation was initiated from 
below, there were no previous experiences establishing new cross-border institutions. 
They lacked legal models and administrative procedures for registering them. Distance to 
the center in these cases helped the cities to develop their own solutions, because they 
had the power to break the rules or to create their own forms of cooperation. 
Cross-border cooperation also was hindered by the diﬀerences in the forms of 
decentralization in various countries. The joint programs have to be developed under 
diﬀerent institutional settings. For example, in Croatia the elected county local govern-
ment (županije) and the network of regional development agencies control the funds, 
while in other countries they are mostly under the ministries.
Other soft areas of cooperation (e.g., cultural events) were managed by the elected 
local governments. For example, in the case of Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad the founders 
agreed to organize consultative meetings on a rotating basis, that is every year in another 
member city. Joint decisions had to be put on the agenda of the respective assemblies 
(elected councils).
Local autonomy to create triangles of cooperation and the dynamics of the events 
gave a lot of ﬂexibility to the participants. Non-governmental organizations were often 
the initiators and the driving forces of political-administrative collaboration. Thus, if 
after a local election the new leadership that had inherited the cooperation agreement 
decided not to talk to their neighbors, then the NGOs continued their own contacts. 
They helped to maintain a minimum level of cooperation. So the lack of standard rules 
also could support the active members of the joint organizations, because they could 
modify the procedures and the role of initiators, even if the driving forces behind the 
triangles might have been changed.
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Financing Cooperation
Flexibility in organizational forms and management schemes of the triangles also in-
ﬂuenced the funding mechanisms. There were no regular forms of revenue collection 
for cooperation purposes. The centralized local government ﬁnances and project-based 
cooperation prevented them from establishing stable funding rules. However, the ac-
tivity focused funding helped the triangles of cities to collect external funds, primarily 
from donors. 
So the permanent costs of cooperation—that is the project overheads—were often 
charged on other initiatives. This cross-ﬁnancing made the projects acceptable to other 
support programs (e.g., for the Igman Initiative/Center for Regionalism in the case of 
Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle). Obviously, when the activities under the triangles of 
cooperation were funded by the donors, then the full costs could be recovered.
Transparency and Publicity 
Activities under the triangles of cities movement are being organized for the general pub-
lic. They are aimed at to foster the reconciliation process, so they should be transparent 
and widely publicized. The local governments actively supported those non-governmental 
organizations that were able to disseminate information. Local media was invited to all 
the actions and events (see the case of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica). Journalists exchanged 
information and reported about the events in the neighboring cities.
THE FUTURE OF THE TRIANGLES: 
FROM SYMBOLIC TO PRACTICAL ISSUES
The ﬁrst cooperation in the present triangles of cities was launched a decade ago. It was 
initiated in the period shortly after the war among the nations of the former Yugosla-
via. At that time, triangles of cooperation were the ﬁrst formal attempts to re-establish 
contacts between former enemies. The emphasis was on the renewal of the local con-
tacts between citizens, non-governmental organizations, and local governments, which 
used to belong to the same country. The ﬁrst stage of cooperation aimed at stopping 
hostilities, breaking the wall of prejudices between neighbors, and slowly starting the 
process of reconciliation. 
The new forms of cross-border cooperation had to be established in that period, 
when the military attacks and the killings were still in everybody’s memory. As one 
partner in a member city of the triangles said, “We do not forget and do not forgive.” 
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However, this attitude is slowly changing, partly thanks to the local movements like the 
Igman Initiative and triangles of cooperation.
Despite the shift in national politics in many countries of the region, which led to 
greater inﬂuence of the nationalistic forces, we believe that a new stage of cooperation is 
starting. The emphasis will move from the very symbolic questions towards more practi-
cal issues. The triangles of cities will prove their strength, inﬂuence, and sustainability if 
they are able to assist the member local governments and NGOs in solving the present 
problems. And these solutions are desperately needed in local public service delivery, 
economic development, environmental protection, etc. As the same partner said, they 
were fully aware of how much they could beneﬁt from cross-border cooperation, because 
“You are richer if your neighbor is richer.” 
It will take a long time until the hostile policies, originating from the experiences 
of the recent past, will be suppressed by this more pragmatic approach towards the 
neighbors. But the triangles of cities have started this process. Luckily, not only local 
populations but also international organizations have noticed the importance of the 
local-level cooperation in a region. The sustainability of the triangles of cooperation will 
be supported by various cross-border programs of the IPA and other European Com-
mission initiatives, like the Transnational Cooperation Programme or by establishing 
Euroregions, as a framework for joint actions. All these instruments will work only if 
they will be utilized eﬀectively by those people who once lived close to their neighbors 
for decades and who still understand one another’s languages. 
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Triangle of Cooperation: 
Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad 
Aleksandar Popov
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The towns of Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina), Osijek (Croatia), and Novi Sad (Serbia) 
belong to a common geographical, economic and cultural area. As part of Yugoslavia, 
they enjoyed a high level of cooperation in all ﬁelds. With the collapse of Yugoslavia and 
the wars waged in the region, cooperation and communication among the towns ceased. 
Regional NGOs—the Center for Regionalism of Novi Sad, partner organizations from 
Tuzla, and the Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human Rights from Osijek—made 
eﬀorts in the late 1990s and early 2000s to restore cooperation among the three towns. 
These eﬀorts bore fruit and on January 21, 2002 in Tuzla: the three mayors and directors 
of three NGOs from each towns took part in a ceremony, signing the Agreement on 
Interethnic Tolerance. This agreement became the basis for the renewal of cooperation 
among the three municipalities. The values of the agreement were operationalized in 
a range of joint eﬀorts in areas of economics and business, ecology, information and 
techonology, sports, and education, among others. The restored cooperation among 
the three towns has made signiﬁcant contributions to overcoming the deep, post-war 
psychological barriers. It became a model on the basis of which new triangles or circles 
of cooperation of towns would later be formed, leading to the formalization of the 
Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia.
HISTORY
The idea to start a project to reestablish cooperation among Tuzla (Bosnia and Herze-
govina), Osijek (Croatia), and Novi Sad (Serbia) was rooted in these cities’ extraordinary 
history of cooperation across economic, social, cultural, and even political spheres. Their 
cooperation was strong until the commencement of war on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia in the early1990s. 
The long and bloody series of conﬂicts across the region hugely impacted the rela-
tions among Tuzla, Osijek, and Novi Sad. When the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) 
84
C R O S S - B O R D E R  C O O P E R A T I O N :  C I T Y  T R I A N G L E S
withdrew Tuzla on May 15, 1992, the army of the Republika Srpska of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina remained. Tuzla was surrounded and exposed to frequent shelling that had 
numerous victims. Most dramatically, on the evening of May 25, 1995, a shell from 
Ozren Mountain landed in the main city square of Kapija, a favorite gathering place 
of Tuzla’s youth. Seventy-one people lost their lives, mostly youth and children. This 
tragedy is deeply etched in the minds of the Tuzla’s citizens. 
Osijek, meanwhile, was exposed to attacks of by the Novi Sad army corps, which 
were part of the JNA, from the summer of 1991 to May 1992. At the time of the fall 
of Vukovar, a city in northeastern Croatia, in November 1991, Osijek was sealed oﬀ on 
three sides by the Novi Sad army corps and the paramilitary army of the Republika Srpska 
Krajina. Throughout that period, the city was exposed to constant artillery that caused 
total destruction and many casualties. Approximately 1,000 people were killed. 
Figure 1.
Regional Map: Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad
All that happened during this violence—and particularly, the echo of the Novi 
Sad army corps, which still resounds in the ears of the citizens of Osijek—severed 
relations between Novi Sad and Osijek and Novi Sad and Tuzla, even following the 
Dayton Agreement and termination of war. Against this traumatic backdrop, some non-
governmental organizations in all three cities were moving to restore the relations broken 
by war. Their programs and activities encompassed the restoration of relations and the 
rebuilding of understanding and trust. In Tuzla, the most active NGO was the Forum 
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of Tuzla Citizens; in Osijek, the Center for Peace, Non-Violence, and Human Rights; 
and in Novi Sad, the Center for Regionalism. Another contributing factor was that, 
at the end of the 1990s and in the early part of this decade, the leading local authori-
ties were relatively democratically-minded and willing to make the ﬁrst tentative steps 
towards the revival of cooperation among all three cities. 
From the moment of the introduction of a multiparty system in the former Yugosla-
via to this very day, a party with a social-democratic orientation had ruled in Tuzla. Selim 
Bešlagić, the popular and charismatic mayor, was the leader of the city administration 
at the time of initiation of cooperation. The situation in Osijek was similar during the 
war and in the early part of this decade; the Croatian Social Liberal Party was in power, 
with its coalition partners the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Croatian Peasant 
Party (CPP), and their mayor was Zlatko Kramarić. But in Novi Sad, after the local 
elections in 1997, the ruling coalition was formed by opposition parties, the pillars of 
which were the Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) and the Democratic Party (DP). 
At the time the cooperation began, the mayor of Novi Sad was Stevan Vrbaški from 
the SRM party. It is important to highlight their personal characteristics here, since all 
three mayors were individuals oriented towards the reestablishment of cooperation and 
overcoming the ballast of the recent past. 
When the idea of reestablishment of cooperation among the three cities emerged at 
the Center for Regionalism, several problems were taken into consideration:
 • overcoming of psychological barriers that remained as consequences of war, 
destruction and crimes against humanity that happened in this region;
 • restoration of economic cooperation; 
 • re-establishment of other modes of cooperation (cultural, educational, informa-
tion, sport, in the civil sector);
 • solving the status problems of the citizens who went missing due to the war and 
disintegration of the former Yugoslavia (return of refugees or their properties, 
pensions, citizenship, and other issues);
 • establishment of bus lines (e.g., even now, no direct bus line exists between Novi 
Sad and Tuzla) and restoration of other ways of communication; and
 • overcoming visa barriers (at the beginning of the project there was visa 
regime between what was at that time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and 
Croatia).
The three cities—Tuzla, Osijek, and Novi Sad—belong to the same geographical 
area known as the Pannonian Plain. Even the very geographical position deﬁned many 
similarities in the mentality, as well as in the level of economic and cultural develop-
ment, all the more so for this region that once belonged to the Austro-Hungarian 
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Monarchy which, as a highly organized state, left indelible, positive traces in cities’ 
further development. 
All three cities are important industrial centers. Prior to the war, Tuzla had a chemi-
cal industry, coal mines, and a popular salt. Novi Sad was one of Vojvodina’s centers for 
agriculture and had many other branches of industry, such as oil reﬁning, chemicals, 
cable manufacturing, and other industrial capacities. Besides agriculture, Osijek had 
well-developed chemical, textile, wood, construction and paper industries. 
These developed production capacities and the cities’ proximity to one another 
enabled a high level of commodity exchange and cooperation in production. The coopera-
tion of these cities should be viewed in a broader regional context, for due to the natural 
gravitation towards each other in the past, an intensive cooperation was implemented 
not just among the three cities, but also among the regions they represented—the Tuzla 
basin, Eastern Slavonia, and Vojvodina. 
Information on the Cities
Osijek is situated on the right bank of the Drava River, 25 kilometers upstream from 
its conﬂuence with the Danube. During its history, it belonged to the Roman Empire, 
was later destroyed, then rebuilt by Ottomans, and since the end of the seventeenth 
century it was within the Habsburg Monarchy. In 1809, it was granted the charter of a 
Free Royal City and during the early nineteenth century it was the largest city in Croatia. 
It developed along the lines of other big cities in Europe, mostly under the inﬂuence 
of Vienna and Budapest. In 2009, Osijek was the fourth largest city in Croatia, the 
economic and cultural center of the eastern Croatian region of Slavonia, and adminis-
trative center of the Osijek–Baranja County. According to the latest census (2001), the 
total population of Osijek was 114,616. Croats make up more than 85 percent of the 
population, while other ethnicities include Serbs, Hungarians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, 
Macedonians, and Roma. 
Tuzla lies at the bottom of Majevica Mountain, on the Jala River in the northeast of 
Bosnia. At the end of the ﬁfteenth century, during Ottoman rule, organized salt mining 
began and continued to the present. After Turkish reign, Tuzla was shortly under the 
Habsburg Monarchy rule, and after the First World War it became a part of Yugoslavia. 
Following the Second World War, Tuzla developed into one of the most important 
industrial and cultural centers. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was the 
only city in which a citizens-oriented party was in power. Tuzla is now the third-largest 
city in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the seat of Tuzla Canton. According to the 1991 
census, Tuzla had a population of 131,618: 50 percent Bosniaks, 15 percent Serbs, and 
15 percent Croats. Due migration during and after the war, the city’s population now 
is estimated to be 174,558.
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Novi Sad is divided into two parts, one in the very south of the Pannonian Plain, 
while the other is situated on the slopes of Fruška Gora. The Danube forms a natural 
border between the two parts of the city, the central urban area on one side and Petro-
varadin and Sremska Kamenica on the other. The city was originally mentioned in the 
documents in 1237 under the name of Petrovaradin, as well as some surrounding settle-
ments. By the end of the seventeenth century, the population on the left bank of the 
Danube began to grow as mostly Orthodox migrants who were banned from settling in 
Petrovaradin settled there. Novi Sad got its present name and became a Free Royal City 
by Maria Theresa’s decree in the eighteenth century. Since then, it rapidly developed 
into an economic, cultural and educational center of Vojvodina, and in 1945 it became 
the capital of the province. Currently, it is the administrative center of the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina and Southern Bačka District. According to the latest census, taken 
in 2001, Novi Sad is the second largest city in Serbia, with 300,000 inhabitants. 
Table 1.
Population,* Area, and Economic Data
Osijek, 
Croatia
Tuzla, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Novi Sad, 
Serbia
Population 114,616 (2001) 131,444 (1991)** 299,294 (2002)
Croats 99,234 6,328 6,263
Serbs 8,767 13,137 225,995
Bosniaks 211 44,091 15,687
Hungarians 1,154 5,040
Montenegrins 175 1,740
Roma 124 1,144
Macedonians 178 299
Albanians 480 7,230
Slovaks 860
Romanians 2,032
Ruthenians
Area 196 sq km 302 sq km 699 sq km
Employment rate 32.24% 23.80% 32.2%
National GDP per capita (2008) 16,100 USD 6,500 USD 10,900 USD
Notes: * Figures on ethnic groups are estimates. Data are gathered in diﬀerent ways, using diﬀerent 
questions (e.g. about ethnicity, identity, mother tongue) and survey techniques. 
  ** Taking the inﬂux of refugees into account, the city is currently estimated to have 174,558 
inhabitants.
Sources: National Statistical agencies, 1991–2002.
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Good economic cooperation was matched by many other modes of cooperation. 
Culture and educational exchanges also were normal among these multiethnic cities. 
Good interethnic relations at that time permitted a great number of mixed marriages, 
and consequently family ties. It also knit together these and other cities in the region. 
The distance between the cities was no more than three hours of driving thanks to good 
road infrastructure. 
The ﬁrst step to establish cooperation among the triangle Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad 
was made—due to circumstances—outside of the context of non-governmental orga-
nizations. However, relations among individuals did play an important role. Aleksandar 
Popov, the founder and the Director of the Center for Regionalism, had been, until 
1998, a high- ranked oﬃcial in the Vojvodina Reform Democratic Party. The party was 
social-democratic in orientation. Founded by Ante Marković, the reform Prime Minister 
of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), it had tried to stop disintegration 
of the Yugoslav state and the eventual civil war. In this context, the party and Aleksandar 
Popov personally, worked on the establishment of cooperation with the parties of the 
similar political orientation in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. 
The ﬁrst step in this direction was to contact the Union of the Social Democrats of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (UBSD), formerly part of Reform Party of Bosnia and Her-
zegovina. The party’s headquarters was in Tuzla and its president was then the mayor, 
Selim Bešlagić. One of the steps towards reinforcement of cooperation between the two 
parties was the facilitation of a visit of a large group of representatives of the biggest 
companies from the Tuzla basin to Vojvodina in 1997. During the visit, they had an 
opportunity to meet their former partners, as well as some new companies that were 
interested in cooperation and restoring or creating new business relations. Besides Novi 
Sad, the economic delegation visited Vojvodina’s three other large economic centers, 
Zrenjanin, Kikinda, and Subotica. 
In October 1998, Center for Regionalism was founded. Since there was no willing-
ness for continuation of cooperation in the platform of his party, Aleksandar Popov 
independently continued this cooperation at the Center. 
Return of Refugees
One of the ﬁrst projects implemented by the newly founded Center was the organized 
return to Tuzla of refugees residing in Serbia. The project was implemented in cooperation 
with the Regional Committee of the Association for the Return of the Refugees of Vo-
jvodina and in cooperation with the oﬃcial authorities of the Municipality of Tuzla. 
Prior to the ﬁnal deﬁnition of the project, the mayor of Tuzla, Selim Bešlagić, agreed 
that it was essential to ensure the full cooperation of the city authorities and services. 
At the beginning of the project, launched by the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia, 
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refugees from Tuzla were invited via announcements in several daily newspapers and 
through refugee associations in Serbia. Thereafter, a meeting was held with approxi-
mately 130 applicants, where forthcoming activities were agreed upon. In the process 
of gathering the necessary data on each applicant, the standard application form of the 
Commissioner for Refugees in Tuzla also was ﬁled. The following step of the project 
implied organizing the collective visit of all registered individuals to Tuzla, where they 
had an opportunity to gather information, through conversation with Selim Bešlagić 
and his associates, on the condition of their residential properties, and the possibilities 
and procedures of their return, that is, the return of their ownership rights. 
However, even though the refugees were given promises and guarantees at the time 
of the visit, some individuals in the oﬃce of the Commissioner for Refugees and the 
competent municipal Secretariat for Utility and Housing Services attempted to obstruct 
their implementation. The obstruction was supported by some of the leaders in these 
authorities who had misappropriated ﬂats of the refugees. After talks between the proj-
ect representatives and Selim Bešlagić, this problem was resolved by separation of the 
competent secretariat in two parts—one in charge of utilities, and the other dealing with 
housing services. The head of the Secretariat for Housing Services eﬀectively began case 
by case, with Mr. Bešlagić’s full support. By the end of the project, all registered people 
either returned to Tuzla or managed to regain ownership of their residential units. 
The project commenced in the beginning of 1998, fairly soon after the termination 
of the war. It was uncommon for the head of the Secretariat to visit Novi Sad but on 
several occasions he came in order to meet the refugees and have additional consulta-
tions. Another peculiarity of the project was that—despite the initial distrust among 
refugees—the number of participants increased from the 130 to approximately 150 as 
the project progressed. All of them exercised their rights of return to Tuzla or had their 
property returned. This project, started by the Center for Regionalism and was suc-
cessfully implemented in cooperation with the municipal authorities, and represented 
a solid foundation for the continuation and enhancement of such cooperation. 
Starting Trilateral Cooperation
Selim Bešlagić paid his ﬁrst oﬃcial visit to Novi Sad in November 1998, arranged by 
Stevan Vrbaški, then president of the Novi Sad Assembly. On this occasion some actions 
were agreed upon as the ﬁrst steps in the reestablishment of cooperation between the 
two cities. In the autumn of 1999, Stevan Vrbaški paid a visit to Tuzla, when the two 
mayors signed the ﬁrst protocol on cooperation between the two cities. It was envisaged 
as the commencement of cooperation in the ﬁelds of trade, culture, education, sport, 
information, and others. Even during the war, Tuzla did not terminate its cooperation 
with Osijek. At the beginning of cooperation between Novi Sad and Tuzla, an idea 
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was born to include this Slavonian city in the cooperation, hence making the bilateral 
cooperation trilateral. 
By broadening the cooperation to link the three traditional regional centers, coop-
eration was reestablished among the bordering regions of Vojvodina, Eastern Slavonia, 
and North Eastern Bosnia, foremost to encourage economic cooperation. At the be-
ginning of 2000 the Center for Regionalism, with the help from its partner in Osijek, 
the Center for Peace, Non-violence, and Human Rights, organized a series of public 
discussions on the idea.
The majority of citizens who participated in the discussions supported the idea, which 
still needed the city administration’s approval. In order to provide a concrete oﬀer for the 
city administration, the team that worked on the establishment of the cooperation started 
to work on a document which would represent the basis of the cooperation program.1 
The title of the document was the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–Novi 
Sad. Jovan Komšić from the Center for Regionalism was the author of the original text 
of the Agreement, which was later developed by other team members. 
The basic requirements for the establishment of cooperation in the cities’ triangle, 
articulated by this document, had been identiﬁed in previous talks with the leaders of 
city authorities of Novi Sad and Tuzla. The city of Osijek was represented by Tihomir 
Salajić, a close associate to Zlatko Kramarić, the mayor of Osijek, who was already at the 
time one of the key people in a network of NGOs and municipalities in South Eastern 
Europe,2 as well as with the stakeholders from economic, cultural, and other areas. 
The preamble of the Agreement contains the following chapters:
 1) Signatories of the Agreement
 2) Objectives and principles of the Agreement
  • To establish the social framework for the activities of local self-government 
bodies, local public institutions, non-governmental organizations, and citi-
zens of multicultural cities of South Eastern Europe, in all social, cultural, 
and educational ﬁelds, committed to the development of liberal democracy, 
ethnic and religious tolerance, and to the protection of human rights, in 
accordance with the authentic citizens’ needs and with the European system 
of social values; 
  • To preserve cultural diversity, to protect the rights and freedoms of national 
and ethnic minorities, to cherish civic virtues and traditions of co-exis-
tence; 
  • To promote the European principles and experiences in the ﬁeld of hu-
man rights, freedom, multiculturalism, and interculturalism, as essential 
preconditions of democracy; 
  • To oppose the language of hatred, xenophobia, prejudices, inﬂexibility, and 
all forms of ethnic and religious intolerance
T R I A N G L E  O F  C O O P E R A T I O N :  T U Z L A – O S I J E K – N O V I  S A D
91
 3) Program of activities: cooperation of the three cities in education, culture, social 
events, implementation of administrative power, and organization of public 
services, public communication and program policy of the media that serve as 
a public service
 4) Inclusion of other social subjects in the Agreement, like non-governmental or-
ganizations, chambers of commerce, religious groups, sports organizations, 
environmentalists, universities, and cultural and educational institutions
The draft text of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad was 
presented for the ﬁrst time at a round table in Novi Sad on July 4, 2001; it received sup-
port, with some proposals, from the representatives of the Novi Sad city administration, 
experts, NGO representatives, and other participants. The text of the Agreement was 
presented in Tuzla on July 8, 2001; Jasmin Imamović, the Mayor of Tuzla, participated 
the discussion and fully supported the text. 
The ﬁnal presentation of the Agreement took place in Osijek on November 9, 
2001. Besides Zlatko Kramarić, the Mayor of Osijek, this event was attended by several 
members of the city administration and Osijek–Baranja district. Participants in the 
round table supported the text and the main idea. However, a discussion ensued around 
“Croationization” of some elements of the text, which had been translated into Croatian 
language by the city administration of Osijek.3 Following the three round tables, the 
three cities’ administrations reached an agreement. On January 21, 2002, the Agree-
ment on Interethnic Tolerance was oﬃcially ratiﬁed in Tuzla by the three mayors and 
the directors of three non-governmental organizations.
In a region fragmented by the military force of the 1990s, the Agreement on Inter-
ethnic Tolerance re-established cooperation between the cities of Tuzla, Osijek, and 
Novi Sad. On the basis of this model, a growing number of triangles and circles of 
cooperation in the region of South Eastern Europe have been established.
Public reactions in Novi Sad to the establishment of cooperation with Tuzla and 
Osijek were mainly positive. The whole project had been supported by the key rep-
resentatives of the authorities from the very beginning. When the project entered its 
operational phase, there were many positive reactions in the public and media. Due 
to the anti-war image of the organizers of the project from Novi Sad and the support 
they provided to the citizens of Tuzla during the war, the establishment of cooperation 
was met with very good reactions. Tuzla’s media contributed to this by providing great 
attention to each project activity. 
92
C R O S S - B O R D E R  C O O P E R A T I O N :  C I T Y  T R I A N G L E S
The most resistance was anticipated in Osijek, due to the role of Novi Sad army corps 
in the siege and suﬀering of the city during the war. However, in this city there were not 
any negative comments in the media and public on the establishment of cooperation 
with Novi Sad and making of the triangle of cooperation Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad. It 
is worth mentioning that media in Osijek and Croatia did not pay much attention to 
this cooperation’s activities. 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Administrations of the three cities and three non-governmental organizations (Center 
for Regionalism, Forum of the Citizens of Tuzla, and Center for Peace, Non-Violence, 
and Human Rights) are equal partners in implementation of this agreement. Hence, 
the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance was veriﬁed by the competent authorities of the 
administrations of the three cities and the committees of the three non-governmental 
organizations prior to its ratiﬁcation. This model of partnership between the public 
and non-governmental sector was later applied at the establishment of the Association 
of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe—Philia. It proved to be very good, par-
ticularly because of the periodical local elections and changes in leading political forces 
of the cities’ administrations. 
Following the local elections in Serbia in September 2004, Novi Sad city council 
was taken over by the Serbian Radical Party, which prompted negative reaction in Tu-
zla and Osijek. These cities indicated that the city dominated by the radicals was not 
acceptable as a partner to their administrations. But their cooperation with Novi Sad 
was continued through the Center for Regionalism as a second partner in the project 
and signatory of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance. A year later a similar elec-
tion victory in Osijek transferred the city government to the Croatian Party of Rights, 
and the mayor became Ante Djapić, who openly praised the fascist Independent State 
of Croatia (1941-1945) and Ante Pavelić, the leader of a major criminal movement 
that collaborated with fascist regime during the same period. Such development of 
events contributed to a slowdown in the scope of cooperation among the cities. Still 
it did not stop thanks to the active role of the NGOs in Novi Sad and Osijek, the city 
administration of Tuzla, and certainly the Forum of Tuzla Citizens, signatory of the 
Agreement. During 2007, the coalition between two ultra-right parties, administering 
Osijek dissolved and a new election was called. The new coalition was acceptable for 
cooperation with Novi Sad and Tuzla. 
On May 11, 2008, general elections were held in Serbia and the coalition between 
the Democratic Party and the League of Vojvodina Social Democrats assumed power 
in Novi Sad. Shortly after the election, the city leaders announced that they were ready 
to renew their cooperation in the triangle. Based on the initiative of the Center for 
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Regionalism, the three cities’ administrations and two other NGOs agreed that a meet-
ing with signatories of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance should be held in Tuzla at 
the shortest possible notice. An overview of the state of mutual cooperation should be 
provided and a memorandum on continuation of the cooperation between the cities’ 
administrations was signed. Thereafter, representatives of the city departments (economy, 
culture, information, sport, etc.) as well as interest groups and other organizations (e.g., 
regional chambers of commerce, environmentalists) should meet in Novi Sad, and 
develop concrete programs of cooperation in particular areas. 
This meeting has not been held yet, since the Croatian Party of Rights reelection. 
Due to its pro-Fascist orientation, it is considered an unacceptable partner for local 
authorities in Tuzla and Novi Sad. A coalition of a democratically orientated partners 
is expected to win local elections in Osijek that are scheduled for May 2009, which 
would enable the reestablishment of cooperation in this triangle.
Motivation of Various Stakeholders
Local Politicians
Local politicians’ motives to renew or reestablish the postwar cooperation that the cities 
once shared were driven by a number of diﬀerent factors. 
In Tuzla, social democrats that have been in power since the introduction of multi-
party system in the former Yugoslavia, were against the war and nationalism. They were 
open to cooperation with the surrounding cities, including those in Serbia, regardless 
of the fact that the Bosnian and Herzegovinian public considered Serbia an aggressor. 
Selim Bešlagić, at the time mayor of Tuzla and president of the Union of Bosnian and 
Herzegovinian Social Democrats, personally contributed to the establishment of coop-
eration with Novi Sad. 
As regards Novi Sad, it is ironic that the initiative of the Center for Regionalism was 
accepted not only by the Democratic Party but by the Serbian Renewal Party (SRP) 
as well. SRP was a coalition partner in the city authority, but at the national level had 
many elements of nationalism in its program and practical activities. The greatest credit 
for this belonged to Stevan Vrbaški, that time mayor of Novi Sad and the leader in the 
city organization of SRP, who enjoyed a good reputation in the city as a popular physi-
cian. He accepted recommendations for the establishment of cooperation without any 
delay, and during a visit to Tuzla, in autumn 1999, he signed the ﬁrst agreement on 
reestablishment of the two cities’ cooperation. He was also the ﬁrst oﬃcial from Serbia 
to commemorate Tuzla’s war dead. 
After Stevan Vrbaški, the process was continued by Borislav Novaković from the 
Democratic Party, the next mayor of Novi Sad who then signed the Agreement on 
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Interethnic Tolerance. The motives of the two men, as the city and local party lead-
ers, were to scrub away the shame of Novi Sad’s name, caused by the Socialists and 
the Radicals during their rule in the city as well as the crimes of the Novi Sad army 
corps. His intention was to reassert the image of Novi Sad as an open city that fosters 
European values. 
Since the establishment of this agreement on cooperation, Osijek was ruled by a 
coalition formed by the Croatian Social Liberal Party, the Social Democratic Party, and 
the Croatian Peasant Party. They did not have the same opinion on cooperation. Mayor 
Zlatko Kramarić and a fraction of the municipal team from the Croatian Social Liberal 
Party were aware of the fact that part of the Osijek’s public would not look favorably on 
the reestablishment of cooperation with Novi Sad. At the same time, they were conﬁdent 
that cooperation was necessary not just for realizing certain practical beneﬁts, but for 
the improvement of the image of Osijek as a city that accepts European values, reﬂected 
in the tolerance and openness for cooperation, even with those they had considered 
enemies and aggressors. The establishment of such cooperation carried certain risks for 
the city’s ruling group. In the short-run it could cause them losses rather than additional 
support from their constituencies. All the more so because their coalition partner did 
not openly oppose such actions, but had a restrained attitude towards the issue. 
Politicians at the National Level
National politicians involved in the project also had their own mixture of personal and 
political motives to contribute to the cities’ cooperation triangle. 
Direct support from Serbia (within FRY) direct support of the creation and func-
tioning of the Tuzla , Osijek, and Novi Sad triangle was personiﬁed by Rasim Ljajić, at 
that time the federal Minister for Human and Minority Rights, and Goran Svilanović, 
then Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Rasim Ljajić, even 
as a leader of opposition at the time of the Milošević’s regime, participated in the ral-
lies in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, organized by anti-war NGOs. On several 
occasions he participated in rallies in Tuzla that were organized by the Forum of Tuzla 
Citizens. Therefore, it was relatively easy to attract him to the project. Considering the 
fact that his department covered issues of human and minority rights, the improvement 
of interethnic relations in the cities the project encompassed, as well as the smaller areas 
they belonged to, logically fell under his competences. 
An additional reason for him to support cooperation among the cities was his di-
rect participation in one of the project’s events that received a lot of media attention: 
a marathon organized as a symbolic linking among Novi Sad, Osijek, and Tuzla in 
early October, 2003 on the Novi Sad–Osijek–Tuzla route. Rasim Ljajić took part in 
the event of seeing the marathon runners oﬀ from Freedom Square in Novi Sad, where 
he welcomed the eﬀorts to overcome the weight of the immediate past and improve 
relations in the region through the cooperation of the cities. Goran Svilanović, then 
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Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs of the Serbian Republic (FRY) and who also participated, 
was an anti-war activist at the time of Slobodan Milošević’s regime. He was involved in 
the work of NGO Antiwar Action, and in the Civic Alliance, which was also extremely 
opposed to war. 
From the very beginning, the Igman Initiative, under the auspices of which the 
program of cooperation triangle among Tuzla, Osijek, and Novi Sad was implemented, 
was fully endorsed by and Goran who even participated in the work of its second ses-
sion, organized in Novi Sad in March 2001. On that occasion he endorsed the idea 
of the Igman Initiative pertaining to the unilateral suspension of the visa regime with 
Croatia by SR Yugoslavia, expecting the other side to respond the same way. Svilanović 
had publicly endorsed cooperation in the triangle of cities and even characterized it 
at an international meeting as one of the most successful form of cooperation within 
Euro-regional cooperation in the region.
As for the politicians from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the project was directly endorsed 
by Rasim Kadić, then deputy to the minister for European integrations and Nikola 
Špirić, at the time co-president of the Chamber of Nations of the Parliament of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (BiH). Both politicians attended the event of oﬃcial ratiﬁcation of 
the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance in Tuzla on January 21, 2002, where they gave 
welcoming speeches. Rasim Kadić, as a president of the Liberal Democratic Party of 
BiH, which acted as member of the Alliance for BiH, had a personal aﬃnity towards 
this mode of cooperation. He contributed to restoration of understanding and trust. 
He had previously participated at the rallies of non-governmental organizations in BiH, 
Croatia, and Serbia, where he talked about the restoration of the relations broken by 
the war. He also had an obligation, as the second oﬃcial of the Ministry for European 
Integration, to endorse all activities that would approximate BiH to the standards of 
the European Union. 
Nikola Špirić, representative of the Party of Independent Social Democrats of Re-
publika Srpska in the federal parliament of BiH also had participated in several rallies 
of NGOs in the region. He showed a commitment to the restoration of cooperation 
that would contribute to the rehabilitation of the aftermath of the wars. During the 
ratiﬁcation of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance in Tuzla, he welcomed it on behalf 
of the BiH Parliament. 
As regards politicians from Croatia, only then president Stjepan Mesić endorsed 
the Igman Initiative and the concrete activities that functioned under its auspice. Even 
in 2004, he agreed to host the two other presidents at its ninth session, together with 
the Igman Initiative, which was held in Zagreb on September 24. This was a catalyst 
to further summit meetings and they have been held three times since then under the 
auspices of the Igman Initiative. President Mesić used every opportunity to publicly 
endorse the actions of the Igman Initiative and the cooperation of cities such as the 
triangle of Tuzla, Osijek, and Novi Sad. The motive for his involvement emanates from 
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his orientation towards restoration of regional cooperation, primarily with the neighbor-
ing countries, as well as from his anti-Fascist stand that he frequently expressed despite 
the criticism of the nationalist parties in Croatia. 
Local and Central Administration
The motives of economic and cultural cooperation that had inspired local mayors to 
reestablish cooperation were similar for local self-governments, since the mayors were 
often the leaders of the local parties that formed the majority of the local authorities. 
This cooperation was endorsed by the regional authorities like the representatives of 
Osijek–Baranya district and the provincial authorities in Vojvodina. It was not the case 
with the Tuzla Canton where the Party of Democratic Action, which was the party of 
national orientation, formed the pillar of the power; and which was directly opposed 
by the Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina Social Democrats, whose party leader was 
Selim Bešlagić.
Meanwhile the central authorities were only marginally involved in the cooperation, 
except for sporadic support for some activities, such as the support of the Ministry of 
Human and Minority Rights of the SRY (at the time), led by Rasim Ljajić.
Non-governmental Organizations
The three cities’ civic organizations were primarily interested in cooperation. They 
were interconnected by common projects that they used to apply for foreign funding. 
Within the project, the universities in Novi Sad, Tuzla, and Osijek started to cooperate 
on certain common programs. Eventually in Novi Sad in the autumn of 2002, three 
regional chambers of commerce ratiﬁed an Agreement on Cooperation, which resulted 
in cooperation on a series of subjects in the following years. 
Without direct international support it would have been diﬃcult to initiate these 
cooperation initiatives. Foreign foundations and international institutions such as the 
OSCE mission to Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb provided substantial funding and they 
frequently ensured logistical support for some activities. 
Neither the Igman Initiative, representing the broader institutional framework 
of cooperation, nor the triangle of cities had solid, institutionalized management 
structures. The center of coordination of all the triangle’s activities was the Center for 
Regionalism, the main initiator of cooperation. The concrete activities were arranged 
at the level of the directors of the three NGOs and authorized representatives of the 
local self-governments. 
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MODES OF COOPERATION 
Following the oﬃcial signing of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–
Novi Sad in Tuzla on January 21, 2002, the document was ratiﬁed by the assemblies 
of the three cities. Prior, the document had been adopted by the executive boards of 
the non-governmental organizations participating in the project. The Agreement itself 
was developed on the basis of voluntary involvement, thereby its ﬁnal provisions did 
not stipulate the suspension of membership of any of the signatories, but endeavored 
to increase the number of the subjects involved in the cooperation. 
Box 1. 
Article 15 of the Agreement 
The signatories of the Agreement have a desire to consolidate and expand 
cooperation among Novi Sad, Osijek, and Tuzla through the involvement of 
new social actors, civil, cultural and political organizations, including other 
municipalities in the neighboring regions and states. 
Thereof, besides the multicultural cities, as new subjects and equal partici-
pants in the cooperation process initiated by this Agreement, it may include 
non-governmental organizations, cultural associations, media, and institutions 
that are proven promoters of human rights, multiculturalism, and interethnic 
tolerance.
This provision also reﬂected the participants’ intention to develop this cooperation 
into the basis for a new Euroregion, Europannon. The region would encompass north-
eastern Bosnia (Tuzla Canton, Brčko District, and four municipalities along the Drina 
River), eastern Slavonia (Vukovar-Srijem and Osijek-Baranya District), and Vojvodina, 
plus the municipalities of Šabac, Bogatić, Loznica, and Mali Zvornik.
In this micro-project of the Igman Initiative the same ﬂuid management structure 
was adopted to further the functioning of this movement of non-governmental organiza-
tions. By avoiding solid institutional frames, this method proved to be very eﬀective in 
enabling the Igman Initiative and its partners to overcome crises without major disrup-
tion if some of the partners or founders were no longer acceptable for the others. 
For example, the Democratic Alternative Forum from Sarajevo was dissolved due 
to internal problems and instead, a new partner from Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Fo-
rum of Citizens of Tuzla was accepted by the member of the Igman Initiative. Similarly 
disintegration of the triangle of cooperation was avoided when the political parties in 
power in Novi Sad and Osijek were unacceptable to the other partners. 
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Hence, cooperation of the triangle was managed by a steering body made up of 
partners from NGOs and authorized representatives of the three cities’ administrations. 
General coordination and record-keeping became the responsibility of the Center for 
Regionalism. Formally, Novi Sad was represented by one of the vice presidents of the 
Novi Sad City Assembly, Osijek by a member of the city administration in charge of the 
international cooperation, and Tuzla by a member of the city administration in charge 
of social activities. Non-governmental organizations were represented by their directors, 
their presidents, or their authorized representatives. 
Led by the principle of ﬂexibility, the only document that regulated this coopera-
tion was the Agreement itself, thus no rules of procedures for decision-making were 
adopted. All decisions were made at the steering meetings regulated by the Article 13 
of the Agreement. 
Box 2.
Article 13 on the Management Scheme 
All participants, the Agreement signatories, shall, through their representatives, 
give consideration to the implementation of the Agreement once a year and 
adopt a framework plan for the forthcoming joint activities. These working and 
consultative meetings shall be held every year in another city as part of cultural 
events and actions and their participants shall be from Novi Sad, Osijek, and 
Tuzla.
At the meetings, all the decisions were made by consensus, and there were no cases 
recorded in which a member of the coordination team, after the discussion, had a diﬀerent 
opinion from the other members. Proceeding from the principle of mutual trust, each 
member of the coordination—according to the general principles of coordination—then 
represents this triangle in his or her communication with other subjects. In case there 
were certain arrangements that implied concrete obligations of the other participants 
in cooperation, their prior agreement shall be sought. 
As regards to reporting on cooperation to the competent municipal authorities 
within the Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle, the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance did 
not stipulate that it was compulsory; however, Article 12 regulates that:
  “…city councils or city assemblies shall investigate problems and the conditions 
for improvement of international relations according to their programs of work 
and the actual situation. Accordingly, they shall endeavor to put these issues on 
agenda of the local authorities once a year.” 
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The public was informed about the triangle of cities through the regular activities 
within the cooperation and at press conferences or other public events, facilitated from 
time to time by the cities involved in the cooperation. Reporting to foundations or donors 
was done in accordance to rules of the foundations, or contracts concluded with them. 
One should bear in mind for these funds or particular projects within the cooperation 
that mainly those non-governmental organizations applied which had participated in 
the cooperation were obliged to submit reports to their donors. 
There were not any external evaluations or control of the cooperation except in cases 
of implementation of concrete projects, the evaluation of which was often performed 
by the donors. 
Financing of Cooperation 
As regards to ﬁnancing and other issues related to the institutionalization of the 
Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle, one should consider the fact that the establishment 
and functioning of other triangles of cooperation were built upon the experiences of 
this one. Thus, for example, a triangle of cooperation at the tri-border point of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia, just started to function in 2008, following 
seven years of eﬀort by the Igman Initiative and the EastWest Institute,4 and was fully 
formalized. 
The level of formalization is directly proportional to the level of initial suspicions 
and distrust of the parties involved in cooperation. Since within the Tuzla–Osijek–Novi 
Sad cooperation triangle—speciﬁcally, among the people who carried it out—there 
were no traces of distrust. On the contrary, they had extremely good personal relations, 
reﬂected in the spontaneity of their relations. 
In this respect, the parties involved in the cooperation did not have to seek or 
allocate funds, because of the Center for Regionalism’s role to manage institutional 
support for the Igman Initiative. Making a common fund was not an option, as secur-
ing funds for particular projects was believed to be a better option. Subsequently, the 
municipalities and the NGOs, outside of the projects, only ﬁnanced the travel and 
other costs as functions of the cooperation’s coordination as well as some public events. 
However, human resources potential that was made available, as well as oﬃces and the 
equipment used for the activities in the triangle of cooperation, could be considered 
in-kind contributions. 
This method of ﬁnancing was applied throughout the cooperation. Accordingly, 
neither the local self-governments levied any speciﬁc taxes nor allocated any funds for 
ﬁnancing this mode of cooperation. This triangle, unlike other ones that were estab-
lished later (Dubrovnik–Trebinje–Herceg Novi), did not develop projects to resolve 
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infrastructural issues. Nor did it apply for large foreign-sponsored projects. And no 
technical assistance was requested from foreign donors. 
This was a consequence of a four-year delay in cooperation that occurred due to 
unwillingness of certain political parties in Novi Sad and later in Osijek. Following the 
last local elections in Novi Sad and Osijek, this problem was overcome. We can expect 
that, with the complete change of political climate and experiences gained in this triangle 
until now, the scope of cooperation will be expanded and larger, more costly projects 
will be put on the agenda. 
As regards administrative costs, the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad covered 
the main part of the costs through institutional support received from the US-based 
Rockefeller and James Stewart Mott foundations. 
Activities and Projects 
Since the triangle of cooperation Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad was the ﬁrst in the region, it 
was, in a way, a pilot project on which experiences for further work on establishment 
of new similar triangles or circles of cooperation were derived. This was also one of the 
reasons this cooperation was characterized by spontaneous provision of initiatives and 
minimum formalism. Along these lines, we could talk about two kinds of activities 
or projects that were performed under the umbrella of the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance. The ﬁrst kind encompasses projects or activities initiated by the local self-
governments or partnering non-governmental organizations, while the second one 
encompasses initiatives of the organizations and interest groups from the three cities 
that were directed towards carriers of the cooperation. 
Cultural and Sports Activities
The ﬁrst group includes the following projects and activities:
 • Cultural Cooperation
  The inaugural event “Novi Sad Days of Culture” was held in Tuzla from May 
18–20, 2000, under the auspice of the Assembly of the City of Novi Sad and 
the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia. Following this success, various cultural 
programs ﬂowed between the two cities. This mode of cultural exchange lasted 
till 2004 when Radicals came to power in Novi Sad. In the ﬁeld of culture, 
cooperation between Osijek and Tuzla was not interrupted upon the disinte-
gration of the former Yugoslavia, except during the period of the war when the 
two cities were under siege. 
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 • Agreement on Cooperation between Tuzla Cantonal Television and TV Apolo 
  Tuzla Cantonal television and Apolo television in Novi Sad signed an Agree-
ment on Cooperation in the middle of 2002, under the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance. Based on this agreement, programs produced by the two televisions 
were exchanged as well as information on events in the two cities. The agreement 
ceased to function when Radicals came in power in Novi Sad and the whole 
leadership as well as the programming of Apolo television changed. 
 • Novi Sad–Osijek–Tuzla Marathon
  The athletic marathon Novi Sad–Osijek–Tuzla aimed to symbolically link 
the three cities through sports. Intercity sports had been disrupted by the war 
and this event contributed to the reestablishment of competition. At the same 
time it was designed to create among the general public a climate that would 
be favorable for more cooperation. The marathon, in which twenty marathon 
runners from the three cities took part, started at Freedom Square in Novi Sad. 
An hour before the beginning of the marathon, tambura orchestras from the 
three cities played one after another on the stage, helping to attract a greater 
number of citizens and provided them with an opportunity to enjoy beautiful 
music speciﬁc to the Pannon Plain all three cities belong to. 
  Prior to the marathon, the runners and the gathered citizens of Novi Sad were 
greeted by Aleksandar Popov, Director of the Center for Regionalism; Borislav 
Novaković, President of the City of Novi Sad Assembly; Rasim Ljajić, then 
Minister for Human and Minority Rights in FRY; and Mark Davison, Deputy 
Chief of the OSCE Mission to Serbia. Like the marathon participants, they wore 
shirts printed with “Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad” 
on one side, and “Athletic Marathon on the Peace Paths” on the other. Upon 
the concluding their speeches all four of them, together with approximately 
one hundred children from Novi Sad elementary schools, ran in front of the 
marathon. Since the marathon runners attracted the attention of numerous 
media, their pictures were published on the front pages of of four national 
dailies in Serbia. In Osijek, the citizens organized a ceremonial reception for 
the marathon runners, and they were especially greeted by the deputy mayor 
of the city. The marathon runners stayed in Osijek and continued their trip 
the next day in the direction of Tuzla, where their reception was part of the 
city’s anniversary program. Both in Osijek and Tuzla, the local media paid great 
attention to this event, and achieving the main objective of the organizers, to 
relax mutual relations and set the stage for other activities and projects within 
the triangle. 
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Business, Academic, and Environmental Cooperation
The second group includes the following projects and activities:
 • Agreement on Cooperation of the Regional Chambers of Commerce of Novi Sad, 
Osijek, and Tuzla
  In the fold of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad, 
the three regional chambers of commerce signed an Agreement on Mutual 
Cooperation at the end of 2002. As stipulated by the Agreement, exchanges of 
economic delegations from Osijek and Novi Sad were organized on several oc-
casions. Members of the Chamber of Commerce of Novi Sad also participated 
in the conferences in Osijek, where they presented their programs. Delegations 
from Osijek and Novi Sad were regularly invited to visit the annual Tuzla fair 
held in April. 
  Chambers of commerce cooperation was reﬂected in exchange of information 
on positive legal regulations and experiences that were important for their 
members. Unfortunately, data banks of the mentioned regional chambers of 
commerce do not contain any exact information on the scope of cooperation 
among economic subjects from the three cities. 
 • Cooperation of the Universities of the Three Cities 
  In 2003, the University of Novi Sad signed an Agreement on Cooperation with 
the University of Tuzla. Based on this Agreement, the two universities and their 
students’ organizations cooperated together for over ﬁve years. Professors from 
the department for German Language of the Faculty of Philosophy already 
have been teaching at the University of Tuzla for four years and there has been 
a continuing exchange of the teaching staﬀ between the Faculties of Technical 
Science in Novi Sad and Tuzla. Within the mentioned agreement, the UNESCO 
Department for Entrepreneurship in Novi Sad has cooperated with the Center 
for Innovations of the University of Tuzla, and conferences and symposia have 
been held as part of the regular exchanges of the two universities. 
  There has not been any agreement of cooperation between the University of 
Novi Sad and the University of Osijek, yet even without this formal document, 
the exchange of professors has been carried out in the form of cooperation 
between the UNESCO Department for Entrepreneurship of the University of 
Novi Sad and the same department in Osijek. It has been common practice 
for students from Osijek to do their doctorate degree at the Agricultural and 
Technical Faculties of Novi Sad. 
  Cooperation was not interrupted between the universities of Tuzla and Osijek 
after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, and simply continued after the 
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end of the war. Hence this cooperation has been much larger and encompassed 
almost all faculties of the two universities, as well as the students’ organiza-
tions. 
 • Cooperation between the Young Conservationists and Environmental Organizations 
of the Three Cities 
  Cooperation between the Young Conservationists from Novi Sad and related 
organizations from Osijek commenced in 2003 and included two organizations: 
the Allergy Association and Compost Center. Partnership with the Allergy As-
sociation within the project “Living without Ragweed” had several objectives: 
informing and educating citizens, environmental inspectors, physicians, utility 
services, and journalists about invasive ragweed, which triggers severe allergic 
reactions in more than 20 percent of citizens of all ages. 
  Ragweed plagues all the countries of the Pannonian basin and common posters 
and educational materials were distributed in coordination with a series round 
tables in Osijek and Novi Sad, with the participation of experts from Austria, 
Slovenia, Croatia (Zagreb and Osijek), Hungary, and Romania. A further num-
ber of seminars, meetings, and joint activities were held with the cooperation 
of environmentalist organizations from the three cities.
  An elementary school in Tuzla also held a conservationist, eco-camp in the 
mountains of Fruška Gora in 2005 with the participation of a group of children 
and their teacher Ahmo Ibišević. The children enjoyed seven days of ecological 
education and companionship in nature. 
Transparency
The books and records of the cooperation triangle have been fully open to the public 
throughout. This was in the best interest of all the signatories of the Agreement on Inter-
ethnic Tolerance and coordinators of cooperation, for a more favorable public climate was 
created for understanding that this cooperation, despite the burden of the recent past 
and war that led to the termination of cooperation, could work. Public transparency was 
ensured in several ways. Firstly, before signing, the Agreement was promoted at several 
public forums that were covered by the media. Afterwards, when implementation of 
cooperation based on the Agreement started, there were also several public presenta-
tions in all three cities where the citizens had an opportunity to be familiarized with 
the progress and results up to that time. 
Members of this triangle of cooperation made eﬀorts to have all activities within its 
framework covered by media. It was of a great help that a certain number of journalists, 
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primarily from Novi Sad and Tuzla, were directly involved in creation and promotion of 
the cooperation. As regards Novi Sad, we should ﬁrstly mention local television Apolo, 
which under the auspice of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance signed the Agreement 
on cooperation with the cantonal television from Tuzla. One of the independent elec-
tronic media that should be mentioned is Novi Sad Radio 021, which regularly followed 
the triangle’s events and even organized a special forum in Novi Sad dedicated to this 
topic, attended by the three cities’ representatives. 
Good media coverage was also provided by the two Novi Sad daily newspapers, 
Dnevnik and Građanski list. The news on this cooperation was sporadically published in 
some Belgrade media, such as daily newspapers Politika, Novosti, and Blic. In Tuzla, the 
activities within the triangle of cooperation were regularly covered by cantonal and local 
television, local radio Kameleon, and by Tuzla’s newspaper. Occasionally, information 
on the topic was announced on BiH television, and in daily newspapers Oslobodjenje 
and Dnevni avaz. 
The situation was the worst in Osijek where local media were under control of 
extremely right-wing political allies. The media rarely issued information on this 
cooperation, and rarely wrote about it in the regional daily newspaper Glas Slavonije. 
In the national Croatian media there was almost no information on this cooperation. 
In Novi Sad, meanwhile, the Serbian Radical party brought to a halt much of the 
city-founded TV Apolo’s public information programming after being elected 
in 2004. 
Sustainability of Triangles of Cities
As previously emphasized, there were two periods in the development of this triangle 
of cooperation. The ﬁrst one included the idea of its establishment and activities linked 
to this, as well as the activities that ran until the time of the signing of the Agreement 
on Interethnic Tolerance on January 21, 2002, and until the coming into power of the 
Radical Party in Novi Sad and Croatian Party of Rights in Osijek. This period was the 
most intensive for this cooperation and the three cities’ administrations participated in 
their full capacities. 
The period that came after this one was the period in which cooperation continued 
thanks to municipal administration of Tuzla and non-governmental organizations, 
signatories of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, and other organizations, which 
prior to that time had joined the cooperation. Yet, the oﬃcial cooperation between 
Novi Sad–Osijek and Novi Sad–Tuzla did not completely cease during that period. 
Just after the political change in circumstances in the two cities in 2008, the perspec-
tive opened for involvement of the two cities’ administrations in the activities of the 
triangle of cooperation again. 
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Several other facts pertain to triangles of cooperation of cities. Even though the 
model that was created within this triangle of cooperation was used at the establishment 
of other triangles, experiences showed that each triangle is diﬀerent and the speciﬁcities 
should be carefully taken into account during the establishment of triangles, and while 
their activities are planned and run. As an illustration, priorities diﬀer when setting 
up cooperation among cities from the former war zone and from those cities with no 
negative mutual experience in the recent past. 
SUMMARY
Accomplishments 
One of the main accomplishments of Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle is its contribution 
to the establishment of a model that other triangles of cooperation and later Philia itself 
were built upon. It is necessary to mention several accomplishments here. First, this 
triangle of cooperation indicated the advantages of the model in which main partners in 
cooperation are not just city administrations, but local non-governmental organizations 
as well. Thus, their sustainability was achieved even after local elections when political 
groups were elected that did not support the cooperation or were unacceptable to the 
other partners. This cooperation is signiﬁcantly enriched by partnership of the civil and 
public sector, bringing the project closer to the citizens and their needs. 
The other signiﬁcant moment is that this triangle of cooperation generated the very 
Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad, which later on, with certain 
modiﬁcation, became a model for other triangles of cooperation and the basic program 
document of Philia. This document received high praise from the representatives of the 
Council of Europe, who participated in the founding assembly of Philia in Zagreb in 
July 2005. This triangle of cooperation, as well as the other ones that were established 
later, proved to be the best model of cooperation that contributed to overcoming of the 
burden of recent past and psychological barriers from the war. 
However, cooperation within the triangles of cities, and even within Philia itself 
as an umbrella of the whole cooperation, was attributed to the creation of diplomacy 
among the cities. Namely, normalization of relations among the countries of the Dayton 
Agreement has had good but also many bad moments, and under such circumstances 
the cooperation among cities is a constant struggle to overcome stalemates in the nor-
malization of relations. 
People in cities, especially in the border regions where they depend on one another, 
are interested in the most liberal methods to regulate certain issues such as the ﬂow of 
people and goods across the border. Through their joint pressure on national state au-
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thorities, they quicken the establishment of conditions that will make their economic, 
cultural, and other ways of cooperation easier and remove barriers that stand in the 
way to their development. 
Finally, regions that still suﬀer from the eﬀects of war and that also may be burdened 
with a transitional economy or society, cooperation of cities and non-governmental 
organizations is able to create a better overall climate and environment. 
Obstacles 
Since the Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad cooperation triangle was the ﬁrst of its kind, its es-
tablishment and development was accompanied by initial mistakes and diﬃculties. As 
previously mentioned, all the participants in the project opted for a ﬂexible model of 
cooperation. This option clearly had some advantages and disadvantages. The advantage 
of the model was that local political changes in Novi Sad and Osijek did not trigger 
complete termination of the project, but it was continued, although with less intensity 
than before. 
Such a model was a reﬂection of the reality in the three cities: their administration 
did not express willingness to implement any higher level of institutionalization, as op-
posed to the cities at the tri-border point Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and 
Croatia. Namely, only the local authorities in Tuzla were governed by one party, but 
Novi Sad and Osijek were ruled by a coalition of parties, where all coalition partners 
shared the same view regarding the cooperation. 
This loose structure had certain weaknesses, since it lacked systematic planning, and 
accordingly did not develop a greater number of joint projects, which could have been 
attractive to donors. Therefore, some segments of cooperation were arranged individu-
ally, the activities all had the elements of spontaneity in planning and implementation, 
while the representatives of the three cities and the three NGOs mainly had coordinat-
ing roles. 
Still, with the above-mentioned weaknesses, it has been proved that the most impor-
tant thing was to create a favorable climate for the reestablishment of the cooperation 
that was severed by the war and to have the attention of potential partners in the other 
two cities. 
Since the cooperation in this triangle lasted in its full capacity just over two years, 
there was no chance to upgrade or development better planning, organization of joint 
projects, or applications to donors. Therefore the greatest loss of this project was the defeat 
of the democratic powers at the local elections in Novi Sad and Osijek that disabled the 
future development of this triangle of cooperation and upgrading of its initial ideas. 
Just after the political change again in Novi Sad and Osijek in 2008, a perspective 
was opened for continuation of the cooperation from the point where it had ceased 
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in 2004. This new start can use experiences of other triangles of cooperation—such 
as such as the one at the tri-border point Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and 
Croatia—that has built upon the initial experiences and program elements of the 
Tuzla–Osijek–Novi Sad triangle. 
NOTES
1 The pillars of the teams were Jovan Komšić, Aleksandar Popov, and Stanislava Pribiš from Novi 
Sad; Vehid Šehić, Mirjana Mišić Jugović, and Franjo Kovačević from Tuzla; and Tihomir Salajić 
and Katarina Kruhonja from Osijek.
2 For example, the Citizens’ Pact for South-Eastern Europe, founded in 2000 by the Inter Church 
Peace Council (IKV) from the Netherlands.
3 Speciﬁcally, the greatest debate concerned the “Croationized” version of the title of the Agreement, 
which was translated in the City Administration of Osijek as “Sporazum o etničkoj snošljivosti.” 
Though snošljivost and tolerance are close in meaning, some participants thought that former 
implies merely “putting up with each other.” Tolerance, which is used in international documents, 
suggested interaction. Finally, the text remained as it had been originally proposed.
4 The EastWest Institute is an international, not-for-proﬁt organizations “focused on confronting 
critical challenges that endanger peace.” See: http://www.ewi.info.
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Truth, Responsibility, and 
Reconciliation: Bajina Bašta and 
Srebrenica
Boban Tomić
The establishment of cooperation between Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica—the scene of 
one of the greatest crimes committed in the second half of 20th century, and a symbol 
of the atrocities of war—may become a model for overcoming the consequences of 
war and hatred, on the basis of joint activities of non-governmental organizations 
and local authorities in these two municipalities.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Bajina Bašta, a municipality in Serbia, and Srebrenica, a municipality in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
are divided, or linked, by the Drina river. Cooperation between these two municipalities while 
part of the former Yugoslav federation was extremely good, including a high level of interaction 
in economic areas. During the wars of the 1990s, an estimated 7,000 civilians were massacred in 
a few days in July 1995 in Srebrenica. A site of one of the greatest mass crimes against humanity 
since the Second World War, the town became a symbol of suﬀering. Srebrenica was in fact 
shelled from the territory of Bajina Bašta municipality—more precisely, from the slopes of the 
mountain of Tara in Serbia. Thus, many in Srebrencia have resisted renewing cooperation with 
their neighbors after the cessation of war. However, seeking to overcome recent tragedies, local 
civic organizations took the lead in re-building ties. In 2005, upon the initiative of Agora, an 
NGO from Bajina Bašta, and the Center for Regionalism, from Novi Sad, representatives of the 
two municipalities—including local oﬃcials and NGOs—signed an Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance. This agreement served as the basis for reestablishing intermunicipal cooperation in a 
range of areas, based on principles of tolerance and trust. Among the most important cross-border 
initiatives has been the creation of a Cross-Border Development Agency, which has made strong 
economic linkages between the two municipalities as well as with neighboring municipalities 
on both sides of the Drina. The renewal of economic cooperation has been a crucial step in 
dismantling rigid barriers that were created during war.
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Traditions of Cooperation 
 
The municipalities of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica are neighbors on the border of Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, situated in the middle part of the border strip along the 
Drina River. Both municipalities are characterized by rather similar, structures, resources, 
and problems. What diﬀerentiates them to a great extent is the ethnic structure: Bajina 
Bašta, on the Serbian side of the border, has an approximately 96-percent Orthodox 
Serbian population, while Srebrenica, on the Bosnian side of the border is a multiethnic 
municipality. Before the war it was approximately 70 percent Muslim Bosniaks and 
nearly 25 percent Orthodox Serbian. 
Figure 1. 
Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica
Table 1.
Demographic Data: Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica
Popula-
tion 
Population by gender Population Age (years)
Women Men Rural Urban <20 20–30 30–50 >50 
Srebrenica, before war* 36,000 52% 48% 78% 22% 18% 12% 41% 29%
Srebrenica** 6,000 53% 47% 76% 24% 15% 8% 41% 38%
Bajina Bašta*** 29,900 51% 49% 61% 39% 18% 12% 31% 39%
Sources: * National Census, 1991, SFRY.
 ** UNHCR, approximate census in the ﬁeld, 1996.
 *** Census of population, 2002, Statistical Oﬃce of the Republic of Serbia.
BiH
Serbia
Crna Gora
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In the era of state socialism, Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica were closely connected 
both by physical, geographical, and social ties. The Drina River presently is the border 
between these two countries (Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the two munici-
palities; however, that was by no means an impediment to construct the largest Yugoslav 
hydroelectric power plant (HPP) there. For years, the power capacity of Bajina Bašta 
HPP exceeded that of the Yugoslav part of the Đerdap HPP on the Danube River. From 
1961 to 1965, people and companies throughout the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugo-
slavia (SFRY) participated in the construction of Bajina Bašta HPP; this included locals 
from the municipalities of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica. Some time later, a Reversible 
Hydroelectric Power Plant was also constructed here, which was the ﬁrst of its kind in 
Yugoslavia, where the eﬀorts in the construction and subsequent beneﬁts were shared 
among the inhabitants of these two municipalities. 
These two municipalities have also had joint projects in the ﬁeld of infrastructure 
development. One extension of the waterworks network from Bajina Bašta passed across 
the bridge on the Drina River, supplying potable water to approximately 20 percent of 
the territory of Srebrenica. The electrical energy and telephone network from Bajina 
Bašta also covered some parts of the territory of Srebrenica where it was not possible or 
economically proﬁtable for Srebrenica to construct these networks. A large number of 
people living in Bajina Bašta went to work every day in the municipality of Srebrenica, 
especially from the area around the village of Skelani. Also, every morning several 
thousand people would go from villages around Srebrenica and Skelani to Bajina Bašta 
to work in local factories.
The majority of workers were employed in the wood-processing industry (Crni vrh), 
construction industry (Razvoj and Elektroizgradnja), the public utility company (12 
Septembar), clothes manufacturing (Konfekcija Tarateks and Kadinjača), electric energy 
distribution (Elektrodistribucija), and other factories. A smaller number of people, around 
200 of them, were employed in the public sector in schools, healthcare clinics, and public 
administration. These workers generally had very low or no qualiﬁcations at all. 
A great number of secondary school students in Bajina Bašta came from villages in 
the area of Srebrenica, whereas healthcare services, including the maternity hospital, 
were common for all inhabitants of Bajina Bašta and one half of the municipality of 
Srebrenica. 
A part of the Srebrenica municipality bordering the municipality of Bajina Bašta was 
very poorly connected to the center of Srebrenica municipality by 45 kilometers of poor 
mountain roads. For that reason, inhabitants from that part of Srebrenica used to cross the 
river to reach Bajina Bašta (two kilometers of paved road), where they received healthcare 
services, education, found jobs and enjoyed other civil rights that met their needs. 
Almost half of the inhabitants in Srebrenica were born in the hospital of Bajina 
Bašta, thus obtaining the citizenship of the Republic of Serbia. The capacity of the health 
center in Bajina Bašta was suﬃcient to receive all these people. Schools had a suﬃcient 
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number of classrooms, whereas factories, sport centers, and public facilities in Bajina 
Bašta were constructed under the assumption that inhabitants of Srebrenica, inclining 
towards this area, would also use them. 
Most of the jointly resolved problems were examples of good cooperation among the 
closest of neighbors. Local political and social elites eﬃciently controlled all development 
projects, including the and mutual ﬁnancial and material assistance for the construction 
of churches and mosques for Serbs and Bosniaks, respectively. The social life in both 
municipalities was unthinkable without the participation of all friends, irrespective of 
their religion and national aﬃliation. A great number of Serbs and Bosniaks had mixed 
marriages, which only proved that, in practice, there existed a strong citizen orientation 
of Serbs and Bosniaks in both municipalities. 
History
“I have extended a hand of reconciliation and that is my revenge. After being kept 
in prison and tortured, my goal is to achieve beneﬁt for all citizens and overcome 
the recent horrifying events, and this may only be attained through an honest 
approach and cooperation.”
—Abdurahman Malkic, Mayor of Srebrenica
 
Before the beginning of the Bosnian war, people in this area lived peacefully, building 
their communities, villages, and municipalities in harmony. No one feared the memories 
of past conﬂicts, because faith in the contemporary world and modern processes was 
far stronger—although in the collective consciousnesses of Serbs and Bosniaks there 
are strong mythological concepts of national ﬁghts for survival in the past. This con-
sciousness is deeply rooted in the Middle Ages, when conﬂicts between Orthodox Serbs 
and Muslim Turks spread throughout the Balkans. However, the Serbs and Bosniaks 
who lived in the Tito era neither fostered nor encouraged their sensitive national no-
tion of historical injustice. They lived in a harmonious, communist pattern, in which 
the national identity was closely associated with the proletarian ideas of communism, 
brotherhood, and unity. 
When the war broke out, the old wounds opened, and the spirit of the past irretriev-
ably confronted recent friends and good neighbors. Diﬀerences became insurmountable 
and visions of the future could no longer coincide. After the fall of the communist 
regime (when Tito died, and in particular prior to the beginning of the dissolution of 
SFRY) in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, the existing democratic procedures did 
not to suit the future of all these potentially new nations. 
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Instead, as early as in the late 1990s, the region was struck severely by nationalism 
and a strong xenophobic environment emerged. Strong nationalist ideologies were 
deeply rooted among a confused populace of peasants, workers, and clerks. The bitter 
fruit of war brought suﬀering, persecution, genocide, and collective trauma. Being 
greater in number and provided with moral and ﬁnancial assistance from Serbia, Serbs 
were superior to Bosniaks living in the area of Srebrenica and its surroundings. They 
soon took over the control of this territory, leaving over 15,000 Bosniaks surrounded in 
two small enclaves of Srebrenica and Žepa. During the war, these enclaves were under 
United Nations protection. 
These havens were not eﬀectively protected and, on the contrary, perhaps they were 
even sacriﬁced. Towards the end of the war, Bosnian Serbs, under the command of 
General Ratko Mladić, took control over both enclaves, causing over 8,000 Srebrenica 
Bosniaks to perish. This bloodshed reached a climax in the hostilities between Serbia 
and Bosnia and Herzegovina, although, towards the end of 1995, both countries signed 
the Dayton Agreement in order to cease further bloodshed. 
The world characterized the massacre in Srebrenica as genocide, with General Mladić 
and Radovan Karadžić, the leader of Bosnian Serbs at the time, as perpetrators of this 
crime. Bosnian Serbs, as well as Serbs in the rump state, have denied their involvement 
in this massacre till this time, and they still deny it. Not all the perpetrators have still 
been brought to justice and many are at large. 
At the end of 2000, Milošević’s nationalist regime collapsed in Serbia, and in the 
“October Revolution” the democratic powers, gathered under the Democratic Opposi-
tion of Serbia, also won the elections at the local level in Bajina Bašta. Reform-oriented 
parties managed to win the majority votes in the local assembly and assume a proactive 
course regarding the problems that existed at that time in the municipality. In addition 
to a great number of projects aimed at rehabilitation and development of communal 
infrastructure, as well as the economic development, the local authority in Bajina Bašta 
promptly started investigating the possibility to reestablish ties with the municipalities 
with which it had cooperated in the socialist era. 
First of all, contacts were made with Bajina Bašta’s closest neighbor, Srebrenica, to 
be followed by its sister-municipality of Krško in Slovenia. The cooperation with Sre-
brenica was a historical and practical necessity, as these two municipalities are naturally 
connected, allowing them to resolve their problems together in a much more harmoni-
ous manner. Apart from numerous problems that emerged during the war, it was to 
reestablish the fundamental trust among ethnic groups that could only be achieved 
by the process to determine the truth of what actually happened, then to establish the 
responsibility for what happened, in order to eventually reach the reconciliation and 
trust. Political elites at the time had no problems recognizing the common values and 
agreeing about these issues. 
The problem was only the fact that common citizens still had not grasped the 
essence of what happened during the war, and consequently had a diﬃcult time 
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understanding the level of responsibility as well as bearers of it. Political leaders of 
these two municipalities had no disagreement regarding this issue. However, in order to 
establish a full and proper cooperation, it was necessary to gradually transfer the good 
and positive energy that was a characteristic of the municipal authorities of Bajina Bašta 
and Srebrenica to the political establishment, entrepreneurs, NGO sector, citizens, and 
the entire of society. 
In order to reestablish the cooperation between Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica and 
develop it to the full extent, ﬁrst of all it was necessary to build the capacities for co-
operation at the local self-government level regarding the economy, non-governmental 
organizations, and the media. In this respect, authorities in both municipalities deter-
mined the activities that were to gradually create the conditions for a comprehensive 
cooperation, which used to exist between them. Considering the fact that neither of 
the municipalities had the resources and institutional mechanisms required for such a 
serious activity, it was necessary to address international donors for assistance and sup-
port of the proposed intermunicipal cooperation. 
The Fund for an Open Society–Serbia was the ﬁrst organization that fully grasped 
the situation in the ﬁeld, as well as the tasks ahead. During the war, the Fund for an 
Open Society–Serbia provided ﬁnancial and material assistance to the processes of 
information exchange in the cross-border area, by supporting the activities of the local 
independent Radio Television (RTV) Bajina Bašta. This cooperation provided the ba-
sis for deﬁning the courses of action in the ﬁeld of information exchange and cultural 
exchange between Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica that were initiated during 2001, with 
the support of the Fund for an Open Society. 
In 2002, the process of institutional strengthening was joined by the Citizens 
Forum of Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and the Center for Regionalism from Novi 
Sad (Serbia). These two organizations had very important roles in that period, by pro-
viding support and encouragement to the people in the ﬁeld. These organizations have 
been promoting and supporting the ideas of cooperation, good neighbor relations, and 
postwar rehabilitation even before and during the conﬂict. 
They, with the local politicians, non-governmental organizations, and independent 
media, implemented the project of developing a cross-border NGO and an economic 
and information exchange. On two occasions, the Fund for an Open Society supported 
these projects, which resulted in developing the cross-border cooperation agency, which 
is expected to start its work in the near future. 
But how did the citizens of Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta feel about the reestablish-
ment of cooperation between these two areas? In the ﬁrst phase of cooperation, starting 
in 2001, the majority of citizens still did not have enough of the required information; 
however, they felt ready and willing to heal the wounds of war and start new lives. The 
main problem encountered was related to the perception of Serbs, when it came to 
the process of establishing responsibility for the genocide of Bosniaks, which was well 
underway at The Hague International Tribunal. The feeling that they would be col-
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lectively punished and stigmatized was stronger with Serbs than the feeling of reality, 
which posed a great impediment. 
The nationalist Serbian ideologues who were not eradicated in the “democratic 
revolution” in 2000 were the source of threats and intimidations towards activists and 
the political leaders of the municipality of Bajina Bašta, with the undoubted message 
that there should be no cooperation with Srebrenica. However, the cross-border coopera-
tion supporters and protagonists were not intimidated by those threats, but responded 
by taking more actions. 
Still, these tensions among the Serbian part of the population have not diminished 
until today. On the contrary, the assassination of the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran 
Đinđić in 2003 additionally complicated the situation to the disadvantage of progres-
sive forces. Since 2004, the conservative government of Vojislav Koštunica in Belgrade 
restrained the reforms and reactivated old communist personnel. It has aggravated the in-
terethnic relations towards Serbia’s neighbors, particularly towards Muslims. This became 
the millstone around the neck of local activists from Bajina Bašta, and local politicians 
and entrepreneurs who spent the previous years trying to reestablish the fragile relations 
with Bosniaks from Srebrenica. Vojislav Koštunica led to a comeback of nationalists 
and Milošević’s followers, whereas NGO activists and reform-oriented politicians were 
out of favor. After 2003, any form of cooperation between Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica 
became unstable, particularly when the new, strengthened nationalists in Bajina Bašta 
relieved the reform-oriented president of his post in the municipality. He was replaced 
because of his eﬀorts to establish cross-border cooperation with Srebrenica. 
The perception of the local Bosniak public in the municipality of Srebrenica was 
quite diﬀerent, and generally moderate in respect of the problems present in Bajina Bašta. 
Local self-government of the multiethnic municipality of Srebrenica (comprising Serbs 
and Bosniaks) understood the problems in Serbia and Bajina Bašta. Their position in the 
period after 2004, when the reform-oriented local parties lost their leading position in 
Bajina Bašta, was neutral. The authorities of Srebrenica responded to events and certain 
minor activities initiated in Bajina Bašta by the NGO sector. However, in that period 
there was no direct or oﬃcial cooperation between the two municipalities. Primarily 
due to the fact that there were no positive signals coming from the newly-elected, 
conservative local authorities of Bajina Bašta. Representatives of Bosniaks and Serbs in 
the Srebrenica Assembly made constant contributions to the activities of cross-border 
cooperation between the two municipalities. 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
Cooperation between the municipalities of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica in the period 
immediately following the Bosnian war and at the beginning of the democratization 
process in Serbia was based on the incentive that the two municipal leaders restore the 
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old ties and improve the relations between institutions and citizens. However, this new 
era brought along new challenges for the actors of cooperation between the two munici-
palities in the form of numerous common problems, ideas, strivings, and visions. 
In accordance with the transition processes that had already become their reality, 
Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica had to ﬁnd their own, local response to the challenges of 
transition. Apart from the tragic war, both municipalities had hundreds of unemployed 
people, social services were on the verge of collapse, and almost all areas of public life 
still were unregulated. In early 2000, the population of Srebrenica was less than 5,000, 
of which some 1,000 inhabitants lived in the town, while the remaining population 
lived in the surrounding settlements. The population was mainly Serbian, since Bosniaks 
only reappeared from exile to their former, prewar homes very slowly. 
The factories were destroyed, and apart from one factory, “11Mart,” there was no 
industry. Catering, trade, agriculture, and the public sector were the only business ac-
tivities in operation. The municipality was living on donations from the international 
community. In Bajina Bašta, the economy was ruined owing to a poorly-conducted 
privatization processes, causing almost all factories to stop operating overnight. Only 
large public enterprises kept functioning in the ﬁeld of forestry and hydro-electric energy 
production. The number of the employed used to be 8,500 and was reduced by half, and 
the number of the unemployed increased by more than half, from 2,000 to 4,200.
Public ﬁnance management was quite critical, as both kin states (Serbia and 
Republika Srpska, BiH) were just preparing their ﬁscal and monetary systems for 
European integration. The ﬁscal decisions were centralized and local authorities lacked 
the human resources, as well as the material and other conditions of ﬁnance discipline. 
High poverty and unemployment rates among the population were a serious problem. 
There was a complete separation of the lower and upper classes, particularly the local 
elites who illegally and under dubious circumstances came into possession of substantial 
capital and consequently accumulated much social power and inﬂuence. These problems 
were equally present in both municipalities, putting the burden mostly on ordinary 
people. The middle class almost disappeared in the period of war destruction and social 
stratiﬁcation. 
Political Developments
The idea of initiating joint actions between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta was in many 
ways signiﬁcant, but most of all, it was to demonstrate the political maturity of local 
reform-oriented politicians and the determination of local authorities to start resolving 
the accumulated problems. Most local politicians were willing to be involved in joint 
actions of the two municipalities but their opinions were split. Reformists clearly were 
distinguished in both municipalities: their basic orientation was the modernization of 
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society on the principles of Euro-Atlantic integration and acceptance of the responsibil-
ity for the future of the local community. 
Local authorities in Srebrenica comprised Serbs and Bosniaks. The Bosniak Party 
of Democratic Action (SDA), which was constructive party at national level, was the 
majority party of the Bosniaks. Serbs were represented by Serbian Democratic Party 
(SDS), burdened by the war’s heritage of nationalism, along with a smaller number of 
representatives of the reform-oriented SNSD party (Party of Independent Social Demo-
crats). The majority of the council in Bajina Bašta was comprised of reform-oriented 
parties of the opposition. 
On the other side there were nationalists who, at ﬁrst, did not obstruct the processes 
of cooperation and joint projects. However, their inﬂuence started to grow after 2003. 
Following the reform-oriented democratic leaders in Bajina Bašta, the cooperation with 
Srebrenica was questioned. Later, the reformists regained control over the key municipal 
functions in Bajina Bašta, which lead to the continuation of cooperation. 
Nevertheless, in the relation of local politicians towards cooperation of these two 
municipalities, one may notice both the strong nationalist policy and xenophobia of 
the Serbian population in both municipalities, being isolation-oriented and regressive 
in respect to their Bosniak neighbors. Serbian nationalist politicians in the local com-
munity were consistent with the implementation of radical and nationalist ideas that 
were the basis for the Bosnian war and genocide. The only purpose of the occasional 
paciﬁcation of nationalists in the period from 2000 to 2003 was to mislead the reform-
ists and strengthen the nationalists. 
The policy of disagreement and misunderstanding caused a lot of damage to all 
forms of cooperation and progress in cross-border cooperation. Their actions were 
directed against organizations in the non-governmental sector like Drina Mreže (The 
Drina Networks) and Agora from Bajina Bašta, as well as against the independent media 
like Radio-Television (RTV) Prima and individuals who were the key persons when it 
came to cooperation with Srebrenica. 
That period was characterized by frequent anonymous death threats, open political 
attacks on NGO sector activists, speeches of hatred in the local council of Bajina Bašta, 
media campaigns, and economic repression, manifested in a number of job dismissals. 
The activist Vladimir Jevtić was dismissed from his position as a primary school teacher 
by a hidden “suggestion“ that “he should not be socializing with Muslims.” The former 
president of the Municipality of Bajina Bašta, Mr. Boban Tomić, was dismissed from 
his function as the president of local parliament by nationalists, which was followed 
by frequent threats, police surveillance, various searches, and framed court charges 
against him. 
Nationalists acted legally through the speeches they delivered in the Municipal As-
sembly of Bajina Bašta. They told untruths and referred to the cooperation between these 
two municipalities as an act of treason against Serbs, thereby sending a call for public 
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justice. There were also frequent anonymous threats to activists, as well as graﬃti writings 
on the walls of the Municipal Assembly and RTV Prima buildings in Bajina Bašta. 
Nevertheless, owing to good organization and support, mostly provided by in-
ternational organizations, all nationalist pressures were successfully blocked. Support 
provided by international donors (Balkan Trust for Democracy and Fund for an Open 
Society) included the provision of funds for three projects of cross-border cooperation 
implemented by Agora NGO and Radio-Television Prima from Bajina Bašta. The donors 
granted the funds that were used to organize joint open forums, public discussions, and 
radio and television shows promoting the culture of interethnic dialogue, cooperation 
between the two cross-border municipalities, truth, responsibility, and reconciliation.
On the territory of the municipality of Srebrenica, the resistance towards cooperation 
between the two municipalities was manifested in a latent form by the most extreme 
nationalist policies of Serbs and Bosniaks. However, there were no cases of open actions 
or hate speech. Instead, despite of disagreements, the atmosphere of tolerance prevailed 
in Srebrenica, and all the activities for cross-border cooperation were accepted in an 
unreserved and cordial manner. 
The dominant religious group in Bajina Bašta is Orthodox Serb, while in Srebrenica 
the religious groups include Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosniaks. In terms of coop-
eration between these two municipalities, the representatives of the Islamic religious 
community and Serbian Orthodox Church had no problems in their relations. On the 
contrary, their resistance towards this cooperation was unnoticeable. The clergymen 
participated in public events and they always undoubtedly supported the peace events 
and cooperation. 
The cooperation between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, although slightly decreased 
in 2004, was quite intense in the ﬁeld of municipal administrative cooperation. Since 
the start of cooperation in 2001 until the present day, the two municipal administra-
tions have maintained a high level of cooperation, particularly when it comes to certain 
actions or concrete needs of citizens or organizations. All administrative, as well as 
general aﬀairs, are performed without obstacles; therefore, this form of cooperation is 
considered to be excellent. The cooperation of municipal administrations is signiﬁcant, 
but its character is only formal, as it involves only clerks, without the participation of 
politicians or decision-makers.
Civic Cooperation
NGOs and their representatives were intensely involved in the cooperation, primar-
ily linking the local organizations with active participation of women and the youth. 
In Srebrenica, during 2005, organizations like Biznis forum (Business Forum), Želja 
(Desire), Žene Podrinja (Women of the Drina Basin), and Orhideja (Orchid) organized 
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joint actions with the partner organizations from Bajina Bašta. They received ﬁnancial 
support for environmental actions from the Regional Environmental Center in Budapest. 
In Bajina Bašta, non-governmental organizations like Ekološki pokret (Environmental 
Movement), Drina Mreža, Agora, and Tara Biosfera (the Tara Biosphere) took part in 
these actions and have maintained a good relations until the present day. 
In particular, environmental activists and like-minded ﬁshermen from Srebrenica 
and Bajina Bašta cooperated to conduct numerous joint actions on the Drina River. 
These eﬀorts were supported in 2007 by the CARE International’s Drina Valley Tourism 
Development Program, funded by the Netherlands in the period from 2005 to 2008. 
The river has rebounded due to the removal of illegal landﬁlls and the protection of pre-
cious ﬁsh species. In addition to this, public security was strengthened as the game and 
ﬁsh wardens acted to discourage the cross-border smuggling of goods, drugs, weapons, 
and people across the river. 
Cooperation among entrepreneurs has not yet reached its potential level due to a 
lack of institutional conditions. There are private business owners in both municipalities 
who would like to cooperate in the ﬁeld of agriculture, craftsmanship, services related to 
tourism, and in particular, wood processing. However, they lack joint institutions, they 
do not know how to register their organizations, due to the fact that they belong to two 
diﬀerent states. This constitutes a formal, but very signiﬁcant impediment, for in order 
to enhance the cooperation, an institutional form for such cooperation has to exist. 
Economic Relations
Resources for the production of agricultural products, organic food, and tourism-re-
lated services are underexploited though they have huge economic potential to drive 
growth in the area. In both municipalities there is an idea of establishing joint capacities 
in production and processing, especially with the Central European Free Trade Area 
(CEFTA) agreement in force, and numerous beneﬁts related to the cross-border eco-
nomic cooperation. Still, support and encouragement from the central authorities of 
Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina/Republika Srpska are insuﬃcient. 
Until now, Srebrenica’s special interest in cooperation was represented by growers 
of raspberries, strawberries, blackberries, and blueberries; trout breeders; and factories 
that process beech timber. Their market is in Serbia, and they would like to establish 
a better cooperation than what exists so far. In Bajina Bašta people are interested in 
the export of beef and mutton, as well as dairy products, and some consumer goods to 
Srebrenica, because this town, together with its neighboring municipalities, makes a 
good market for their products. 
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International Support
In the previous period, international donor organizations were involved in this coop-
eration and they have had a special place and role among the actors of cooperation of 
Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica. The greatest ﬁnancial support so far has been provided by 
the government of Norway, which provided substantial funds, through its embassies in 
Belgrade and Sarajevo, to be allocated for projects related to environmental protection. 
Under the auspices of this program, the Drina River Committee was established, whose 
ﬁrst activities were implemented in the municipalities of Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, 
and now extending to 29 municipalities along the Drina River. This project resulted in 
substantial investments to clean the surface waste from Lake Perućac, shared by both 
Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta. The Regional Environmental Center from Budapest was the 
implementer of this project, with oﬃces in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Banja Luka. Cohesion 
has been fostered by the environmental awareness of the municipalities’ inhabitants, 
motivating them to join together to preserve their natural resources and climate.
The most important donor has been Care International, which established their 
oﬃces in Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, with the aim to develop a three-year support 
program for small and medium-sized initiatives in the ﬁeld of sustainable tourism. 
Financed by the funds from the Netherlands, the program has had outstanding results, 
and remains one of the most propulsive programs of the international community in 
these municipalities. 
The Fund for an Open Society–Serbia provided the ﬁnancial support to non-
governmental organizations from Bajina Bašta, namely to Drina Mreža and Agora 
NGOs, with which the cooperation was ﬁrst established during 2001. That was the time 
when these two NGOs, together with the local independent Radio Television “Prima,” 
initiated an action to stimulate the local public and politicians to establish and start the 
cooperation between these two large and important municipalities. 
The Fund for an Open Society also provided assistance to programs implemented by 
the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad with local non-governmental organizations 
in both municipalities. That support, though only at the beginning was crucial, as it was 
provided at the time when none of the international donors were present in this area. 
At the formal level, this resulted in signing the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance in 
2004 by representatives of these two municipalities. 
Individuals
The importance of personal commitment cannot be stressed enough in the establish-
ment of this cooperation. 
In Bajina Bašta, the president of the municipality was Boban Tomić, a representa-
tive of the Democratic Party and who was in the opposition during Milošević’s regime 
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and one of the holders of democratic changes in this municipality in the period after 
the fall of Milošević. 
Likewise, the president of the municipality of Srebrenica was Abdurahman Malkić, 
who was also willing to establish cooperation with Bajina Bašta, irrespective of the fact 
that grenades were ﬁred at Srebrenica from Bajina Bašta and his own tragic, personal 
experiences during the war. Dramatically, at the time of the genocide in Srebrenica in 
July 1995, he managed to avoid execution by swimming across the Drina and hiding 
in the woods near Bajina Bašta for some time. After a while, he was caught by Serbian 
security forces and imprisoned in Bajina Bašta, where he was tortured. Fortunately, he 
survived the war, to become the president of the municipality of Srebrenica when the 
war ended. 
When presenting the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance at the round table organized 
in Bajina Bašta, he stated the following: “When I was on my way to Bajina Bašta, for 
the ﬁrst time after almost ten years, my colleagues asked me why I was going there after 
everything that had happened to me. I told them that I was going there to seek revenge. 
My revenge would be to extend a hand of reconciliation ant tell them that they had 
been forgiven for everything.” 
The attitude of the central authorities towards the cooperation between Bajina Bašta 
and Srebrenica has remained very problematic. Signals were sent from local communities, 
asking for the support for establishment of the institutional mechanisms and capacity 
building needed for the cross-border cooperation, but the central authorities did not 
respond adequately to those calls. Both sides expect their governments to engage more 
eﬀectively in the programs aimed at strengthening the partnership, friendly spirit, toler-
ance, and understanding, in order to speed progress in both communities. 
Sarajevo and Belgrade are unfamiliar with the problems of local communities beyond 
their immediate borders. Local progressive structures (NGOs, reform-oriented politi-
cians, and individuals) have always proposed various forms of cooperation. However, 
the problems arise when it comes to regulations in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
as cross-border cooperation has been insuﬃciently deﬁned by these neighbors. Indeed, 
nobody knows how to formally establish and to register cross-border institutions. For 
example, where to register the cross-border development agency or where and how to 
register a farmers’ association, youth organization, or business forum? This administra-
tive issue should be regulated by the two states, in order to establish the conditions and 
mechanisms that would facilitate concrete networking of people. 
Form of Cooperation
Both municipalities used the rights and possibilities provided to them within the legal 
regulations of their kin states, as well as those parts of the municipal statutes that concern 
the international cooperation of municipalities, in order to establish their cooperation. 
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None of the municipalities had problems when designing and signing the agreement 
on mutual cooperation with the neighboring municipality, as legal regulations in Ser-
bia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were very clear and aﬃrmative in this respect. It was 
particularly convenient that Republika Srpska, as an entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
including Srebrenica, already had signed a bilateral agreement with Serbia that allowed 
the establishment of all forms of cooperation among local self-governments. 
Respecting their decision to jointly better the living conditions of all their citizens, 
in particular, to build future cooperation on the principles of true and full cooperation, 
the two municipalities agreed that a vital prerequisite of cooperation includes respect-
ing the right of the other side to have their own perception of the problem, as well as 
its solution. In that respect, the municipalities adopted a clear plan and unambiguous 
decisions. 
In the ﬁrst phase of the cooperation initiation, Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica failed 
to draw up a special document in the form of agreement or protocol of cooperation, 
but signed the special protocol for each ﬁeld in which a project was applied. For in-
stance, a special cooperation agreement was signed concerning the cleaning of surface 
waste from Lake Perućac on the Drina River, with municipalities being the promoters 
and main sponsors of activities. The idea of signing a special cooperation agreement 
or charter has not been implemented because political turbulence in Serbia resulted in 
changes within the local authorities in Bajina Bašta, so the signing of an agreement was 
postponed until further notice.
On the basis of mutual understanding and special agreements for each individual 
area, it was established that each municipality or organization would be entrusted by 
the municipality to participate in certain areas of cooperation. It also would be allowed 
to withdraw from the cooperation if the activities were contrary to the declared goals, 
values, and principles of cooperation adopted by the municipalities. 
In that respect, municipalities followed a very ﬂexible procedure that did not bind 
any municipality oﬃcially to ask for the termination of cooperation. However, this 
never happened, because the principles of participation were observed and the politi-
cal leadership on both sides wanted to further develop and improve the cooperation. 
As far as mutual agreements and decision-making processes are concerned, municipal 
authorities fully agreed that the holders of the most relevant activities should be the 
presidents of the municipalities (they are called municipal mayors in Bosnia), whereas 
decisions are to be adopted by the consensus of the participants in meetings. Both 
municipalities were represented by the president/mayor of the municipality, presidents 
of municipal assemblies, heads of municipal administrations, and one representative of 
a local non-governmental organization. 
In the meetings of the working body, minutes were taken by the municipality that 
hosted the meeting and these minutes contained a short overview of discussions, as 
well as conclusions that were adopted. Meetings between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta 
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municipality presidents were more frequent until 2004, whereas formally, meetings 
were only called for quarterly in both municipalities. The topics of their meetings were 
mainly concerned with the cities’ current activities, as well as exchange of information 
and experiences. 
Cooperation between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta has always been carefully presented 
and promoted in the local media and for the broader public. Managers of the services 
and the implemented projects had to provide a greater level of transparency regarding 
their projects. Both municipalities used the services of their local media to disseminate 
the messages containing the results of activities and good practices of intermunicipal 
cross-border cooperation in the ﬁeld. A special working body, being in charge of the 
dissemination of news and messages on the joint activities was not established, but a 
responsible person was nominated. 
The implementation of a cooperation project always included eﬃciency research 
and monitoring; the evaluation of cooperation was performed for each individually 
organized and approved project. Considering the fact that municipalities did not have 
strictly formalized administrative structures and bodies, there was no integrated ﬁnancial 
management . Instead, each municipality individually funded the joint actions taken 
on their respective territories. 
The main obstacle to establishing a joint institutional framework (working bodies, 
joint funds, etc.) was found in the insuﬃcient regulations of the kin states. There was 
no model for an organization that would be able to straddle the border and suﬃciently 
protect the interests of both municipalities. For example, it was diﬃcult to determine 
a model by which a joint committee would be registered and bank account opened. 
The lack of formal legal solutions slowed down the process of formalizing the coopera-
tion, establishing joint bodies, and organizing ﬁnances. However, the municipalities 
expressed their willingness to establish an optimal model of joint institutions that could 
be formalized in the future. 
In the discussion about the potential forms of cooperation, the two municipalities 
easily detected a common problem that originated from the level of central authori-
ties of their kin states. Neither Serbian legislation nor the legislation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina and Republika Srpska contained the relevant laws that would allow mu-
nicipalities to establish cooperation with the neighboring municipalities and to develop 
more solid norms and institutions. In this sense, it was not possible to provide answers 
to a number of formal questions, although these questions were of crucial relevance 
and signiﬁcance for further cooperation, with both sides willing and ready to resolve 
the existing dilemmas. 
For example, the question of the formal registration of joint bodies has remained 
unresolved until today. However, there are more dilemmas related to managing the joint 
resources, ﬁnances, and potential property that would be acquired by both municipalities 
in the course of cooperation. All these issues aﬀected, to a great extent, the outcome of 
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cooperation in the formal legal sense. In this context, in spite of their good will, neither 
municipality managed to resolve the dilemmas, mostly because the legal environment 
of their kin states was neither favorable nor suﬃciently ﬂexible and creative. 
Funding Cooperation 
The municipalities of Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta established those forms of coop-
eration and joint activities that could be entirely ﬁnanced by each municipality or by 
international donors. The projects funded by the municipalities were entirely ﬁnanced 
by one municipality, due to a lack of institutional possibilities to establish joint funds. 
But the implementation of certain actions was funded by the international community, 
governments of other countries, as well as donors. These actions were ﬁnanced in both 
municipalities, with the funding implemented in the direct communication between 
international organizations and municipalities or other organizations involved in pre-
determined projects. 
The funding of activities was always implemented on the basis of the combined 
participation of a large number of project participants. For example, a project was ﬁ-
nanced through direct funds supplied by the donor, while the municipality provided the 
transport vehicles and petrol, and the non-governmental sector provided the voluntary or 
paid engagement of activists in the ﬁeld. In this respect, there were a number of multiple 
combinations of positive participation by all actors in the cooperation process. 
In the cooperation so far, the municipalities have yet to introduce a local fee or 
ﬁnancial contribution to be allocated for some forms of cooperation between the two 
cross-border municipalities. The main obstacle is a lack of coordination and a very 
rigid position of state regulations towards the institutions of cross-border cooperation. 
On many occasions, like at joint meetings and evaluations of previous projects, the 
municipalities expressed their willingness to act in order to create favorable conditions 
for the introduction of local ﬁnancial contributions that would be allocated for cross-
border projects. In addition, the municipalities seem to be quite ambitious, as they are 
aware that the ﬁnancial contribution of citizens ensures the establishing of not only a 
new quality of life, but also personal trust among citizens and their respective ethnic 
communities. 
In previous cooperation between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, international donors 
and governments recognized the need and signiﬁcance of the cooperation between these 
two municipalities, and played the crucial role in funding. Although the importance of 
this cooperation extended to a great number of social spheres, from ecology to political 
and security-related stability in the region, international organizations seemed to have 
the greatest aﬃnity and sensibility for the problems of the people living in these two 
municipalities.
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Before the war, each municipality had its own ﬁnancial contributions for the con-
struction of local infrastructure and institutions of public interest. Nowadays, however, 
neither of the municipalities have a public ﬁnancial mechanism for local fund-raising. 
The idea was that both municipalities should join and make a decision that all the citi-
zens contribute to cross-border activities and interests by allocating symbolic amount 
of funds for this purpose. So far such a project has not been implemented, but there is 
continuing interest.
Unfortunately, governments of the kin states or the business sectors of both coun-
tries have provided only insuﬃcient encouragement and incentives to this cooperation. 
A strong and direct eﬀort must be made to convince the governments of Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, and Republika Srpska to pay greater attention to cross-border coopera-
tion if it is to succeed. The kin states should recognize that the projects implemented by 
the two bordering municipalities are the keys to resolve citizens’ economic and social 
problems. One of the future projects in both municipalities could concern the lobby-
ing directed towards governments, in an attempt to force and encourage them to think 
in a way that would lead to promotion of the cross-border cooperation of neighboring 
municipalities to the greatest possible extent. 
TYPICAL ACTIVITIES AND PROJECTS
In the ﬁrst years after the war, the two municipalities made the ﬁrst eﬀorts to launch 
projects to support the ﬂow of information and to strengthen institutional resources 
and capacities for future stability. With the help of other international donor programs, 
the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia and the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad 
funded and supported the activities of independent media. These activities were imple-
mented under the motto of “Truth, Responsibility, and Reconciliation” and were aimed 
at reestablishment of dialogue about what creative and positive forms of cooperation 
were possible in the post-conﬂict environment. 
In 2001 and 2002, Agora and Drina Mreža NGOs from Bajina Bašta, the Women’s 
Association from Srebrenica, the Citizens Forum from Srebrenica, as well as the Center 
for Regionalism from Novi Sad, organized a range of open, public events. These local 
debates were on the common future, on overcoming the burden of war crimes and 
building trust and a modern local society based on European and global standards. These 
open debates included the members of the above-mentioned NGOs, as well as a large 
number of citizens and experts from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
Some participants were also the leaders of movements that were integration and 
reform-related, such as the Igman Initiative and the Dayton Triangle, including well-
known activists and scholars like Vehid Šehić, Jovan Komšić, Aleksandar Popov, Živorad 
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Kovačević, Čedomir Čupić,1 and others. Many open public debates and exhibits were 
organized for promoting these new social values and ways to reestablish cooperation 
and trust among neighbors. Special emphasis was placed on the younger generations, 
particularly those groups that were very interested in the cooperation. 
 
Organizing Public Discussions
The ﬁrst project launched in 2001 within the cooperation framework between the two 
municipalities was the project of public open debates and an accompanying media 
campaign named “Truth, Responsibility, and Reconciliation.” Considering the fact that 
a committee for establishing the truth, responsibility, and reconciliation already existed 
at that time in Serbia, similar to bodies established in other post-conﬂict areas around 
the world, there was a concrete need to discuss these issues in the ﬁeld, as well. Agora 
NGO activists and journalists from RTV Prima from Bajina Bašta covered some sensi-
tive issues that troubled the citizens of both municipalities. Search for the truth meant 
the identiﬁcation and clear establishment of the guilty parties and all those responsible 
for the suﬀering, violence, and genocide of the Bosniak population in the region of 
Srebrenica during the Balkan wars. 
This was not an easy process. On the contrary, for Serbian nationalists it meant 
the loss of national dignity and degradation of national heroes who had already been 
largely characterized as war criminals. Under such circumstances it was very diﬃcult, 
almost impossible, to ﬁght for the truth and establishment of responsibility. It was a 
heavy burden for the activists of this campaign. 
Nevertheless, the campaign was carried out, with the series of three public open 
debates organized in Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta. All open debates were recorded for 
broadcasting locally on television and radio. Although diﬃcult and exhausting, this 
campaign produced some results. Despite the fact that it instigated and stirred the na-
tionalistic emotions, this campaign managed to draw the attention of the local public 
to organizations and individuals who were making persistent eﬀorts to ensure a normal 
life, justice, truth, and punishment of those who were guilty of war . This is fundamental 
for the common future of Bosniaks and Serbs, as well as for the genuine reconciliation 
of these two nations. 
This campaign was ﬁnancially supported for two years by the Fund for an Open 
Society–Serbia. It was implemented by Agora NGO and the independent RTV Prima 
from Bajina Bašta, the NGOs Citizens Forum of Srebrenica and Association of Women 
of Srebrenica, the NGO Citizens Forum of Tuzla, and the Center for Regionalism from 
Novi Sad. The two municipalities provided their support to the project by ensuring the 
necessary logistics. Implementation of this project was monitored by a great number of 
domestic and international organizations, particularly those dealing with human rights 
and cross-border cooperation projects in this region. 
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In 2005 and 2006, the project of public open debates and dialogues on new social 
values and tolerance in the region was implemented by Drina Mreža NGO in cooperation 
with Drina Press International from Srebrenica, under the auspices of the Balkan Trust 
for Democracy. The aim of this project was to raise awareness and to promote the culture 
of dialogue on burning issues in the local communities and society at large, as well as 
to improve the forms of cooperation between the two municipalities. For six months, 
open public debates and media shows were organized in Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, 
with the participation of a great number of experts and representatives of prominent 
civil sector organizations from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. 
 
Ecological Iniaitives: Cleaning a Local Lake
In 2003, the government of Norway, through its Ministry of Foreign Aﬀairs, expressed 
its interest in supporting the cooperation projects between the two municipalities, as well 
as between their NGOs and business organizations. In the decade of wars, there were 
a large number of practical problems for public services. One of the most serious was 
the accumulation of waste and the poor waste management policy in both municipali-
ties. These municipalities are situated in an area of extreme beauty, but it was seriously 
threatened by devastation and destruction. 
Lake Perućac, situated behind a dam on the Drina River—the border between 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia and between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta—had 
accumulated ten year of surface waste from towns and villages situated upstream. As 
there was no technical possibility to allow this waste to ﬂow further down the river, the 
entire amount of waste soon ﬂooded extensive parts of Tara National Park. 
The two municipalities soon came to recognize the signiﬁcance of this problem. In 
addition to providing jobs to a number of unemployed, cleaning the lake would also allow 
the whole area to develop its tourism, hunting, ﬁshing, and recreational opportunities. 
Both municipalities asked the government of Norway the assistance, and it allocated 
substantial funds to ﬁnance several projects of cross-border cooperation between these 
two municipalities, as well as in the whole basin of the Drina. 
This issue, and this project for that matter, provided the basis for establishing the 
Drina River Committee in 2005, including the participation of all 29 municipalities 
from three countries (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro) situated in 
the basin of the Drina. It was a unique case, as the cooperation between Bajina Bašta 
and Srebrenica produced a greater incentive for developing a better and more extensive 
cooperation in the cross-border region. 
In the period from 2004 to 2006, the government of Norway, through its partner, 
the Regional Environmental Center in Budapest, provided the equipment and manpower 
for cleaning the surface waste. The project participants included the Tara National Park 
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and two municipalities, which provided the manpower, energy, and communication. 
In the second phase of this project, recycling equipment was provided, signiﬁcantly 
increasing the overall impact. 
In 2006, the Regional Environmental Center from Budapest organized an awards 
competition for the most successful bridges of cooperation among local NGOs that 
helped to design waste cleaning projects, education, and prevention. The purpose was 
to strengthen the NGOs and provide assistance in the process of establishing the coop-
eration not only among the citizens of Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, but among other 
municipalities in the region, as well. This was again the case when the cooperation 
between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta extended to other neighboring towns, since it was 
used as a model of joint activities in the cross-border area. The government of Norway 
was the most signiﬁcant individual donor for activities related to establishing the cross-
border cooperation in the ﬁeld of environmental protection and institution building. 
 
Improving Border Crossing 
In 2004, the leaders of the two municipalities implemented a project concerning the 
rehabilitation of the border crossing at Bajina Bašta–Skelani. It aimed to establish co-
operation among citizens and border services, as well as to develop trust and to improve 
working conditions at the border post, what used to be a small, non-functional border 
post in poor condition. With insuﬃcient facilities and public lightning, nearly ignored, 
this crossing was practically unserviceable. The bridge connecting the two riverbanks 
was terribly unstable..
The two municipalities decided to apply for USAID support to provide the basic 
infrastructure of border services in the best interest of the citizens. The aim was to re-
construct the old bridge, to pave the roadway, to illuminate the entire border crossing 
with quality public lighting, and to include two border police units in the process of 
establishing the cooperation. USAID ﬁnanced the project with enthusiasm, so at the end 
of 2004 the border crossing was rehabilitated and put into operation, in the presence 
of the highest USAID oﬃcials working in this region, along with the representatives 
of diplomatic authorities of the USA in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. It was a 
crowning achievement for the two municipalities, making their common border a better 
place for the two municipalities and two countries to meet and exchange communica-
tion, people, commodities, goods, services, and capital. 
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Training and Capacity Development
In 2005, cooperation between the two municipalities reached a phase when it was faced 
with a lack of personnel and ideas, but the donors were still very interested. In order to 
improve the human resources and to provide institutional capacities for NGO projects, 
the two municipalities moved in the direction of personnel training and education. The 
Association of Women of Srebrenica, in cooperation with USAID in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and the municipality of Srebrenica, organized a training in 2005 on strategic 
and action planning of cross-border cooperation projects between Srebrenica and Bajina 
Bašta. The seminar was organized in Tuzla at Lake Modrac and representatives of local 
self-governments, municipal leaders, NGOs, and civil servants attended. The seminar 
included action planning and drawing up of development strategies in the border region. 
A valuable event, it provided the applicable knowledge subsequently used by many people 
when applying for diﬀerent cooperation projects along the Drina River. 
Economic Cooperation
With consultative support from the Center for Regionalism in Novi Sad, Bajina Bašta 
and Srebrenica have engaged in number of activities to enhance and stimulate local 
economic initiatives. For instance, local businessmen have gathered at small business 
events, where they exchange their business experience and identiﬁed various forms of 
cooperation. Additionally, feasibility study was produced for the establishment of the 
cross-border cooperation agency would operate as a business generator. In 2004, the 
Joint Economic Development Agency of Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica was established. 
Among other accomplishments, the agency produced a study of the strengths and ca-
pacities of the markets within these two cities and formulated novel approaches as to 
how these communities can jointly approach third markets. 
International actors also expressed their interest to provide support to just such a 
cross-border cooperation agency between the municipalities of Srebrenica and Bajina 
Bašta. This program has not yet been started. But these two municipalities intend 
to organize and stimulate the relevant activities to be taken by their entrepreneurs, 
which would provide the basis for their economic development. Both municipalities 
recognized that the development of a common policy on land and natural resources 
management would be beneﬁcial to both of them. More cooperation also is expected 
in the standardization of goods and services, in agriculture and tourism as the two most 
promising spheres of local economic development. Attracting foreign investments may 
be additionally enhanced by establishing a joint free trade zone, as well as by convinc-
ing entrepreneurs to operate on the basis of the recently-signed Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA). 
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Joining Philia 
In 2007, the two municipalities participated in the establishment of the Association of 
Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia. Those who initiated this activity 
included the prominent members of the Igman Initiative and experts of the Center for 
Regionalism from Novi Sad, with special emphasis on the contributions provided by 
Živorad Kovačević, Jovan Komšić, Vehid Šehić, Zoran Pusić, Saša Popov, et al. The two 
municipalities were accepted as members and founders of Philia, a symbol of recognition 
of their previous cooperation. Representatives of the NGO sector from Srebrenica and 
Bajina Bašta, together with representatives of municipalities, are in the same delegation 
and as authorized members they participate in all programs of the Association. 
Tourism Development
From 2006 to 2008 one of the projects with the most signiﬁcant contribution was the 
development of tourism in the valley of the Drina River. It was implemented by the 
CARE International, based on the funds provided by the government of the Netherlands. 
A three-year program to support local NGOs, public authorities, and entrepreneurs, 
CARE International promoted the culture of togetherness on both sides of the Drina and 
improved the business practices and market-oriented tourist economy of the region. This 
project was conceived by the leaders of the two municipalities. In the course of project 
design, it was decided to apply it additionally to other, neighboring municipalities, as 
an example of a more comprehensive project-oriented development of tourism. 
TRANSPARENCY AND PUBLICITY
The process of cooperation between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta happened simultane-
ously with a grievous and painful national reconciliation. That process essentially marked 
the beginning of cooperation between these two municipalities, and it is hard to under-
stand anything that happened later, unless we know the background of this cooperation. 
Although burdened by suﬀering and a painful heritage, the two municipalities found 
their common values and interests. They united their strengths to resist forces that were 
against any kind of cooperation or thought of such cooperation as betrayal.
The authorities of the two municipalities reached a full and undoubted consensus 
on the need to establish and continually strengthen all forms of cooperation between 
local communities, organizations, and citizens. This is why it was crucial to establish 
partnerships and friendly relations among all potential actors and participants. It was 
obvious that the public would have a key role to play in this process and that the 
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outcome of this cooperation would greatly depend on the way the cooperation between 
the two municipalities would be perceived by the public. 
Municipal authorities paid great attention to all programs and actions that were 
leading to strengthening the capacities of civil society, particularly to raising awareness 
of the need to develop a closer cooperation between the municipalities. Therefore, 
there was a great need to achieve the maximum level of transparency and ﬂow of in-
formation concerning the cooperation that existed. Therefore, municipal authorities 
of the two municipalities agreed to provide support for joint and individual activities 
performed by local NGOs and local media that were responsible for the dissemination 
of information. 
Local journalists in both municipalities reported the activities of cross-border co-
operation, particularly the projects implemented and supported in the framework of 
cooperation between Bajina Bašta and Srebrenica. Whenever a project was launched, 
teams of journalists from Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta prominently reported on these 
events. The relationship of journalists and their editorial boards were positive and 
constructive, as media agencies were among the ﬁrst to be involved in all forms of 
cooperation. 
Local media cooperation always included the exchange of relevant information 
between journalists from Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta. As a result, various shows, news, 
and journalists’ contributions from Radio Srebrenica were always broadcast at the fre-
quency of the neighboring radio station Primus from Bajina Bašta, along with the RTV 
Prima from Bajina Bašta, which often reported on events that took place in Srebrenica. 
Newspaper articles, published in local newspapers by journalists from both municipali-
ties, were particularly signiﬁcant, as they contained positive attitudes towards all aspects 
of cooperation between these two municipalities. 
Key incentives for this type of cooperation were provided by the journalists from 
Bajina Bašta, who had been cooperating with their colleagues from Srebrenica for years. 
The director of the RTV Prima was elected president of the municipality of Bajina 
Bašta. This enabled his engagement in the greatest possible promotion and fostering 
of cross-border cooperation with Srebrenica. The participants of this cooperation were 
very much aware of the fact that without a proper public support, the two municipali-
ties would not achieve good cooperation, so the importance of journalists, as well as 
all social structures taking part in spreading the positive atmosphere and information 
about intermunicipal cooperation, was crucial. 
SUSTAINABILITY 
The future cooperation between Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta may be envisaged in the 
context of the results achieved so far and in the light of general political trends in the 
region. Political tensions in the region, in particular the growing complications of the 
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political situation in Serbia until 2008, largely aﬀected the quality of cooperation between 
Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta. On a number of occasions, the political tensions from the 
central authorities, in particular the political tensions from the neo-Nazi organizations, 
posed a signiﬁcant threat to the intermunicipal cooperation between Srebrenica and 
Bajina Bašta. 
In this respect, it is important to further strengthen the institutions of a free civil 
society, united citizens, and entrepreneurs who are able to clearly identify their interests 
and who are eager to cooperate, irrespective of the destruction that threatens them. It is 
crucial to provide the protagonists of cross-border cooperation with clear and concrete 
support, from the side of the international community, as well as the central authorities 
of their kin states. The area surrounding these two municipalities is quite problematic, 
economically undeveloped, and burdened by the conﬂicts from the past. Therefore, 
it makes it more diﬃcult to pursue cooperation and the development of democratic 
institutions and capacities. 
All the protagonists of cross-border cooperation have to accept this fact, as well as 
the authorities of their kin states and the relevant international organizations, particu-
larly those dealing with Euro-Atlantic integration. This cooperation was in the process 
of being established in the past decade, demonstrating that it may be the beginning 
and a model of cooperation to be followed by other border-area municipalities. It also 
provided the models of cooperation for future Euroregions. In this respect, the support 
that organizations of local and regional authorities will provide to this cooperation 
in the future might be particularly helpful. If this approach is applied in practice and 
encounters a receptive response by the people living in the area, the future cooperation 
between these two municipalities will improve. Srebrenica and Bajina Bašta, as the 
initiators of the future Euroregion, are part of the future in which the Drina River will 
not only be an administrative border, but also a factor of cohesion. 
NOTE
1 The core of the group were: Vehid Šehić, president of NGO Citizens Forum Tuzla from BiH; Jovan 
Komšić (professor at Novi Sad University); and Aleksandar Popov, members of the Center for 
Regionalism; and Živorad Kovačević, president of NGO European Movement from Serbia.
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Cross-border Neighborhood Program: 
Baja–Sombor–Osijek
Gojko Mišković
Taking into consideration all activities that have been carried out so far in the 
area occupied by these typical Pannonian and Central European cities, we keep 
experiencing déjà vu. There are numerous and convincing reasons, since they stem 
from the sphere of everyday life, history, and common legacy. As well as at many other 
points in Central Europe, here as well, the lucid thought of Alfred Moser, “Borders 
are scars of the past,” comes to the fore.1
At the beginning of the “short twentieth century,” mass media in the former Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia helped to fan the centrifugal forces of nationalism—
strengthened by wars and totalitarian ideologies. Insisting on diﬀerences and conﬂicts, 
instead of similarities and intertwinement, it resulted in the extinguishment of a centu-
ries-long tradition of coexistence within the same multidenominational and multiethnic 
states, within the biological lifespan of two generations of inhabitants of cities like 
Sombor (Serbia), Baja (Hungary), and Osijek (Croatia). 
The long period of rule by the Habsburg Monarchy—that is, the Austro–Hungarian 
Empire—dissolved when our cities became constitutive parts of the new states built 
upon its ruins in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century. The internal and foreign policy 
of these new states was built upon a false hostility and the suppression of experiences 
acquired during the Austro–Hungarian Empire. In addition, Osijek and Sombor were 
found within the borders of the state of the southern Slavs, which had been transformed 
into the ﬁrst and second Yugoslavia. This was the reality for most of the twentieth century 
and which was completely transformed by the fall of the Berlin Wall and almost parallel 
bloody disintegration of Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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HISTORY
Baja
The present city of Baja was settled by Avars as late as the fourteenth century. The city 
acquired its name from the famous landlord, Balint Bajai, whose family held it for more 
than two centuries. The ﬁrst written records of Baja date back to 1323. The Battle of 
Mohac was a signiﬁcant event in the past, when, due to Turkish conquest, the Hungarian 
population was decimated and the settlement became the center of Baja District (nahija). 
The travelogue of Evliya Cselebi from 1664 reports it as a “double-purpose village and 
fortress situated around the main square,” with around twenty households. 
As the gathering place of the imperial army, Baja had a very signiﬁcant role in the 
wars against the Ottoman Empire. After the expulsion of Turks, in the summer of 
1686, Baja was annexed to the Austrian Empire. Emperor Leopold I, at the very end of 
seventeenth century, issued a Decree on the Free Lowland City of Baja at the request 
of the population. In remembrance of the liberation day, he awarded Baja with a spe-
cial insignia: the seal and coat of arms with the characters of Adam and Eve. Later, the 
landlordship was established, this time within the Grassalkovich family; that brought 
about a time of accelerated development. 
Baja owned a small area of city land, which restricted agricultural development, while 
trade and crafts were growing. The Golden Age in the history of the city was the end of 
eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. Throughout those years it had 
become the most signiﬁcant harbor for transport and trade of grains on the Pannonian 
plain. In legal terms, 1873 symbolized the period when this city was given the privileges 
of adopting its own documents, with the power of law. It additionally proved its role 
as administrative, cultural, and spiritual center of the region. At that time, schools and 
modern administrative institutions were being built. 
Waves of planned migrations of Bunjevac, Šokac, and Serbian inhabitants in the 
seventeenth century, as well as of Swabs in eighteenth century, increased the popula-
tion. In the immediate vicinity of the Danube River, the town placed the focus of its 
economic activity on ﬁshing, ﬁsh trade, knitting of ﬁshermen’s nets, and similar trades. 
After World War I, more precisely from 1921 till World War II, Baja was the center of 
Bács–Bodrog County. It is the second largest city in the Bács–Kiskun County today, 
the county seat being in Keckemét. 
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Sombor
Situated beyond the borders of the former Roman Empire, Sombor came into being 
during the Middle Ages. Peace, relative stability, and conditions for ever-lasting life were 
provided by the state of Hungarian kings (from the eleventh century onwards). Except 
for the Tatars’ invasion of 1241–1242, this area did not experience major devastation 
and population reduction, as was the case elsewhere. 
The ﬁrst records of Sombor date back to 1360 when the settlement of Czobor Szent 
Mihaly was established on the manor estate of the noble family Czobor. Despite its wall 
fortiﬁcations, the Ottoman invasion caused its fall in 1541. In an administrative sense, 
Sombor belonged to the administrative district (sanjak) of Szeged and was the seat of 
administrative units of nahija and kadiluk.2 In 1566 Sombor had the status of a town 
with the three Muslim (mahala) wards and one Christian ward, along with a settlement 
(džemat) of Roma. The writer Evliya Cselebi called it an “old parish.” 
After the expulsion of Turks, Sombor became a part of the Austrian Empire in 
1687 and reached its zenith in terms of its glory, reputation, and signiﬁcance. In 1702, 
it was included in the Military Frontier of Tisza and in 1717 it was granted the status 
of oppidum militare. The ﬁrst captain of the military garrison was the Count Jovan 
Branković during the Great Migration of 1690.
As a consequence of the evident support that Serbs provided to the army of the 
Austrian Empire on the territory of Kosovo, at the time of its campaign against the 
Ottoman Empire, there was a threat of mass retaliation by the Turks after the withdrawal 
of Habsburg military units from that territory. The then head of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, the Patriarch of Peć, Arsenije III Čarnojević, became the leader of a movement 
for the mass relocation of dozens of thousands of Orthodox Christians, Serbs, to the 
territories of southern Hungary and the military border. Over 800 Serbian families 
settled here, preceded by a few years earlier (1687) by members of Bunjevci ethnic 
group who inhabited the area. In the ﬁrst half of the eighteenth century, Sombor was 
the most populated settlement in Bačka County. 
In 1745, the Empress Maria Theresa abolished the Military Frontier of Tisza, the 
leading administrative positions were gradually assumed by the Hungarian nobility, 
and the Serbian frontiersmen of Sombor left for Sirmium County towards the Turkish 
border. In 1749, the people of Sombor paid 150,000 golden Rhine forints to the imperial 
treasury and were awarded the Charter of Liberation that paved the way to the status of 
“free imperial city,” from which Sombor greatly beneﬁted. The city was given 11 hills, 
upon which, over the time, homes arose and developed. A new privileged status brought 
about the increased settlement of Serbs, and after the city of Sombor had been chosen 
as the seat of Bács–Bodrog County (1786), Hungarians started settling in this area to a 
more signiﬁcant extent. In the second half of the eighteenth century Germans started 
colonizing neighboring territory. 
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The nineteenth century was characterized by the development and economic growth 
of the city. Sombor became the administrative, social, spiritual, and cultural center. The 
recently-constructed Great Canal of Bačka was used for irrigation and transport (1802). 
Education received a signiﬁcant boost from the establishment of “Norma” (later known 
as the Serbian teachers’ school), Hungarian grammar school, a school of commerce, a 
Serbian girls’ college, and a Hungarian school of Roman Catholic female teachers. 
Toward the middle of the century the city had the population of 23,000, more than 
Belgrade and Zagreb. The development of Sombor was further promoted by the railway 
to Subotica and Szeged (1869), and a year later (1868) the Savings Bank of Sombor was 
established. The ﬁrst city park was established in 1871. The Hungarian middle-class 
association and Serbian Reading Room were founded in 1845 and 1847, respectively. 
Furthermore, the Historical Society of Bács–Bodrog County and Sombor Sports As-
sociation, with gymnastics, fencing, swimming, and athletics, were also established. The 
ﬁrst printing house and the city library were opened and the theater dates back to 1882, 
and continues to host plays in Serbian, Hungarian, and German. Several important 
periodicals were started, in which Miloš Crnjanski, Jovan Dučić, Aleksa Šantić, Vojislav 
Ilić, and others published their ﬁrst literary works. At the turn of century, the giant of 
Central European modern painting was born in Sombor, the maestro Milan Konjović 
(deceased in 1993). 
Sombor became a part of the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Slovenes, 
Croats, and Serbs in November 1918. Since 2007, Sombor has recovered the status of 
a city within the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the Republic of Serbia; it has 
been the center of west Bačka administrative county since 1990.
 
 
Osijek
The settlement and locality of the present-day city existed since the fourth century BC 
under the Illyrian or Celtic name of Mursa; its existence continued into the period of 
the Roman Empire. The name was ﬁrst mentioned in the written sources in 1196. 
The present name of Osijek is of Croatian origin, whereas there are also other versions, 
such as the German (Essegg), Hungarian (Eszék), Latin (Essec), and Serbian (Osek). The 
settlement’s name is related to the word “oseka” (ebb), which points to a place that is 
always dry and suitable for construction. 
The conquering army of the Ottoman Empire occupied the city in 1526 and Turks 
remained in Osijek for a century and a half. Osijek and eastern parts of the present-day 
Croatia became a part of the Habsburg Monarchy. In the period from 1712 to 1721, 
due to strengthening of the city strategic position, the tvrdja (fortress) was erected. Inside 
the walls, the row of houses with distinguishable Baroque characteristics was built. Its 
central part is occupied by Holy Trinity Square, with the monument of the identical 
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name dating back to the eighteenth century. Due to military concerns, the population 
settled to the west (upstream of the Drava River—uptown) and to the east (downstream 
of the Drava River—downtown). 
Economic and social development in Osijek resulted in the uniﬁcation of its three 
city municipalities into a single entity in 1786. As early as 1729 the Latin grammar 
school was founded and the printing house had started. The privileged status of “Free 
Imperial City” was awarded in 1809, thereby symbolizing the commencement of a 
new development period. Notable progress was evident uptown, where in 1846 the 
impressive Parish Palace was built and then the Croatian National Theater. Another 
landmark is Ante Starčević Square, dominated by the neogothic St. Peter and St. Paul’s 
Parish Church. 
At the turn of nineteenth to twentieth century, as big boulevards were being built 
in Budapest and Vienna, Osijek was building a string of public buildings and private 
palaces in a Secessionist and Eclectic architectural style along its European Avenue. In 
1874, one of the most beautiful and largest hospitals in this part of Europe was built 
in the downtown. 
Following the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, toward the end of 1918, 
the city of Osijek became a part of newly-established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes (called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia since 1929). After the disintegration of the 
country in April 1941, Osijek became a part of the territory of the independent state of 
Croatia. In the middle of 1945, after the collapse of Fascism, all parts of Croatia were 
integrated into Yugoslavia. 
Today, Osijek, along with its neighboring settlements, has a population of around 
115,000, thus being the fourth-largest city by its population in Croatia. The city is 
ﬁnanacial, economic, judicial, and administrative hub of Slavonia. It is also the seat of 
Osijek and Baranya County. 
PAST INSTITUTIONS SUPPORTING COOPERATION 
The “triangle” of Osijek–Sombor–Baja is an irregular and asymmetrical shape and 
type. This is in part because the main initiatives were directed from Sombor towards 
the other two actors. Also, the signiﬁcant distance between Osijek and Baja plays a 
part in this asymmetry. In fact, Osijek’s more natural and compatible counterpart (in 
terms of population and university and county center) is the Hungarian city of Pécs. 
Also, the construction of bridges on the Danube and Drava rivers, which has facilitated 
communication among people as well as the movement of goods from diﬀerent sides 
of these major Pannonian rivers, was relatively recent. 
Oﬃcial and extensive cooperation between Baja and Sombor began during the 
socialist period, despite “imperfect” relations between the regimes of Yugoslavia and 
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Hungary. Intermunicipal cooperation was organized around managing the Danube 
River and ﬂood defenses. An agreement signed in Sombor (Box 1) brought together 
employees of the local water management companies as well as local self-government 
oﬃcials in both cities, thereby establishing cooperation between the two cities. 
Box 1.
Agreement between the Baja City Council and the Municipal Assembly 
of Sombor on Establishing Fraternal Relations 
As a result of previous friendly relations, the representatives of both areas decided 
to extend mutual communication, enhance good neighbourly relations and 
develop manifold cooperation so as to contribute to the improvement of socialist 
development of both areas, on the basis of exchanged experiences, as well as to 
strengthening of the friendship between the people of the People’s Republic of 
Hungary and Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
For the Executive Council
of the City of Baja
For the Municipal Assembly
of Sombor
President
Farkas László
President
Jovan Vasiljević
December 14, 1966
The program that was drafted at the time envisaged meetings and cooperation of 
social, political, and economic-business actors on both sides. One of the most important 
goals deﬁned under this program was opening the border crossing Hercergszántó—Bački 
Breg, which promptly took place in 1967. Although the agreement formally applied to 
the city of Baja and municipality of Sombor, from the very beginning it was emphasized 
that it included the district of Baja, too. This gesture of mutual aspirations occurred 
during a period of distinctive state-administrative-organizational-territorial models, 
when cooperation was developed within two broader and, in terms of size and popula-
tion, similar territories. 
What started with seven events in 1966 had reached 37 by 1974! Particularly 
impressive was the exchange of symphonies from Sombor and Baja, organized at least 
biannually in each city. 
Four decades later, in 2006, the political setting had changed dramatically. After the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the SFRY, Serbia became an independent 
state again. Hungary joined the European Union and NATO. But, due to the eﬀorts of 
local leaders and communities, cross-border cooperation withstood the test of time. 
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Relations between Sombor and Baja clearly exempliﬁes Eric Hobsbawm’s syntagma 
about the short twentieth century, from the start of World War I to the fall of social-
ism, as a time of extremism and exclusiveness that brought about immense human 
suﬀering.3 
“If humanity is to have a recognizable future, it cannot be by prolonging the past 
or the present.” 
—Eric Hobsbawm
The Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century
 
The formation of new states in the Central Europe after the Great War in 1918 also 
brought about dramatic changes in everyday life for a great number of individuals and 
families who spoke Hungarian as their native language. An excessive number of civil 
servants of the Hungarian state became unwanted as the borders of newly-established 
states were demarked and populations were exchanged after World War I on the terri-
tory of the former Austro–Hungary. Further ethnic homogenization resulted on both 
sides of borders of the newly-established countries (the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and 
Slovenes and the Kingdom of Hungary)
In addition to state-sponsored population exchanges, there were also ongoing ethnic 
migration and national homogenization on both sides of the new border. Communica-
tion lines in the direction north-south, such as the railway and inland transport routes 
between Sombor and Baja like Franz’s Canal (present-day Bezdan–Baja Canal), the Great 
Bačka Canal, and the Danube River itself, which had been managed for centuries and 
systematically developed, were losing their signiﬁcance dramatically. An uninterrupted 
chain of economic and social diﬃculties in the interwar period brought development 
to a standstill in “the new state peripheral areas” of the First Yugoslav Republic and 
post-Trianon Hungary. 
The Second World War and its disastrous repurcussions—enormous civilian casual-
ties, material and economic devastation, and the division of European countries and 
their populations into opposing “blocks,” to name a few—as well as subsequent events 
in Central and South Eastern Europe—created grave obstacles for cross-border relations 
between Sombor and Baja. 
Yet, there were moments of engagement. A popular and bloody uprising against 
Soviet rule gripped Budapest in 1956. Thousands of refugees from Hungary ﬂed to the 
border area of Sombor. In this quite delicate case, the policy of Yugoslavia proved to be 
uncommonly ﬂexible and pragmatic. At the highest level, it collaborated with the Soviet 
Union: leaders of the uprising, who were hiding in the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest, 
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were extradited. At the same time, the Yugoslav regime, which was far more liberal and 
open than that of its neighbors, also made dramatic eﬀorts to assist refugees reach the 
countries of their own choice. In 2006, ﬁfty years’ later, this local victory of humanity 
over the totalitarian ideology was honored by dedicating a plaque to the citizens of 
Sombor in recognition of their contribution. 
Relations between Osijek and Sombor did not have a ﬁrm political-institutional 
framework, mostly due to the fact that both cities were parts of the same state from 
1918 to 1991. The interests of the single-party policy of “fraternity and unity” in the 
Second Yugoslav Republic dictated that city of Sombor twin with the city of Šibenik in 
Dalmatia. This was a distortion of the actual intertwinement between the Croatian and 
Serbian ethnic community inﬂuenced by Venice and Vienna, respectively. 
By the beginning of the 1970s, gradually museums, galleries, archives, and magazines 
assumed a cultural form of cooperation among Subotica, Sombor, and Osijek, resulting 
in regular cultural events that took place until 1991. Osijek’s university was considered 
very attractive destination for rigorous higher education, even by citizens in Sombor, 
who also cooperated to produced joint radio broadcasts for the area. 
The end of the Warsaw Pact and bloody disintegration of the SFRY entirely changed 
this part of the Pannoninan Basin: the Danube and Drava marked lines of conﬂict 
between Serbia and Croatia. The creation of new state borders—that is, their ethnici-
zation—was the priority of the war that began in the early 1990s. The city of Osijek 
became a war zone in the truest since. Traumatic memories and traces of those times are 
visible. They re-emerge in the Slavonian collective memory as waves of ethno-nationalist 
rhetoric, xenophobia, and suspicisions of conspiratorial movements. 
Meanwhile, the territorial hinterland of Sombor was turned into a chaotic terri-
tory under an undeclared state of war. Preparations for a violent statewide response 
on the part of Serbia to the challenge of Croatian independence were made. And, an 
“antibureaucratic revolution,” which having abolished the autonomy of Vojvodina 
and destroyed the institutions of Vojvodina, then ruined the backbone of Sombor’s 
development. The last decade of the twentieth century was a period of total collapse 
for everyday urban life. 
Similar to the role of Sombor during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, at the turn 
of the twentieth century the city of Baja was “the harbor of salvation and encourage-
ment” (1991–2000) during the disintegration of Second Yugoslavia and subsequent 
war. Thousands of refugees were moving north. The position of Hungary was extremely 
sensitive: foreign policy concerns demanded fast recognition of newly-established states, 
but not at the expense of the total breakup of relations with Serbia, since the victims of 
such a course of action would be the Hungarians of Vojvodina. 
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International sanctions by the United Nations in 1993 against the state personiﬁed 
by Slobodan Milošević, as well as hyperinﬂation and shortages of basic goods in Serbia, 
additionally complicated the situation in the border area. Having retained a visa-free 
regime at the border crossings, Hungary facilitated the everyday provision and subsid-
ence of Serbian citizens. Relations between the local authorities of Sombor (the Socialist 
Party of Serbia led by Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav 
Šešelj) and Baja were strictly reduced to humanitarian and charity eﬀorts.
Only toward the end of 1996, after the local power was assumed by the anti-Milošević 
coalition Zajedno (Together), did it become feasible to think about an alternative in 
Sombor that would start rebuilding cooperation in the region. Leading local government 
oﬃcials welcomed the change of government in Sombor with unconcealed pleasure, 
preparing, on that occasion, a memorable ceremonial welcome for the delegation of 
the twin city. 
From this perspective, it has been extremely diﬃcult to estimate the extent of mate-
rial, moral, political, and logistical support that arrived from the territory of Hungary 
for the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia, opposition 
political parties, and other opponents of the regime of Slobodan Milošević, Mirjana 
Marković, and Vojislav Šešelj. It was also in those years that documented informal 
contacts were made between the oﬃcials of Osijek and Sombor on the grounds of third 
countries, most often when international symposia were organized. 
At the level of valuable local initiatives, which during the war years called for an im-
measurable amount of personal courage, what needs to be pointed out are the contacts 
of peace activists of the association of Ravangrad from Sombor and managed by Mrs. 
Manda Prišing as well as of other similar civil organizations from Osijek.
Only after the completion of the military intervention of NATO forces in Kosovo 
(mid-1999), did most citizens of Serbia realize that they had to actively participate to 
change the ruling regime, if they wanted the real prospects of normal lives. Within such 
a climate, at the sitting of the Assembly of Sombor Municipality, by a majority vote of 
more than half the councilors, a document of strategic and historical signiﬁcance was 
adopted. Political will that was undoubtedly expressed therein was an actual legitimate 
ground for initiatives of cross-border cooperation that would ensue in the following 
decade. At the time of its adoption, that was the only oﬃcial document of full support to 
the Stability Pact for South-East Europe by any political authority in Serbia (Box 2). 
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Box 2.
Declaration of the Municipal Assembly of Sombor 
on the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe
The Municipal Assembly of Sombor, held on October 4, 1999, upon the discus-
sion of the Stability Pact for South-East Europe, adopted the following: 
DECLARATION
1. Having considered the fact that current government in Serbia attaches 
extremely little importance to the Stability Pact and almost ignores its 
existence, and that its fundamental nature is of great signiﬁcance for the 
entire region as well as for the citizens of FRY, the Municipal Assembly 
(MA) deems that all possibilities envisaged by the Stability Pact must be 
supported and accepted.
2. MA of Sombor agrees to the clearly-deﬁned goal of the Pact which is sup-
porting South-East European countries in their attempt to enhance peace, 
democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity so as to 
achieve stability in the entire region.
3. MA of Sombor, by insisting on fostering of the traditional principles of 
cohabitation and national, cultural, and religious equality in Sombor and 
Vojvodina, expresses its ambition toward positive democratic changes that 
will introduce the culture of cohabitation and openness to the world to 
the entirety of Serbia. 
4. By democratizing Serbia, the door of the international community will 
become open for us and Serbia will be welcomed as an equal member of 
the Stability Pact. Good cooperation with neighboring countries stipulates 
the economic prosperity and thereby, Serbia will take its position in the 
Stability Pact, which is kept for it in the Articles of Association.
5. MA of Sombor calls on all municipal assemblies across Serbia, as well as 
Provincial, Republic, and Federal Assembly to inform the citizens of the 
meaning and signiﬁcance of the Stability Pact and commit themselves 
to positive promotion and recognition of the Pact principles, since good 
neighborly relations and cooperation with the world are prerequisites for 
the future of all our citizens. 
Councilors of the Sombor Municipal Assembly
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A doyen of diplomacy, long-standing Ambassador to China and the Minister of 
Foreign Aﬀairs of the FR of Yugoslavia in the Government of Milan Panić, Mr. Ilija 
Đukić, honored the representatives of citizens of Sombor by his direct presence at the 
session and some of his suggestions were put forward in the the draft declaration. 
IMPLEMENTED PROJECTS 
Cross-border Cooperation and Reconciliation between Sombor 
and Osijek: A Selection of Initiatives
The Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, as well as involvement in the activities of the 
Center for Regionalism and Philia, provided a framework and atmosphere that allowed 
for accelerated and concrete cooperation between Baja and Sombor. This framework, 
rooted in values of mutual respect and tolerance, also ensured the high quality of in-
termunicipal relations.
Sombor and Osijek, as founding members of Philia, were among the ﬁrst cities 
in the wider South Eastern European region to initiate mutual communication. Their 
early engagements resulted in some of the ﬁrst projects that had visibly positive results. 
A certain extent of communication between the cities existed prior to the establish-
ment of Philia, owing largely to the eﬀorts of the Center for Regionalism. However, 
despite the best eﬀorts of those involved with the Novi Sad-based NGO, the approach 
to cross-border to cooperation was limited. Communication was irregular and perhaps 
best characterized by suspicion. 
Good will on the part of city authorities to overcome any distrust and cooperate 
was vital for moving intermunicipal cooperation ahead. As well, an informal network 
of actors from diﬀerent sectors provided opportunities for a more relaxed dialogue and 
actual realization of needs. Local NGOs and civic associations played a special role. 
They launched a number of initiatives and were recognized as important partners by 
municipal authorities.
Activities to facilitate cross-border interaction between Osijek and Sombor varied 
widely, in terms of their form, the kinds of range of participants, and the positive 
involvement of the media after 2000. One particularly important stage in advancing 
intermunicpal cooperation was the project “Strengthening Local Democracy in South 
Eastern Europe,” which lasted for 16 months through 2005 and 2006. From the very 
beginning, crucial support for this project was provided by the local self-governments 
of Sombor Municipality (and the Municipality President Dr. Jovan Slavković) and the 
city authorities in Osijek. According to the decision of the funding party, two leading 
non-governmental partners were choses: the NGO Green Osijek and the NGO Green 
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Network of Vojvodina. As a result of agreement among all actors, a Cross-border Coun-
cil, the Project Program Committee, was established. Cooperation and reconciliation 
between Sombor and Osijek and the establishment of the advisory body was part of 
a larger project, initiated simultaneously in seven areas throughout the former SFRY 
that experienced direct armed conﬂict. The entire project was conceived and ﬁnanced 
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), relying on the 
ﬁeld experience and logistic capacities of other organizations, as well as the respective 
local self-governments. 
Strengthening interethnic reconciliation and local democracy in Sombor and Osijek 
was set as the major goal by encouraging activism in communities aimed at the use, 
enhancement, and promotion of environmentally-friendly recreational, cultural, and 
tourist capacities on both sides of the border. A number of joint activites have been 
implemented in pursuit of these goals.
Via Pacis Pannoniae Cycle Path
This initiative has its roots in major plan to develop a network of bicycle routes within 
the Pannonian regions of Croatia, Serbia and Hungary, under the banner of the Pan-
nonian Peace Trails, or Via Pacis Pannoniae. The project was conceived in 2004 by the 
Green Network of Vojvodina and Green Osijek, and developed initially as community-
based initiatives supported by the Balkan Trust for Democracy. The Osijek-Sombor trail 
began as a project called “The Cross Border Cooperation and Reconciliation” ﬁnanced 
and supported by CRS (Catholic Relief Services) and USAID (United States Agency 
for International Development). Several organizations assisted with the coordination 
of activities, including the Ecological Association, Green Osijek and Green Network of 
Vojvodina, local authorities of Osijek and the Municipality of Sombor.
Beyond creating a cycle path, the underlying idea of the Pannonian Peace Trail was 
to connect people, preserve natural and cultural values for sustainable development in 
the Danube region. It was envisaged to contribute to cross-border cooperation, building 
tolerance and democracy and helping demilitarize this region once engulfed by war. 
The route represents a communication and cooperation bridge connecting the regions 
of Pannonia (Baranja and Slavonia in Croatia and Vojvodina in Serbia). The bicycle 
route along the Osijek–Sombor Pannonian Peace Trail is the third cross-border peace 
route in the world.
The greenway from Novi Sad in Serbia runs along the Danube, linking Novi Sad 
to Futog and Backa Palanka. Next, it crosses the Danube and the Serbian–Croat border 
to Croatia. In Croatia, the greenway passes through Ilok and Vukovar to reach Osijek 
with its surroundings (including the marshes of Kopacki Rit). The greenway arches back 
to Serbia, across the Danube, to reach Apatin and Sombor. The route continues on to 
Subotica, and returns to Novi Sad (Cenej District). This route stretches through some 
of the best preserved nature areas on the Danube River, including Kopački Rit Nature 
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Park and the Gornje Podunavlje Nature Reserve, and links together many diﬀerent ethnic 
communities, which still live in a traditional way. Travelling along the route, visitors can 
enjoy local cuisine, discover traditional handicrafts, explore cultural and historic sites, 
and take advantage of boating, horse carriage rides and photography opportunities.
The bicycle route in Osijek begins on the right side of the road heading north, just 
beyond the bridge over the Drava River. The starting point in Sombor is located by the 
Saint Florian monument in Batina street. 
Tambur Camp and Workshop of Young Musicians of Osijek and Sombor
The School of Tambur Music from Sombor, under the instruction of Mr. Đura Parčetić, 
and members of the Cultural and Art Society Pajo Kolarić, with Ms. Željka Grgošević as 
the conductor, were the partners and participants in this cooperation. Valuable advisory 
support was provided by Mr. Zvonko Bogdan, a famous singer and cultural ambassador 
of the tambur, who is highly respected in both Serbia and Croatia. Additionally, an 
original pageant was performed by the due of Branislav Bane Krstić and Dr. Miroslav 
Miša Ilić, who, aside from playing tamburs, also presented and explained the origins 
of the song that had found its way to the listeners on both sides of the Danube, in the 
most severe times of war. 
Bearing in mind the generally favorable reception of tambur orchestras in Vojvodina 
and Slavonia, it was this project that received maximum support through launching 
of a special campaign in the local media, primarily in Sombor, where the camp was 
organized. As a result of the engagement of media professionals, the one-minute radio 
jingle was produced which rephrases the words of the legendary tambur virtuoso Janika 
Balaž, “I’m not much of a speaker…and therefore I play.” 
During one week, the tambur camp was promoted on local radio stations (Radio 
Fortuna and Radio Spektar). Even ﬁshermen on the Danube, twenty kilometers away, 
found out about the event. Furthermore, the television performance of the participants 
and creators of the music workshop harmoniously ﬁtted in the promotional campaign. 
In addition, the information about the organization of the camp was also announced 
in the printed media in Sombor (Somborske novine Dunataj), as well as in the editorial 
column of the prestigious daily Danas. The Green Network of Vojvodina announced 
the tambur camp in the daily Gradjanski list in Novi Sad. This minor media campaign 
resulted in an excellent attendance record both at the music workshop of Branislav 
Krstić and at the concert of young musicians.
Owing to the eﬀorts of the President of Sombor, the tambur camp was mentioned 
as a successful model at the annual conference of the Community of Municipalities 
(Gemeinsam Gemeinde) in Romanshorn, Switzerland (June 16–18, 2006) as well as at 
Philia’s second conference in Podgorica, Montenegro (July 5–7, 2006). Furthermore, a 
case study of the project appeared in the agenda of the Ninth International Seminar for 
Strengthening of Democracy in Konjic, Bosnia and Herzegovina (July 9–15, 2006).
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The tambur players from Sombor and Osijek held a concert in September 2006, on 
the occasion of formal presentation and opening of the cycle path Via Pacis Pannoniae. 
Organic and Biological Agriculture 
Having represented organic farming methods for over a decade in the region, the BIOPA 
Association from Osijek was invited to host a one-day presentation on itssystematic 
program to introduce and educate farmers.An interested group of students and farmers 
came to Sombor, with the support of Megatrend, a private university, and its Faculty 
of Biofarming. 
This Association since has become a major partner not only for producers across 
Slavonija, Baranya, and the rest of Croatia, but also for the state authorities (e.g., Min-
istry of Agriculture), in the process of complicated negotiations with the competent 
bodies of the European Union. 
Informing and educating farmers has a major role in re-positioning agriculture’s 
future in the Pannonian region. For example, the Osijek market agreed to “positively 
discriminate” in favor of organic products, along with the BIOPA shop of certiﬁed 
products also at the market. 
BIOPA also organized a visit to a traditional sheep farm in the picturesque area of 
Zlatna Greda, at the heart of Kopački rit National Park that presented this program’s 
eﬀorts to enhance and preserve traditional lifestyles threatened by scrupulous EU regula-
tions concerning animal hygiene, grazing, and feed. 
Though this program is poorly funded, its realistic and consistent plan made up 
for the lack of funds. Dunataj and Danas media outlets both covered the events. There 
is an obvious compatibility of interests between this association and the NGO Green 
Network of Vojvodina. 
Sports Events
In the ﬁeld of sports events, a friendly tennis tournament between tennis players from 
Sombor and Osijek (November 2005) as well as matches between football clubs Osijek 
and Radnički (May 2006) were organized. In both cases, the matches were held in a 
friendly atmosphere. 
Good Neighborhood Programs between Serbia and Hungary 
As the brief overview of projects suggests, a positive example of regional cross-border 
cooperation may be found in the model of inter-municipal cooperation. After relations 
between these cities had been suspended for nearly two decades, Philia played an important 
role in re-establishing communication channels through seemingly “simple” processes—by 
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arranging exchanges in which students visited colleagues in neighboring cities, holding 
joint press conferences, implementing sharing news and information, and facilitating 
exchanges and frequent meetings among mayors and local decision-makers.
For Baja and Sombor, a personal visit was an important step in moving cooperation 
to a higher level. At the initiative of Municipality of Sombor and General Secretariat of 
Philia, a full-day study tour to Baja was arranged on May 22, 2006. Philia was represented 
by a disinguished professor from the University of Novi Sad, Dr. Jovan Komšić. 
Dr. Péter Széll, Mayor of Baja, welcomed the guests. They visted the self-government 
oﬃce of the German minority, which is housed in the city center, then proceeded to the 
premises of the Serbian minority self-government, where a joint press conference and 
roundtable on the perspectives of interethnic relations was conducted. 
It became clear that cooperation between Baja and Sombor could have very concrete 
beneﬁts—namely, in terms of accessing much-needed material and ﬁnancial resources 
that would beneﬁt both cities. The cities decided to apply jointly for EU funding, 
which was available speciﬁcally for cross-border projects. Several projects within the EU 
“neighorhood” framework have been accepted for funding. Some, in fact, received the 
largest amount of ﬁnancial support available at the time of submission. A brief overview 
of a few projects includes the following:
 • Culture and Nature for Better Quality of Life: Stimulating the development 
of tourism in the regions of Bács–Kiskun megye in Hungary and West Bačka 
District in Serbia through the creation of a database and Internet resources on 
tourism opportunities. 
 • Enhancing Foreign Direct Investements in the West Bačka District: Facilitating 
foreign investment by developing an “investment guidebook,” a multilingual 
database of business opportunities, and a website with relevant information for 
potential investors.
 • Hungarian–Serbian Cross-border Cooperation Project in the Field of Waste 
Management: Contributing to the improvement of waste management as a 
region issue, through awareness-raising and extensive evaluation of problems, 
opportunities, challenges, and solutions of the issue. 
In additional to advancing regional development and cooperation, these projects 
must be seen within the process of EU integration. Speciﬁcally, they have been part of 
an overall strategy to build support and strengthen local capacities for EU membership. 
This view was taken by the Regional Agency for Development of Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises and Entrepreneurship of Sombor, headed by Dr. Saša Bošnjak from 
the Faculty of Economy in Subotica, which played a lead role in advancing cross-border 
cooperation. The vision was that inter-municipal cooperation between Baja and Sombor 
would improve the position of these smaller urban centers and contribute to the process 
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of decentralization and to balanced regional development—elements that were in-line 
with EU standards. 
Additionally, the agency and its devoted staﬀ placed great emphasis on bringing 
together a wide range of stakeholders, including consultants, civic groups, local oﬃcials, 
representatives of local businesses, and individuals from educational institutions to at-
tract support for and enhance cross-border cooperation. That is, attention was placed 
on the multi-sectoral process of cross-border cooperation. Stakeholders on both sides 
of the border learned about how cooperation can be (and is!) beneﬁcial for local com-
munities over the long-term. They also had their say in the formulation of cohesive, 
local or regional development strategies. This inclusive approach likely helped garner 
attention and support from the EU and other international actors. The case of Baja 
and Sombor exempliﬁes the value of partnership between diﬀerent sectors and actors, 
namely NGOs and the local self-government. Because a multi-sectoral approach was 
taken, cooperation gained broad-based legitimacy. 
Building broad-based support for cross-border cooperation is one issue. Another 
issue relates to concrete project development and implementation, in which the Regional 
Agency for Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises and Entrepreneurship 
of Sombor also played a leading role in many cases. One very important and necessary 
element in the projects discussed above was systematically locating strong partners across 
the border, including partners within the local governments. A signiﬁcant amount of 
eﬀort was put into anyalzing potential partners and modes of partnership and cultivat-
ing alliances in diﬀerent ﬁelds: foreign direct investment, tourism, nature protection, 
and secondary education, and waste management. In many cases, municipal museums, 
public schools, and tourist agencies were identiﬁed as partners, because they displayed 
signiﬁcant institutional capacity and also could facilitate long-term cooperation.
Finally, the case of Baja and Sombor exempliﬁes the values of partnership between 
the non-governmental sector and the local self-government. Because a multi-sectoral 
approach was taken, cooperation gained broad-based legitimacy. Also, the realization 
of a number of speciﬁc initiatives improved the position of smaller urban centers and 
speciﬁcally contributed to the idea of decentralization and balanced regional develop-
ment, completely in line with the standards of the European Union.
The Danube Triangle (Donaudreieck)
In the period following the change of the dictatorship in Serbia in 2000, the Associa-
tion of the Danube Basin Swabs/Germans made clear that the state and its institutions 
have to stand behind the development and eﬀorts of civil society initiatives. In one 
case, a linguistic minority group in the region was a key player in bringing attention to 
opportunities for civil society-government cooperation, speciﬁcally in terms of cross-
border cooperation. 
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The sensitive task of preservation and strengthening of ethnic, cultural, and linguistic 
identity of the remaining Danube Basin Germans, a regional German-speaking minority, 
would have been impossible without establishment of eﬀective mechanisms of cross-
border cooperation. Toward these ends, the Institute for Foreign Relations (Institut fuer 
Auslandsbeziehungen–IFA) from Stuttgart, the Minsitry of Foreign Aﬀairs (Auswaertiges 
Amt), and the Cultural Endowment of the Danube Swabians of Baden-Wuerttemberg 
(Donauschwaebische Kulturstiftung des Landes Baden-Wuerttemberg) became involved in 
the Baja, Sombor, and Novi Sad area. 
Specﬁcially, IFA expert Peter Kratzer brought about beneﬁts for the whole region 
during his three-year assignment (2005–2008). With a high motivational level, de-
cades-long involvement in neighboring transition countries (Hungary and Romania), 
knowledge of a number of European languages, and a capacity to create team spirit, 
he advanced the performance of local NGOs—ﬁrst in Sombor, as well as in the larger 
area. Prior to his involvement, the the numerically small ethnic community of Germans 
living in Vojvodina were internally divided. The involvement of IFA helped build ties 
within the community; it also had a much larger impact.
It is important to note that the establishment of the regional oﬃce of the Institute for 
Foreign Relations in Sombor, and not in Novi Sad or Belgrade, was signiﬁcant. Its loca-
tion made it accessible to citizens, and thus helped mobilize people, spread knowledge, 
and build capacities at the very local level. Development was driven locally, rather than 
“from above.” This experience, much diﬀerent from the common model of “centered 
action” of international organizations based in Belgrade and Novi Sad, suggests an ef-
ﬁcient way to assist countries experiencing political, social, and economic transition. 
A realistic asessment, selection, and engagement of available human resources, and 
particularities of the local community, coupled with a direct, carefully managed, long-
term program of a foreign donor, are more demanding, but they can yield better, more 
intrinsic development and stabilization. On a practical level, this mean much smaller 
individual amounts of seed money are used, the ﬁnal eﬀects of which are far easier to 
be controlled. Here, the potential for corruption is reduced, which the foreign donors 
may inadvertently encourage due to their bloated programs poorly administered from 
the center. 
An example was the International Conference of the Cultural Network (Kultur-
netzwerktreﬀen) that was held on February 17–19, 2006 in Sombor. The event gathered 
around 60 participants from Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Romania, and Germany. The 
aim was clear: to show the vitality and beneﬁts of continuing to support the use of the 
German language. A great number of institutions of the City of Sombor (the mayor’s 
oﬃce, library, museum, the school of music, foreign-language schools) made their own 
contribution to this event. One of the participants put it: “There was the feeling of 
togetherness.” 
Another prominent example of improvement of cross-border cooperation in only 
three years (2005–2006) is the Regional Conference of the German National Minority. 
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As of 2009, there were four such events that were organized in Apatin, Baja, and twice 
in Osijek). The annual event has become so popular that it attracts the general public, 
regardless of their nationality, not just the German ethnic community in the countries 
of the Danube Triangle. 
In addition, the excellently conceived and regularly updated website of the Danube 
Triangle, Dunaudreieck.eu.4 The website addresses a range of current issues and events 
in the region with information in German, Hungarian, Serbian, and Croatian.
SUMMARY
Taking into account the historical and political tides of the last century that engulfed 
the cities of Osijek, Sombor, and Baja—two world wars, the collapse of socialism and 
emergence of three independent, newly democratizing states, a devastating civil war 
accompanied by international sanctions and the military intervention of NATO, shift-
ing geopolitical interests, new systems of local and national governance, and dramatic 
changes in the region’s ethnic and linguistic demographics—cross-border cooperation 
has one of the few remedies to political and economic isolation.
From the above-mentioned examples of the implemented projects, the international 
community’s presence was clearly evident, and as such provided the “catalyst” for coop-
eration: reliable rules, ﬁnancial assistance, permanence, and predictability.
There are obvious diﬀerences in the values and preferences of the international 
community in the three neighboring countries: Hungary is a member of and Croatia 
clearly lean towards the European Union; both participate in NATO; Serbia’s relations 
with the European Union and Russia ﬂuctuate, while military-security neutrality is 
preferred over NATO membership. Local self-governments are far from autonomous 
in Serbia and they have limited autonomy in Croatia. So it is not easy to express local 
interests that may not coincide with the accepted “policy of the state.” 
Additional shortcomings are reﬂected in the impoverished, incompetent, and po-
litically-controlled Serbian city administrations that lost the properties that they had 
acquired for over three centuries to the central state. Unfortunately, until the present 
day, the central authorities (government of Serbia) have not proposed a law that would 
provide for the restitution of property to the Province of Vojvodina or other cities and 
municipalities in Serbia. Local government assets were seized during communism and 
once more during the 1990s by the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Another disadvantage 
has been Serbia’s refusal, up until now, to emancipate and empower the “homegrown 
non-governmental sector.” Therefore, everyday life for this “the third sector” is concen-
trated on providing for its mere existence, instead of focusing on “building society.” 
In addition, it is also surprising that the region around the city of Sombor is not 
a place under special state care in every conceivable aspect. It has been unsuccessfully 
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struggling for years for an extension and re-categorization of the major border crossing at 
the 50-kilometers border with the European Union (Hungary). Proposals and attempts 
to enhance and rehabilitate the road and railway infrastructure running to Sombor 
and the northern tri-border point of Vojvodina and Serbia toward Central Europe are 
treated with the similar “centralist contempt.” It is considered that adoption of the Law 
on Regional Development, stipulating the need for positive discrimination of border 
regions, will contribute to further enhancement of these interactions. It will provide 
the legal framework in compliance with the EU standards, which would facilitate the 
further development and regional connections on all grounds. 
We emphasize the superiority of a “supranational concept” of the cross-border 
cooperation. This example of organization and program goals of the Danube Basin 
Germans, which is about German assistance to German minorities abroad, within an 
overall framework on EU principles. Following the mass persecution of Germans from 
Central Europe after World War II, the usually benign eﬀect of the German language, 
civilization, culture, and everyday life regressed. The constitution and empowerment of 
the supranational European Union created the conditions that rehabilitated all beneﬁts 
personiﬁed in the “paciﬁst German spirit.” 
It is actually the character of this, essentially “domicile social capital” that brings 
about this preferable “sustainability of modernization initiatives.” The sense and scope 
of assistance provided by Germany through its national minority in Vojvodina, will 
essentially enable a greater presence of the German language and culture in Vojvodina 
and Serbia, which would be an additional correction to the (essentially anti-European) 
discourse about Greater Serbia . 
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NOTES
1 Alfred Everts, an expert on issues concerning Euroregional cooperation, during the “Banat Forum” 
(Banatski forum) Conference on European Regions, Zrenjanin, October 30–31, 2001. 
2 Several nahijas composed one kadiluk. the diﬀerence between these two units is that, at the time 
of the Ottoman Empire, kadiluk represented the judicial and administrative area (srez).
3 See Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: the short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, London: 
Michael Joseph, 1994. 
4 More on this initiative can be found at: http://www.donaudreieck.eu.
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Local Cooperation in the 
South Adriatic Region 
Živorad Kovačević
INTRODUCTION
Soon after its establishment, the Igman Initiative decided that one of the key directions 
of their activities to overcome the consequences of wars, hatred, and the absolute absence 
of mutual trust should be the development of cross-border cooperation of cities and 
municipalities in the frame of the so-called “triangles of cooperation.” Within a decade 
after the war, this cooperation began to grow in terms of both the territory, participants, 
and content through circles, and even quadrangles, of cooperation that involved more 
cities and extended beyond the three countries of the so-called Dayton Triangle. This 
network was the basis to establish a new organization named the Association of Multi-
ethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe–Philia, gathering a number of cities from all the 
countries of the wider region of the South Eastern Europe. 
The ﬁrst triangle of cooperation was established in 2001–2002 among Osijek 
(Croatia), Novi Sad (Serbia), and Tuzla (Bosnia and Herzegovina). Assemblies of these 
three municipalities adopted the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance, which subsequently 
became the basic program document of Philia. 
Encouraged by the initial success in this triangle, at its fourth session held in 
Dubrovnik on October 19–21, 2001, the Igman Initiative, founded in the wake of the 
Dayton Agreement, in cooperation with the EastWest Institute, launched an initiative 
to establish a new triangle of cooperation among Dubrovnik (Croatia), Trebinje (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina), and Herceg Novi (Montenegro, at that time within Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia). The idea was to renew neighborly contacts (ruptured during the war) 
between local authorities, local agencies, non-governmental organizations, cultural 
groups, and individuals in ﬁelds of common everyday interest like ﬁre protection, water 
management, waste disposal, tourism, culture, and the like.
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THE THREE CITIES
The most famous of these three cities is Dubrovnik. In the ﬁfteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries Dubrovnik was the only city-state (Republic of Dubrovnik–Republic of Ragusa) in 
the eastern Adriatic area, a competitor with Venice for its wealth and trade. A number 
of monuments of that era make the entire city a vast museum that was acknowledged 
and added to the UNESCO list of world cultural heritage sites. 
Dubrovnik is now one of the most prominent tourist destinations along the Adriatic 
Sea, an important harbor and the seat of Dubrovnik-Neretva County. In 2001, there 
were 43,770 inhabitants living in Dubrovnik (as opposed to 49,728 inhabitants ten 
years earlier). Around 90 percent of the population are Croats. When Croatia declared 
independence, in early October 1991, the Yugoslav Army (composed of Serbs and 
Montenegrins) besieged Dubrovnik for seven months. 
Dubrovnik was heavily bombed, over a hundred of its inhabitants were killed, and 
many were wounded. Many buildings and monuments were severely damaged and 
their restoration was completed by 2005. Members of paramilitary formations from 
Montenegro ravaged the area surrounding Dubrovnik, particularly Konavle. The main 
culprits have been convicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague, 
but memories of these incidents are still fresh, slowing down the establishment of nor-
mal relations between Dubrovnik and cross-border cities in Montenegro and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina. 
Trebinje is a city in Herzegovina and the southernmost municipality in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In 1991, its population was 21,870, while this number has slightly de-
creased by today. Over two-thirds of the population are Serbs and one-ﬁfth are Bosniaks. 
The city lies on the Trebišnjica River and is considered one of the most beautiful cities 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the signature of the Dayton Agreement, the prewar 
municipality of Trebinje was divided into two municipalities: Trebinje, which became 
a part of the Republic of Srpska, and Ravno, which became a part of the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Until 1992, Trebinje was a highly developed city in terms of its economy, with 
metals, clothes, foods, and a hydroelectric power on the Trebišnjica River as the main 
industries. During the war and in the period that followed, this region fell into isolation, 
facing a sudden fall in employment (with unemployment rate over 20 percent). A large 
percentage of the population capable of work has moved or been banished from the 
city. Trebinje is situated in the tri-border with Croatia and Montenegro, providing it 
with a number of advantages and possibilities. It is around 15 minutes of car from the 
seaside. There are two lakes in the vicinity of Trebinje—Lake Trebinje and Lake Bileća, 
with huge potentials in terms of tourism and economy. 
Herceg Novi (Montenegro) is situated in a signiﬁcant and attractive geographic 
location between the highest mountain of the Dinara Massif—Orjen (1,895 meters) 
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and at the entrance to Boka Kotorska (the Bay of Kotor), which was, in 1997, included 
in the association of the 28 most beautiful bays of the world. The population of the 
municipality of Herceg Novi is 39,000, and 20,000 live in the city center. The city was 
founded at the end of fourteenth century. The Turks conquered it in the late ﬁfteenth 
century and ruled the city for two centuries, interrupted by a short period of Spanish 
rule in sixteenth century. After the Turks, the city was conquered by the Venetians, who 
remained in power until the decline of the Republic of Venice in 1797. Since that period, 
there have been frequent changes in Herceg Novi’s administration (Austrians, Russians, 
French, Austro–Hungarians). Since 1918, Herceg Novi was a part of Yugoslavia.
These three cities are one hour’s drive from one another. During the tourist season, 
the roads are clogged and drivers face many delays. When a rather time-consuming 
border-crossing procedure is added, very long queues of vehicles are formed, another 
obstacle for citizens living in these cities wishing to travel to their neighbors. The road 
between Trebinje and Herceg Novi was in a quite bad condition, but was modernized 
in 2008. The three cities have many issues in common, which they, unfortunately, have 
not resolved together. 
One of the most urgent problems is ﬁre protection. Fires regularly devastate the for-
ests and other vegetation every year in the period of hot summer days, spreading across 
the state borders, where there is usually very little joint action or mutual assistance. In 
2007, a ﬁre broke out in Trebinje, devastating Herzegovinian and Croatian territory and 
reaching the city of Dubrovnik, but no joint actions occurred on this occasion. Due to 
a very strong wind at that time, the ﬁre destroyed the entire coast of Dubrovnik, leav-
ing a spooky image of black remnants of burnt trees, instead of lush green vegetation, 
in its wake. Pollution of the sea and water courses is also a signiﬁcant problem requiring 
joint action. Increasing and improving tourism could be a common opportunity to work 
together, though little has been done in this regard. 
Before the war in the 1990s, citizens, city administrations, economic entities, and 
tourist organizations of these three cities cooperated as units in one common country. 
The war, however, brought drastic changes. These three cities became parts of three dif-
ferent countries, with their borders closed for a long time, and relations between the 
newly-established countries being far from friendly and normal, with the eerie shadow 
of absurd conﬂicts, victims, destroyed dwellings, lost property, internal and external 
migrations, and distrust cast over the entire area. 
Under such circumstances, only the most persistent enthusiasts from the Igman 
Initiative could have believed that it was possible to rehabilitate the broken relations and 
establish the necessary cooperation in this rather small, but highly divided and hostile 
area, as was the case with antiwar NGOs of these three countries that later began to 
cooperate. 
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INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION AND THE FIRST STEPS 
The response of the civil sector from these three cities to the Igman Initiative’s session 
held in October 2001 in Dubrovnik was encouraging. There were ten representatives 
from Dubrovnik, eleven from Montenegro, and nine from Trebinje. They came from 
non-governmental organizations—mainly youth, environmental, and cultural organiza-
tions—chambers of commerce, tourist associations, and agencies, scientiﬁc institutes. 
The session included the active participation of the Deputy High Representative 
in BiH, the Head of the UN Liaison Oﬃce, Croatia, a representative of the UN for 
BiH, and representatives of the OSCE, Council of Europe, and the Spanish Agency 
for Cooperation. Representatives of the EastWest Institute aimed to be the preeminent 
catalyst for innovative policy solutions to emerging security problems, especially 
where a high level of collaboration among states, communities, businesses, and NGOs 
is crucial.
However, none of the mayors or high oﬃcials from the three cities responded to the 
invitation. Nor did representatives of the three states attend the session, although they were 
invited. However, among the participants were a number of respectable individuals from 
the three neighboring countries, who were well-known in the region, including scientists, 
eminent individuals in the ﬁeld of culture, journalists, and antiwar and human rights 
activists, which added great signiﬁcance to this session that was accompanied by substan-
tial media coverage. Mr. Ivan Šprlje, Head of Dubrovnik–Neretva County, addressed the 
meeting and participated in the work of session. Other oﬃcials from the three countries 
who attended the session included Mr. Sejfudin Tokić, Vice-President of the Assembly 
of BiH, Mr. Miodrag Vuković, Adviser to the President of Montenegro, and Mr. Nenad 
Čanak, President of the Assembly of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, Serbia. 
The participants decided to form a working group for cooperation among the three 
cities. The group took advantage of the available time and held three sessions dedicated 
to issues of cooperation in the ﬁeld of natural resources management (environment, 
water, and ﬁre protection), the economic sector (tourism, small and medium-sized 
enterprises), and youth and cultural cooperation.
The group adopted two types of conclusions. In the general conclusions, partici-
pants stated that cooperation between the cities in the southern Adriatic triangle was 
of vital signiﬁcance for prosperity, security, and peaceful coexistence in the region, as 
well as for integration into a wider European political and economic environment. It 
was emphasized that an intensiﬁed and systematic cooperation at the local cross-border 
level would be in the best interest of the three communities, but it should be developed 
in the framework of a wider perspective of European integration. 
In addition, it was underlined that there were major political impediments to the 
cross-border cooperation, mostly arising from consequences of the war, and which 
should not be underestimated, as they require a special treatment within each of the 
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three communities. “Even technical and practical cross-border cooperation in such a 
vulnerable region has certain political implications,“ the participants emphasized. 
Therefore, it is vital to involve all relevant actors in the development of coordinated 
cross-border strategies—i.e., NGOs, representatives of private sector, educational, 
and cultural institutions, the media, as well as local and regional authorities. A special 
invitation was extended to the mayors of these three cities, regional authorities, and 
competent ministries of the three countries to actively engage in the drafting and 
implementation of cross-border strategies that are in the interest of all. The role of the 
local media in ameliorating the lack of information concerning the cross-border area 
has been particularly emphasized. 
Concrete actions were recommended, including the recording of all existing (bilateral 
and trilateral) initiatives in the ﬁelds of their interest and/or jurisdiction and identify 
the key factors in each ﬁeld, in order to establish highly representative and specialized 
working groups to convene in the very near future. The Center for Communication 
from Kotor oﬀered to be the host of the working group for youth and cultural coopera-
tion, the Chamber of Commerce and Tourist Association of Trebinje were hosts to the 
group for private sector development, whereas Dubrovnik–Neretva County agreed to 
host to the working group for natural resources and cultural heritage.
Implementation of the Conference Conclusions 
The meeting held on March 27, 2002 at the Cultural Center of Kotor was dedicated to 
youth and cultural cooperation, and in addition to representatives from Dubrovnik and 
Trebinje, it included the participation of representatives of cultural and youth NGOs, 
the media and student associations from Herceg Novi, Kotor, Tivat, and Podgorica. 
Representatives of youth organizations did not fail to mention and to discuss the 
consequences of the war. 
Although this topic was emotional issue, particularly to representatives of Dubrovnik, 
the young participants concluded in the end, that among of all social groups, the youth 
suﬀered the greatest losses because of isolation on all sides of borders after the war. 
The new generation was subject to a decade of propaganda concerning the neighbors, 
disseminated through the media and in school curricula, too. The present participants 
insisted that their very participation in the meeting was a sign indicating that they 
were open and liberal, but the majority, however, were not ready for an open dialogue 
quite yet. 
In the conclusions to this meeting, the youth and their representatives living near 
the border regions stressed that the peripheral position of these territories, compared 
to their respective national capitals, was the main reason why these areas should be 
interdependent, if they intend to stop their mutual isolation. 
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Two problems aﬀecting youth were particularly emphasized: employment was nearly 
impossible to secure after completing their education and an increase in drug addiction 
was also worrying. They clearly saw that the main obstacles to cooperation were the lack 
of information in the cross-border area. City administrations, the media, and public 
institutions only declared their support for projects aimed at reestablishment of trust 
and reconciliation, without any true commitment, for fear of losing political support 
if they should launch such initiatives. Non-governmental organizations were seen as 
weak, lacking political or ﬁnancial support, and unable to be good partners for joint 
projects. The postwar social and economic malaise also led to a high rate of all types of 
crime. Irrespective of all the obstacles, the youth were determined to carry on with joint 
initiatives in the following four ﬁelds—media, education, culture and environmental 
protection. 
On June 3, 2002, a seminar was organized in Dubrovnik by the EastWest Institute 
and with the participation of the OSCE, and dedicated to tourism and the develop-
ment of small and medium-sized enterprises. Approximately thirty participants, mainly 
representatives of tourist agencies, discussed their common problems and interests. It 
was proposed to create a common cross-border website to include all crucial information; 
to develop a network and the cross-border marketing of micro-business products and 
services; to organize small cross-border fairs; to establish subgroups based on sectors; 
and to conduct an analysis of the visa and customs procedures, as well as other barriers 
to cross-border trade and investments, so the appropriate proposals could be submitted 
to the central authorities aimed at achieving the liberalization of the visa and border 
regime. 
A conference of the Forum of Cross-Border Cooperation in the South Adriatic Area 
was held in Dubrovnik on September 28–29, 2002. It was based on the proposal of the 
Igman Initiative. Representatives of the EastWest Institute, the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE, the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of Europe, and the Stability 
Pact for South-Eastern Europe, as well as a great number of representatives of non-
governmental organizations, cities, regional and central authorities, scientiﬁc institutes, 
and individual experts attended. 
Fire protection, water management, waste disposal, small and medium-sized en-
terprises, tourism, and youth cooperation remained at the top of the agenda since local 
or central authorities of the three countries continued to ignore these “soft” issues that 
could bring about cooperation. However, a range of concrete conclusions was adopted, 
concerning the forms of cooperation in any of the above-speciﬁed ﬁelds.
A round table on water and environmental protection was held on January 25, 2003 
in Dubrovnik. The only representative from Croatia was a representative of Dubrovnik-
Neretva County (no one represented Dubrovnik or Konavle), although the round table 
was organized in Dubrovnik. The discussion mostly focused on water supply problems 
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in Herceg Novi. A halt in negotiations between Herceg Novi and Konavle, through 
which the pipeline passes, transporting water from Trebinje to Herceg Novi, indicated 
the severity of the situation. As there was no representative from Konavle present in the 
round table, operational conclusions could not be adopted. It was emphasized that this 
issue could not be resolved without the help of the central authorities. 
The participants also agreed to create a regional cross-border register of pollutants, to 
adopt a joint emergency plan, and establish teams to respond to environmental incidents, 
including pollution of the sea, water, and soil. Such teams already exist in Croatia, so 
the presence of such teams could be extended throughout the entire region. 
The last event regarding regional cooperation was held on March 1, 2003 in Trebinje, 
with the topic concerning municipal waste. None of the eleven representatives of the city 
of Dubrovnik and the Dubrovnik-Neretva County attended the seminar. Representatives 
of Trebinje informed the participants that they were engaged in relocating the existing 
landﬁll, whereas the landﬁll in Dugonja, used for waste disposal from Herceg Novi (for 
which a monthly fee was paid) was closed by a decision of the competent ministry. It 
did not comply with sanitation standards. 
The seminar concluded that the most eﬃcient solution would be of a regional 
character, implying that a common landﬁll in concert with a recycling initiative should 
be established. It was also concluded that the Croatian side should be informed about 
the proposal, and if it agrees, a concept of a bilateral solution could be made. It would 
be based on a study and project jointly prepared and developed by experts from the 
two municipalities. 
Following the conclusions of the session held in Dubrovnik, special seminars and 
round tables were organized in 2002 and 2003, concerning particular issues of regional 
cooperation, ﬁnanced and directed by the EastWest Institute. Cities and institutions 
from Croatia kept a noticeable distance. Actually, things have not moved any further 
from these seminars and their respective conclusions, as the appropriate mechanisms 
for their implementation have not been provided. As a matter of fact, these were gath-
erings of good will, without an institutional set-up; therefore, only appeals and general 
recommendations, not speciﬁc decisions, were sent.
WATER SUPPLY IN HERCEG NOVI
One of the most urgent problems that needed to be solved was re-establishment of the 
regular water supply in Herceg Novi. The water source is within the water system of the 
Trebišnjica River in Republika Srpska (Bosnia and Herzegovina). The water reaches the 
water treatment plant in Herceg Novi, passing through a low-pressure gravity pipeline, 
which passes through Konavle and is connected to the pipeline at the hydroelectric 
power plant in Croatia. 
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Figure 1.
Tri-border Area of Croatia, Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina
 
The construction of a pipeline from Plat to Herceg Novi before the war was ﬁnanced 
from self-contributions of the citizens of Herceg Novi. The investor reimbursed the 
owners of the property through which the pipeline extended for any potential damaging 
of trees and crops. At the time when the entire system was under construction, all the 
locations were the territory of a single country (then the SFRY); therefore, there were 
no cross-border problems whatsoever. The situation in the region, however, changed 
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drastically in early 1990s, with the establishment of new countries. Nowadays, the main 
source for water supply in Herceg Novi is situated in three diﬀerent countries, bringing 
together historical and cross-border cooperation issues. 
During and after the conﬂict, severe water supply problems were experienced in 
Herceg Novi. The supply was cut, then re-established in 1993, with occasional inter-
ruptions still occurring. A contract between municipalities of Konavle (Croatia) and 
Herceg Novi (Montenegro) was ﬁnally concluded on August 7, 1996, in the presence 
of the observers of the European Economic Community. 
The contract obliged the Konavle Communal Society, Cilipi (Konavosko komunalno 
Društvo–Ćilipi) to provide all necessary conditions for transport through the main water 
pipeline. The amount of water should be made available to the maximum of its capac-
ity, according to the consumption needs. The main water pipeline should be regularly 
maintained, provided that the Herceg Novi Water Supply Company has paid for the 
general repair of the pipeline. The Herceg Novi Water Supply Company was obliged 
to pay to the Konavle Communal Society for the transportation of the water and the 
maintenance of the pipeline to the amount of 0.10 Deutschmarks (DM)/m3 of water 
in 1996, which was to be gradually increased each year to the amount of DM 0.30 by 
2000. It was also obliged to pay for the installation of water meters in Plat and Debeli 
Brijeg. 
The contract was signed, but both sides were unhappy. Frequent disagreements 
resulted in periodical water shortages in Herceg Novi, which considered the Croatian 
charge for the water transit very high. According to their claims it was beyond the 
ﬁnancial possibilities of the city, so they simply stopped meeting their ﬁnancial obliga-
tions. The arrears accumulated. Consequently, the water supply often was interrupted, 
a substantial problem, particularly in the tourist season. There have been attempts to 
ﬁnd a mutually acceptable solution, through direct contacts between Herceg Novi and 
Konavle, but none of them were ultimately successful. 
In 1999, the government of the Netherlands paid all the accumulated water debts 
of Herceg Novi, as well as the transit costs for the following 12 months, hoping that, 
in the meantime, a lasting resolution would be reached. A new contract was signed in 
May 2000 and it was envisaged to have a duration period of ﬁve years. Herceg Novi 
agreed to pay a lump sum of DM 50,000 per month for the transport of water and the 
maintenance of the pipeline in the period April 2000–April 2001. After this period the 
price of water would rise to DM 0.22 or EUR 0.112 per cubic meter (which would 
not include depreciation of the pipeline). Instead of two, only one water ﬂow point 
(at Debeli Brijeg) was envisaged. In case of arrears, the municipality of Konavle was 
authorized to stop the transport of water until all water bills are paid. The contract was 
to come into eﬀect after Herceg Novi meets all its obligations. If this would not be the 
case before April 1, 2001, then the price of a cubic meter of water would be calculated 
on the basis of the average ﬂow of water of 300 liters per second (777,600 m3 for 
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30 days to the amount of 17,072 DM per month). However, this contract was not 
observed by any of the sides, so the situation has remained unchanged. 
The political parties in power at that time were HDZ (Hrvastka Demokratska Zajed-
nica, or the Croatian Democratic Party, founded by Franjo Tuđman) in Dubrovnik and 
Konavle, SNP (the Socialist National Party, which supported Slobodan Milošević) in 
Herceg Novi, and SDS (the Serbian Democratic Party, founded by Radovan Karadžić) in 
Trebinje. This obstructed and made compromise nearly impossible . Whenever there was 
a cut in water supply, mayors of Herceg Novi and Konavle exchanged mutual accusations 
in public, creating an unfavorable atmosphere for achieving sensible agreements.
At its fourth session, held in early June 2002 in Kotor, the Igman Initiative con-
cluded that the attempts to reach a resolution to the water supply problem in Herceg 
Novi, had not broken the deadlock: 
  “As it is quite certain that the authorities of these municipalities still stick to 
their positions, thus not contributing to reaching the ﬁnal resolution, the 
non-governmental organizations from these three cities, whose representatives 
participated in the session, are oﬀering their good practices and services.” 
Thus, they proposed the establishment of an independent three-member expert 
group, including experts in water supply and legal and economic aﬀairs. 
Members of this expert group should not come from any of the countries governed 
by the Dayton Accord in order to achieve the maximum impartiality. The task of this 
expert group was to document and determine the situation and propose the appropri-
ate solutions within three months. The proposal was submitted to the OSCE Oﬃce in 
Podgorica, along with the request for assistance in ﬁnding the experts and donors to 
ﬁnance the project. 
In general, the OSCE does not engage in issues of this kind, but this time they agreed 
to provide their assistance because of the potential for conﬂict between the communities 
on both sides of borders, as well any violation of fundamental human rights. At the 
request of the OSCE, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation agreed to 
sent one expert and pay the costs of his mission. The mission worked in the ﬁeld in the 
ﬁrst half of September, held a number of discussions, gained an insight into the legal 
and technical documentation, and submitted the report. 
The report contained an objective and thorough estimate of the ﬁnancial aspects 
and the technical condition of the pipeline and waterworks, pointing to huge water 
losses due to their poor condition. It also reported on the non-observance of the signed 
contract, according to which the maintenance of the pipeline and its installations 
should be undertaken by Konavle, only after the owner of the pipeline, Herceg Novi, 
has completed the entire repair of the pipeline and installations. 
The reports also stated that that “the problem was rather sensitive, as it combined 
rational elements with personal opinions, non-related to any ﬁnancial or technical 
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aspect.” The experts’ opinion was that “a resolution may be reached if both sides should 
agree and consider the problem in an objective manner, and then began dealing with 
it, starting from the most urgent technical aspects.” 
The experts provided concrete proposals. It seemed that the objective platform for 
an agreement was ﬁnally deﬁned. Representatives of the Igman Initiative visited the two 
mayors and insisted on reestablishment of the negotiations on the basis of the experts’ 
report. Still, there were no results, and the two sides continued to accuse one another 
of obstructing the agreement. 
The complex relations between the municipalities on the opposite side of the border 
have required careful and planned actions of all those participating in the process of 
reconciliation and the creation of the prerequisites for actual and concrete implementa-
tion of projects aimed at improving the life of citizens, regardless of their ethnic group. 
The obstructions caused by particular actors conversely inspired the attempts to ﬁnd 
the alternative methods that would motivate all representatives of local authorities to 
start a dialogue and reach a resolution. 
One way out was to ﬁnd higher levels of authority, this time in ministries of foreign 
aﬀairs. After holding two regional conferences, organized by the Center for Regionalism, 
under the auspices of the respective three ministries of foreign aﬀairs, things started to 
move in a positive direction. The inﬂuence and power of ministries provided the nec-
essary incentives to the local authorities and under their auspices, political diﬀerences 
were reduced. 
In addition, local authorities, using persuasive arguments for the necessity of 
regional cooperation, the improvement of the quality of life, and opportunities for 
new markets, began to act. The long-awaited dialogue was ﬁnally initiated. In brief, 
after holding several meetings with municipal representatives, in which each muni-
cipality delegated one or two members to deal with the issues of cross-border 
communication and cooperation, a mixed committee was established to engage in 
deﬁning the priorities in their newly-established relations and drawing up regional 
project proposals to be submitted to international ﬁnancial institutions and donor 
organizations. 
RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF PREVLAKA PENINSULA
Among the unresolved border issues between the newly-established countries, Croatia 
and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), particular attention 
is paid to the issue of the Prevlaka Peninsula, which used to be under the jurisdiction of 
the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA). The issue of Prevlaka Peninsula has been open since 
1992 when a United Nations’ mission was established by Security Council Resolution 
No. 779 from October 6, 1992. Later, the UN Mission of Observers (UNMOP) was 
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established on February 1, 1996. The Security Council renewed the mandate of the 
mission every six months. 
An agreement on normalization of relations between the FR Yugoslavia and Re-
public of Croatia was signed on August 23, 1996. In this agreement, the two countries 
recognized each other as independent states within their international borders. It envis-
aged resolving the issue of the border in an amicable manner in the spirit of the Dayton 
Agreement and good neighborly relations.
Nevertheless, the two governments had diﬀerent positions : the Yugoslav govern-
ment considered this to be a territorial dispute (the dispute on sovereignty over the 
peninsula) and a security issue, whereas the Croatian government considered it to be 
exclusively a security issue, implying that Croatian sovereignty over the peninsula was 
indisputable, and the agreement should resolve the issue of the security of navigation in 
the bay. Given these circumstances, it was impossible to ﬁnd a minimum starting point 
required for negotiations, and the Prevlaka Peninsula has since become one of the most 
severe impediments to achieving a normalization of relations between the new states. 
Compounded by the already hostile relations in the South Adriatic triangle, it caused 
a lot of problems for the population living near the border. 
Figure 2.
Vicinity of Prevlaka Peninsula
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Citizens in the frontier area had intensive contacts before the armed conﬂict, par-
ticularly those who had properties on the other side of the border. They needed visas to 
cross the border, which could be obtained only in capitals of the two countries. Long 
queues of automobiles and buses waited to pass through the very strictly controlled 
bordercrossing. The same held for tourists who intended to see both Dubrovnik and 
Herceg Novi. Nautical tourism, leisure, and sports were seriously aﬀected. Fishing was 
unregulated in this zone. 
However, after a shift in democratic attitudes, the governments of Croatia and Yu-
goslavia began to ﬁnd a solution in an friendly way. They agreed, in a pragmatic manner, 
that the agreement would not identify and set the borderline. This was issue on which 
the two sides took opposite positions, so they decided only to deﬁne the regime near 
the border. A cooperative and sensitive attitude of both sides facilitated the adoption of 
a temporary agreement that managed to remove this sensitive issue oﬀ the agenda for a 
while. All solutions were considered temporary. That is, they would not prejudice a ﬁnal 
resolution that would be deﬁned in an agreement on the border in the future. 
This provided an opportunity to resolve, in an amicable manner, some important 
issues, which were of great relevance for the normalization of relations and daily life. 
On the basis of the adopted agreement, a complete demilitarization was implemented: 
in Yugoslavia three kilometers from the line, and in Croatia ﬁve kilometers away from 
the line. Temporary border traﬃc was established, allowing the inhabitants of munici-
palities of Herceg Novi, Kotor, and Tivat in Yugoslavia and the municipalities of Župa 
Dubrovačka and Konavle, as well as the City of Dubrovnik in Croatia to cross the border 
with only their ID cards or a border pass. 
Alongside the existing bordercrossing in Debeli Brijeg, another interstate border-
crossing was established at Konﬁn. The two sides agreed to develop and encourage 
comprehensive cooperation in a numbder of ﬁelds, namely tourism, the coast guard 
and emergency services, and sea-borne pollution. During the tourist season (April 1 to 
October 31) it was agreed not to conduct border control on nautical tourists, leisure, 
or sports. The agreement also included cooperation on air traﬃc between Dubrovnik 
and Tivat. 
The agreement also regulated ﬁsheries in this zone. It should be emphasized that 
Croatia and Montenegro agreed several years ago, to build a joint tourist-recreational 
center on Prevlaka Peninsula. This agreement was signed by presidents of Croatia and 
Montenegro, Mr. Stjepan Mesić and Mr. Milo Đukanović, and presented to the UN 
General Secretary, Mr. Koﬁ Annan, who promised to fully support it. 
Despite some negative responses in both countries, the wider public actually wel-
comed the agreement and considered it as a good sign of resolving the disputable issues 
between the two countries. This international agreement resulted from the eﬀorts and 
cooperation between the two interested governments, without any interventions of the 
international community. This fact has been particularly important and encouraging 
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for the entire region, where the international presence and direct intervention, as well 
as pressure, are visible to a great extent. 
The Prevlaka Agreement not only made life easier for citizens living near the border, 
but also showed what an incentive it would be to ﬁnd an amicable resolution to the 
issues that are in the interest of the local communities situated in the tri-border area. 
CHANGING THE STRATEGY: FOCUSING ON NATIONAL AUTHORITIES
The Igman initiative invested a lot of eﬀort to encourage cooperation in the South Adri-
atic triangle, but the concrete results were rather modest. The EastWest Institute provided 
its immeasurable contribution in organizing and ﬁnancing the follow-up events, taking 
place after the session in Dubrovnik held in October 2001. During 2002 and 2003, a 
number of regional meetings were held, at which useful and concrete conclusions were 
adopted, but no one was willing and able to implement them in practice. 
The Igman Initiative could state the following:
 • Non-governmental organizations and business entities (particularly related to tour-
ism) provided their full support to the need of cooperation within the triangle 
in a number of ﬁelds in the interest of all;
 • International institutions and organizations provided signiﬁcant political, ﬁnan-
cial, and logistic support to the civil sector initiative;
 • local (particularly national) media covered the regional initiatives insuﬃciently, 
resulting in low publicity; moreover, they were most frequently adding fuel to 
ﬁre when it comes to mutual accusations and ethnic conﬂicts;
 • as in other cases, the Igman Initiative counted most on the local authorities for 
the support of reestablishment of trust and cooperation in implementation of 
concrete initiatives and projects; however, this support was entirely lacking, 
with mayors most often contributing to a further deterioration of precarious 
inter-relations;
 • the central authorities provided only their verbal support to cooperation, with-
out any serious commitments, although the professional services of the three 
countries in the ﬁeld of environmental protection, tourism, ﬁre protection ﬁre, 
infrastructure, and so forth, actively participated in searching and proposing 
the solutions for joint projects.
Based on these ﬁndings, the Igman Initiative concluded that it was unwise to expect 
that NGOs would be able to stimulate other crucial actors to undertake joint actions. 
Therefore, the strategy had to be changed: it was impossible to make a breakthrough 
without the local authorities. As a general preposition, non-governmental organizations 
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have had a trailblazing role in the process of the alleviation of tensions in the aftermath 
of war and the encouragement of the cross-border cooperation. Their strongest allies 
were municipalities and mayors in border areas. 
However, in case of the South Adriatic triangle, mayors were the staunchest oppo-
nents to the cooperation, with a support of the good part of the local electorates. The 
relations between central governments were better than at the local level. Political parties 
in power were more ready to foster normal cooperative relations with the neighboring 
countries than their local chapters in border areas. However, the central authorities, i.e., 
the party leaders, could make a decisive impact on them. 
Thus, with the assistance of international organizations (the OSCE and High 
Representative to BiH in particular), it was necessary to address the central authorities 
of the three countries. First, because their general position was developed in a positive 
sense towards good neighborly relations, particularly in the context of joint eﬀorts and 
striving towards European integration. In the three cities, the inhabitants’ attitudes 
began to soften and they slowly became more willing to start cooperation with their 
recent enemies. 
After a great deal of patient work, eﬀort, and meetings organized with senior state 
oﬃcials from 2005 to 2007, the Igman Initiative managed to obtain the support of the 
three ministers of foreign aﬀairs. In the mean time, Montenegro declared independence, 
and thus became the third partner in negotiations, replacing the State Union of Serbia 
and Montenegro. It was particularly important that Croatia accepted to take an active 
part in encouraging cooperation within the triangle. The Croatian authorities used to 
be most reserved, regarding cooperation with the two former enemies with suspicion. 
Extending the Range of Participation
After consultations with the ministers of foreign aﬀairs from Croatia, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, and Montenegro, staﬀ from the Igman Initiative came to the conclusion that 
other local and regional communities should be included, in addition to Dubrovnik, 
Herceg Novi, and Trebinje, primarily because the majority of them were directly involved 
in resolving problems in their joint interest (water supply, ﬁre protection, and opening 
borders, among others).
In this sense, the cooperation mechanism involved Neum and Ravno from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, the municipalities of Konavle, Župa Dubrovačka, and Dubrovačko 
Primorje, as well as Dubrovnik–Neretva County from Croatia and Kotor and Tivat 
from Montenegro. As a result, the number of participants increased from three to 
eleven participants.
Ravno is one of the southern-most municipalities in Herzegovina. Until 1997, 
it was a part of the municipality of Trebinje, belonging to the territory of Republika 
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Srpska. Unlike Trebinje, Ravno is a part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
It is very small. According to the census conducted in 1991, it had 198 inhabitants, 
mostly Croats. 
Neum is a town, tourist settlement, and the only municipal center at the Adriatic 
Sea in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The town has around 2,500 inhabitants and the whole 
municipality around 5,000. The Adriatic Highway passes through Neum, connecting 
it with Split, Dubrovnik, and the entire Adriatic coast. In addition, an electric railway 
passes through the Neretva valley, from Sarajevo and Mostar, to Ploče. Neum has been 
developed as a tourist area in the region that used to be a rural and ﬁshing area. 
Konavle is a small municipality, situated southeast of Dubrovnik. Its population 
is a little over 8,000 (96.5 percent of them are Croats). The center of the municipal-
ity is Cavtat. Konavle is actually a very narrow area between Snežnica Mountain and 
the Adriatic Sea, from Cavtat to the border with Montenegro at Prevlaka. Konavle is 
a wealthy municipality, and has always been one of the ten wealthiest municipalities 
in Croatia. The most developed economic branches here are tourism and agriculture. 
Dubrovnik’s airport is situated on the territory of Konavle (in Ćilipi).
Župa Dubrovačka is a municipality with 6,500 inhabitants (93 percent Croat). It is 
situated in the area between Dubrovnik and Cavtat. The center of the municipality is 
the popular Srebreno holiday resort. The most developed part of the local economy used 
to be agriculture and provision of agricultural products to Dubrovnik; nowadays, it is 
tourism. There is a range of beautiful resorts along the coast, attracting a great number 
of visitors and tourists. 
The municipality of Dubrovačko Primorje was established in 1997, and is the second 
biggest municipality in Dubrovnik–Neretva County, spreading over an area of 197 km2. 
Its population, however, is very low (only 2,500 inhabitants), living in 20 settlements, 
of which the settlement of Slano is the largest, with 500 inhabitants. This municipal-
ity was devastated in the recent war, and later by an earthquake in 1996, and is now 
the area is administered under special state care. The municipality has established its 
development targets: building a tourist resort in Rat (for which they need a potential 
investor), construction of a business zone of 17 hectares, construction of wind farms, 
the airport, golf courses, and the tourist zone.
Dubrovnik-Neretva County is the southernmost Croatian county. Because it borders 
with Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is divided in two parts at Neum—the Dubrovnik part 
with Korčula and the Neretva part. There are ﬁve cities (Dubrovnik, Metković, Korčula, 
Ploče, and Opuzen) as well as seventeen municipalities. The county has 123,000 inhabit-
ants, of which 93 percent are Croats. According to the oﬃcial records, during the war in 
1990s, a total of 14,194 houses were burned and looted. The most important economic 
branch is tourism, along with maritime transport. The oldest European saltpan is located 
in Ston, dating back to the fourteenth century, which is still used for traditional salt 
gathering and production. People living in the Neretva valley and Konavle are mostly 
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occupied with agriculture, and animal husbandry to a smaller extent. At the peninsula 
of Pelješac and the island of Korčula, the most important economic areas are viticulture 
for the production of autochthonous wine varieties, olives, and shipbuilding.
Kotor is situated in one of the most beautiful bays in the world—Boka Kotorska. It 
has 5,500 inhabitants. Throughout the history, Kotor has been a city of merchants and 
famous seafarers. Now, its most important economic branch is tourism. The old quarter 
of Kotor is one of the best preserved medieval urban centers, typical for cities established 
in the twelfth and fourteenth centuries. Its medieval architecture and a large number 
of monuments lead to Kotor being added to the UNESCO list of World Cultural and 
Natural Heritage sites. Kotor resembles Dubrovnik in many ways and attracts a great 
number of visitors. Carnivals and festivals are organized every year, making this beauti-
ful city even more magniﬁcent. 
Tivat is the most recently established municipality, with the smallest area in Boka 
Kotorska. It occupies an area of approximately 46 km2, with a population of around 
13,000. Its greater development and growth as an urban center began only towards the 
end of the nineteenth century. The main airport on the Montenegrin coast is situated 
on the territory of Tivat. This city attracted a number of investors. The construction of 
a large marina for yachts is currently ongoing.
A New Chapter in Intermunicipal Relations
During 2006, the Igman Initiative was persistently lobbying, with the support of the 
OSCE and the EastWest Institute for a meeting of foreign aﬀairs ministers from Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montenegro, with the aim to stimulate cooperation 
in the South Adriatic area. The meeting was, at last, organized in Neum on April 27, 
2007. Ministers Mr. Sven Alkalaj (BiH), Mr. Milan Roćen (Montenegro), and Ms. 
Kolinda Grabar Kitarović (Croatia) signed a joint statement, agreeing, among others, 
on the following: 
  “Cross-border cooperation is one of the prerequisites of regional development, 
just like the regional cooperation is a stimulus to development of our countries 
and is an integral part of the European process in which our counties take part. 
We encourage the improvement of the cross-border cooperation, support joint 
projects aimed at improving and developing this cooperation, as this is all an 
integral part of our mutual good neighborly relations and European visions that 
we share.” 
It was agreed that the three respective countries, each for the period of one 
year, would coordinate the activities of public and local authorities in the process of 
170
C R O S S - B O R D E R  C O O P E R A T I O N :  C I T Y  T R I A N G L E S
implementing the tri-border cooperation. The Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs of Montenegro 
was the ﬁrst chairman for 2008. 
After that, representatives of local authorities were supposed to sign a memoran-
dum that would be the basis for operationalization of that cooperation. Unfortunately, 
the memorandum remained unsigned, its text was not fully harmonized among the 
signatories, and this contributed to the absence of a number of representatives of the 
tri-border local authorities from this meeting. 
In order to provide a new incentive to continuation of the initiated cooperation 
process, a preparatory meeting was held on April 14, 2008 in Zagreb, including the 
participation of assistant ministers of foreign aﬀairs of the three countries responsible 
for bilateral relations, as coordinators of this process for the country they represented, 
along with mayors and representatives of municipalities of Dubrovnik, Konavle, Neum, 
Trebinje, Kotor, Tivat, and Herceg Novi, ambassadors of Montenegro and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and representatives of the Igman Initiative, the EastWest Institute, and 
the UNDP Mission to Montenegro.
At the meeting in Zagreb it was agreed to hold another meeting of foreign aﬀairs 
ministers in Dubrovnik on May 5, 2008. The Igman Initiative and the EastWest Institute 
agreed to make all the necessary arrangements and hand out a revised text of the memo-
randum for the establishment of a joint commission for natural resources management 
and cooperation in the ﬁeld of natural and other types of emergencies. 
Meanwhile, the Igman Initiative came up with the idea to organize a meeting of 
religious leaders, who would provide support to the process of reestablishment of trust 
and reconciliation in this area. The initiative was accepted by Bishop Grigorije of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church, who invited the Catholic bishop and the imam of the Islamic 
religious community to attend a meeting in Trebinje and called for mutual forgiveness 
and reconciliation. 
At the proposal of the Igman Initiative, the Municipal Assembly of Trebinje adopted 
a statement that underlines that Trebinje and Dubrovnik were connected in many ways 
throughout their mutual history (Box 1).
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Box 1.
Statements of Regret
“Trebinje was a natural hinterland to Dubrovnik, 
whereas Dubrovnik was Trebinje’s window to the world.”
Good economic and trade cooperation has been fostered between these two 
cities for centuries, as well as strong interpersonal relations, the evidence of 
which may be seen in numerous God-parenthoods existing until the present 
day… Evil times that fell upon some parts of the former Yugoslavia in the pre-
vious decade did not avoid this region. The war brought along horrible crimes 
committed on people, along with huge devastation and the breaking up of the 
connections that had been fostered for centuries. Unfortunately, this happened 
between Trebinje and Dubrovnik. 
A part of terror that happened to Dubrovnik came form the side of Trebinje, 
and we, the councilors of the Municipal Assembly of Trebinje, would like to 
express great regret for what happened. To admit to your mistake is grand, but 
we also know how magniﬁcent it is to forgive. This is why human languages 
contain wonderful words and phrases like “I am sorry” and “forgive me.” 
Uttering these words is, ﬁrst of all, in the interest of the citizens of Trebinje 
and Dubrovnik, as well as in the interest of future generations that will come 
after us, which is why we need to look to the future. Being the ﬁrst neighbors 
to one another, we have a range of common interests, whose harmonization 
will be to the beneﬁt of our citizens, as well as common problems whose solv-
ing will contribute to development and progress in both cities and the wider 
region that we belong to.” 
The president of the Municipal Assembly of Trebinje, Mr. Nikola Sekulović, 
who has been an activist in the Igman Initiative since its establishment, conveyed 
this apology at the meeting in Dubrovnik, and stated, with regret, that a part 
of the terror that happened to Dubrovnik did come from the side of Trebinje. 
“We express deep regret for what happened. To make mistakes is human, as is 
to commit a sin against someone else, but it is even more human to admit to 
your mistake and try to ﬁx it,” Mr. Sekulović stated.
At the same meeting, the Minister of Foreign Aﬀairs of Montenegro, Mr. 
Milan Roćen said that his country “would like to express regret for all the pain, 
all atrocities, and all material losses” suﬀered by the citizens of Croatia, specially 
Konavle and Dubrovnik, that were inﬂicted upon them by particular citizens of 
Montenegro. “Dubrovnik was a victim of aggression and destruction where the 
innocent were killed and highly valuable assets were severely damaged.”
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These messages conveying apologies were welcomed in Dubrovnik, substantially 
contributing to creating an amicable atmosphere and developing the cooperative spirit. 
The meeting in Dubrovnik was for the ﬁrst time attended by mayors and representatives 
of all cities and municipalities, as well as of Dubrovnik-Neretva County, who signed a 
joint statement. The statement says that it is not a legally binding document and the 
participation in the work of the joint commission they established will be based on a 
volunteer basis. 
Box 2.
Decision on Establishing the Joint Commission
Excerpts from the Decision
”Commissions for cooperation in the ﬁeld of natural and other types of disasters 
and natural resources management, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, 
shall be established on the basis of the Statement signed on May 5, in Dubrovnik 
by representatives of local authorities from the tri-border area between Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Croatia, and activities shall be implemented 
in accordance with the provisions and in the spirit of that statement. […]
Article 2
In the framework of the set goals and ﬁelds of work, the Commission’s concrete 
tasks will include the following:
• Collection of the existing projects of cooperation in previously speciﬁed 
areas of cooperation,
• Initiating new projects,
• Final veriﬁcation of projects to be submitted to donors,
• Presenting the veriﬁed projects to the donor community,
• Monitoring the activities concerning the implementation of the accepted 
projects,
• Initiating and coordination of all other forms of cooperation in the tri-
border area of these three countries.
Article 3
All decisions of the Commission shall be made on the basis of harmonization 
and consensus….
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The goals of the joint commission for natural resources management and cooperation 
in the ﬁeld of natural and other types of emergencies include the following: to provide 
support to joint cross-border projects, to exchange communication and information 
about the issues in the joint interest, to develop the projects in the interest of all and 
apply for EU funds, to plan and agree on the strategy of protection and development 
of the cross-border area at the sea and the interior, to cooperate and provide assistance 
in the event of natural disasters and environmental incidents, and to develop the region 
in compliance with the concepts of the European Union. 
Potential ﬁelds of activities to be undertaken by the commission were established:
 1) natural resources management: utilization and protection of water resources, 
monitoring and protection of the sea, environment and environmental protec-
tion, energy and waste management;
 2) cross-border interventions in urgent situations: ﬁre protection, other natural 
disasters and environmental incidents;
 3) enhancement of the economic cooperation: regional development of tourism, re-
establishment of other forms of economic cooperation and establishment of 
passenger transport lines between the signatory cities/municipalities; and
 4) demining.
Formalizing Cooperation by the Commission
The commission is composed of three groups of representatives: one representative 
of each local community that are appointed by the corresponding local authorities, 
one representative of each of the three governments, and the expert working group in 
identiﬁed ﬁelds of cooperation. The commission decisions are made by consensus. If 
the commission needs to meet more frequently for the project purposes, it may operate 
with a reduced number of representatives of the interested local communities. Repre-
sentatives of the Igman Initiative and the EastWest Institute, which agreed to cover the 
costs of the commission’s meetings, are involved in the work of the commission. The 
Ministers of Foreign Aﬀairs agreed that their assistants in charge of bilateral relations 
would assume the role of coordinators of these activities. 
At the commission’s session held on June 23, 2008, chaired by the Assistant Min-
ister of Foreign Aﬀairs of Montenegro, the Rules of Procedure—drafted by the Igman 
Initiative—concerning the commission’s work was to be adopted. Still, due to a mis-
understanding in preparation of the session, representatives of local communities from 
Croatia did not attend the session, so another meeting had to be scheduled, which was 
held on July 21, 2008 in Herceg Novi. 
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This time, the commission was in full force, the Rules of Procedure was adopted and 
discussion was initiated on the possible joint projects. The meeting was characterized 
by a constructive working atmosphere. The greatest attention was paid to ﬁre protection 
(exchange of information, ﬁre alerts, video surveillance, demining, aircraft used in aerial 
ﬁreﬁghting entering the territory of another country, establishment of a regional center 
for procurement of equipment, and the possibility of obtaining the EU support). 
The necessity of starting a joint project to regenerate the surrounding devastated forests 
was underlined. Utilization of water resources and water supply was also the topic of discus-
sion. In addition to reaching a solution for the disputed water supply between Konavle 
and Herceg Novi, the project of constructing a new pipeline was proposed. One of the 
topics that attracted the attention of all participants was cooperation in dealing with the 
issue of municipal waste. A joint expert group will consider various solutions—from a 
joint landﬁll for waste disposal to construction of a waste recycling plant. It was proposed 
to establish a regional center to be in charge of solid waste management. 
Regional development of tourism was the next topic on the agenda. Several proposals 
on joint projects were made, including the creation of a common tourist product. It 
was concluded that a joint proposal should be submitted to establish new bordercrossing 
points in the Dubrovnik-Herceg Novi-Trebinje triangle. The Igman Initiative proposed 
the border regime monitoring project, in order to increase the eﬃciency of crossing the 
borders. The participants also agreed on the proposal that the international musical and 
sport event called “Games without Borders,” involving young people from diﬀerent 
regions of the world and which has already been organized by the Igman Initiative in 
Mostar, Priština, and Gračanica, also be organized in cities of the South Adriatic area.
The participants agreed that joint expert groups prepare the relevant projects. It has 
to be considered and adopted at the commission’s session, prior to applying for funds 
from the European Union and other potential donors at the meeting of foreign aﬀairs 
ministers. Particular emphasis was placed on the need to establish a close cooperation 
with the newly-founded Regional Council for Cooperation (which replaced the Stabil-
ity Pact for South-Eastern Europe) seated in Sarajevo, whose representatives should be 
invited to all sessions of the commission. Active support also should be sought from 
the High Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
The next meeting of the Commission was held on November 2, 2008 in Tivat. On 
this occasion, approximately ten projects, jointly prepared by expert groups of the tri-
border municipalities, were veriﬁed. These projects include the following:
 • Regional center for ﬁre protection
 • Automated ﬁre surveillance
 • Promotion of cultural heritage for the purpose of sustainable tourism
 • Water supply: maintenance and increase of regional waterworks capacity
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 • Establishing the new small bordercrossing points
 • Civil border monitoring at the tri-border between Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, and Croatia
 • Waste water puriﬁcation plant
 • Transport network
 • Exchange of tourist visits.
At this meeting, the participants agreed to complete all veriﬁed projects until De-
cember, when the last meeting would be held in the period of Montenegro’s chairing 
of the commission. At this meeting, ﬁnal versions of projects would be adopted. Pre-
sentation of projects to donors would be organized at a donors’ conference, envisaged 
to take place as part of the meeting of the three foreign aﬀairs ministers, in the second 
half of January 2009.
Therefore, after seven years of persistent attempts, the full support of local and 
central authorities to cooperate in the South Adriatic area was ﬁnally achieved. In addi-
tion, the institutional mechanism was established for preparation of joint projects and 
their implementation, which provides, for the ﬁrst time, a suﬃcient basis to expect the 
cooperation in this turbulent region to start developing in full swing.
SUMMARY
In reality, there are many problems of joint interest in the South Adriatic triangle that 
could be resolved eﬃciently by joint eﬀorts, as they are of cross-border character. The 
greatest impediments were psychological and political barriers to cooperation, i.e., the 
consequences of the recent war, evident in a lack of trust, a reserved attitude to contacts, 
and especially to cooperation, with recent enemies.
The progress in developing the cooperation will depend, ﬁrst of all, on political will, 
as it lies in the hands of politicians, who were the main obstacle to ﬁnding a common 
language for quite a long time. Non-governmental organizations and representatives of 
business sector were willing and ready to cooperate, but civil society remained powerless 
to achieve any considerable cooperation on their own, without support and faced with 
obstructive local authorities and cautious central governments.
The media failed to support a number of initiatives launched by non-governmental 
organizations, particularly by youth organizations, to discover the complete truth about 
the past and thus overcome its burdens and step into the future. Religious communities 
hesitated for a long time to give their assent to forgiveness and reconciliation, but, in 
the end, they played a positive role in creating the conditions needed for establishment 
of mutual contacts and cooperation.
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A valuable contribution to the development of cross-border cooperation has been 
provided by the EastWest Institute, as has organized and ﬁnanced a great number of 
meetings and events. International organizations were willing, whenever needed, to 
provide their support. However, they could only support cooperation when the main 
actors, primarily local authorities, were ready to cooperate. The OSCE provided experts 
who conducted the objective analysis of the issue of water supply in Herceg Novi, 
and subsequently made very concrete recommendations for resolving this issue. This 
organization also played a very constructive role in lobbying with central authorities, 
particularly in Croatia. Changes of the international programs’ strategies also helped 
to launch the new wave of cooperation. 
Changing the strategy of the Igman Initiative from the primary impulse of coop-
eration among non-governmental organizations to a direct involvement of national 
governments, that would encourage the local authorities, has proved to be the only 
eﬃcient solution in such speciﬁc circumstances surrounding this deeply-scarred area. 
In order for this support not to remain only verbal, a well-developed mechanism of 
cooperation of local communities was established, including monitoring, provision of 
incentives, and the direct assistance of central authorities.
Goals and ﬁelds of cooperation must be concrete in order to work and have been 
precisely formulated in order to avoid misunderstanding about the goals of this initiative 
to bring together the tri-border area of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Montene-
gro. They are exclusively focused on identiﬁcation of problems that are of joint interest, 
preparation of projects that would be the same for all or for some local communities, 
and lobbying with international institutions for ﬁnancial support. 
The Igman Initiative has been, at all times, actively involved in the mechanism of 
cooperation, willing to help in preserving the created momentum and issue a public 
warning should any delays or misunderstandings occur. The Igman Initiative is also 
aware of a problem that is very speciﬁc for Bosnia and Herzegovina—there are two 
government entities and weak central authorities, whose impact on local authorities is 
insuﬃcient. For this reason, this organization will continue its lobbying activities with 
the authorities of these two entities, even more so because the municipalities in the 
triangle belong to both entities;
The Igman Initiative will make use of the positive fact that presidents of states take 
active part in this organization’s sessions, and will, in this respect, make eﬀorts to ensure 
the necessary political support to the project of cooperation in the South Adriatic tri-
border area. The pattern the Igman Initiative has successfully applied in other triangles 
of cooperation, based on the civil sector initiative that is later accepted by local and 
other authorities, could not be eﬃciently applied in this area.
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ANNEX
Figure A1.
“Closer Cooperation of Multiethnic Cities,” Herceg Novi, Montenegro
In November 2006, oﬃcials in the multiethnic city of Herceg Novi discuss their 
experiences in cross-border cooperation with colleagues from Kyrgyzstan. 
The visit was presented in local and national media.

Local Policies in Multiethnic 
Community Management
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Activities of the Fund for an 
Open Society–Serbia and the 
Center for Regionalism
Tomislav Žigmanov
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This ﬁnal section provides an overview of a three-year-long project of the Fund for an 
Open Society–Serbia to develop and reach a morally sustainable and ethno-culturally 
sensitive model of governance in multiethnic local communities in Serbia. It was imple-
mented by three diﬀerent local self-governments (Senta, Sombor, and Zrenjanin) in 
Vojvodina, in cooperation with the Center for Regionalism from Novi Sad and a group 
of experts engaged to assist with the project. 
The project began with an in-depth analysis of the existing status of local minority 
policies. The results were later the subjects of public discussions held in each local com-
munity. This was followed by a number of activities aimed at developing the capacities 
of local authorities and minority institutions and organizations for the creation and 
implementation of minority policies at the local level by means education (round tables, 
consultations, organized trainings, and study tours). 
The target groups of these activities were the elected and appointed representatives 
of local, regional, and central administrative authorities, representatives of local minority 
institutions and NGOs, cultural and educational institutions, the media, etc. At the same 
time, various activities were undertaken in order to establish good models for minority 
policies in local communities. In this respect, the concrete problems and existing needs 
in given local communities ﬁrst were deﬁned, followed by the planned creation of the 
most adequate and optimal solutions, which had to observe the legal framework, inter-
ests, and needs of each particular minority community, as well as realistic possibilities 
for the local community concerned. Finally, the initiatives were deﬁned, along with the 
manners of their articulation (models, procedures, system, etc.), which was followed by 
the implementation of the initiatives as one of the ways of resolving the problems. 
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“National minority protection is of crucial importance for stability, democratic 
security and peace on the European continent.”
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND INSTITUTIONAL SETTING
A relatively large number of persons belonging to national minorities live in Serbia. 
According to the last census (2002), a population of 7,498,001, excluding Kosovo, lives 
in Serbia. Serbs, as the most numerous national community, account for 82.86 percent. 
Persons belonging to national minorities account for 14.38 percent, whereas the oth-
ers, undeclared and undecided, account for 2.67 percent. According to these census 
ﬁgures, the largest minority in Serbia are Hungarians, who are the sole group making up 
more than 3 percent of the population (3.91percent or 293,299), followed by Bosniaks 
(1.82percent or 136,087), Roma (1.44 percent or 108,193), Yugoslavs (1.08 percent or 
80,721), Croats (0.94 percent or 70,602), Albanians (0.82 percent or 61,647), Slovaks 
(0.79 percent or 59,021), Vlachs (0.53 percent or 40,054), Romanians (0.46 percent 
or 34,576), and others. Hungarians, along with Bosniaks and Romas, make up almost 
one half of the minority population in the Republic of Serbia–7.17 percent. 
National minorities in Serbia live dispersed over the whole territory. Minority groups 
are concentrated in the regions of Vojvodina (Hungarians, Croats, Slovaks, Romanians), 
Sandžak (Bosniaks), and in the south of Serbia (Albanians). In some areas, ethnic Serbs 
are a minority in those municipalities inhabited by a majority of Bosniaks, Hungarians, 
or Albanians. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences among these groups, such as in terms of 
health indicators, educational attainment, professional qualiﬁcations and position on 
the labor market, political mobilization, and so on.1 These characteristics of minority 
communities signiﬁcantly aﬀect how they can exercise their rights as well as the character 
and intensity of articulation of their interests. Similar to other countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, the Roma minority has the greatest number of unfavorable social indi-
cators. All these variables were taken into consideration in the course of implementing 
the planned project activities. 
If pluralist democratic societies are to fulﬁll their potential, then they should 
guarantee the conditions that ensure that persons belonging to national minorities, 
like the majority, may freely enjoy both universal civil rights as well as special minority 
rights, thus achieving their full integration into society. Broadly put, socially inclusive 
policies necessitate a number of speciﬁc beneﬁts for members of minority groups. The 
manner in which minority rights are regulated and implemented in practice and how 
persons belonging to national minorities are integrated into society signiﬁcantly inﬂuence 
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the quality of interethnic relations, the degree of the civil cohesion of the society, 
human security, stabilization of the democratization process, and ultimately, economic 
prosperity. 
All these aspects were considered in the development of projects on managing 
multiethnic communities by the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia. Speciﬁcally, the 
overall position of minorities, and the quality and scope of exercising minority rights 
in a given local community, are not eﬀected only by the formal legal and institutional 
framework, but also by speciﬁc local minority policies. This proved to be a rule also in 
this case, that is, without local minority policies—particularly in the transition coun-
tries—there are great obstacles to exercise minority rights and to integrate minorities 
into society, and as a result, their absence negatively eﬀects the quality and stability of 
interethnic relations. 
In this project on local minority policies, the following activities were implied, 
including a set of speciﬁc programs, institutional mechanisms, and concrete actions of 
public authorities, political actors and civil organizations aimed at: (i) the establishment 
and development of systematic guarantees as well as all other (ii) social prerequisites for 
protection of cultural identities and promotion of eﬀective participation of minorities 
in public decision-making processes. The existence of such policies in local multieth-
nic communities crucially contributes to the promotion of interethnic tolerance, the 
harmonization of diﬀerences, the implementation of legal guarantees, and the develop-
ment of comprehensive practices for exercising legitimate interests and needs of persons 
belonging to minority communities. They all are aimed at democratic development of 
local communities and at improving the quality of citizens’ life. 
To this end, such policies uphold, promote, and exercise the principles of multicul-
turalism in local communities, and their implementation proves intercultural competence 
of public authorities at the local level. Considering that they were signiﬁcantly lacking in 
Serbia, the basis for diﬀerent and numerous activities launched within this project was 
centered around two objectives: (i) building and developing of local minority policies; 
(ii) reinforcing and deﬁning the prerequisites of their existence (e.g., the improvement 
of the legal framework and supporting institutional solutions, which existed at the level 
of central authorities).
Accordingly, it seems relevant to point to two more signiﬁcant deﬁcits that existed in 
the sphere of multiethnic communities’ management in Serbia. Firstly, similar to other 
transition countries in the region, the capacities of local governments in Serbia were 
underdeveloped for an adequate and quality response to the challenges of (democrati-
cally) managing multiethnic communities. Secondly, the entire complex of minority 
issues in Serbia was going through a transition, both in the formal and legal sphere and 
in institutional, structural segments. 
They had various deﬁcits of objective nature, which were mainly reliant on central 
authorities, such as: (i) the unresolved issue of political representation of minorities 
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at all government levels; (ii) the ambiguous manner of participation in the decision-
making processes, particularly the role of National Minority Councils as bodies of 
minority self-government; (iii) the incompleteness of new institutional arrangements 
(e.g., the relationship between National Minority Councils and Interethnic Relations 
Councils within local assemblies); (iv) problems in exercising human and minority 
rights; and the (v) issues of protection at local level, particularly the issues of informa-
tion, education, culture, and oﬃcial language use.
One should also bear in mind that throughout the three-year period of the project 
duration (2005–2007) the country was distinguished by additional characteristics. 
Comparing Serbia to other countries in Central and South Eastern Europe, this is a 
country experiencing a late transition, which started following the demise of the regime 
of Slobodan Milošević in the autumn of 2000, over a decade since many of Serbia’s 
neighbors began to refashion their economies and societies. Until then, the democ-
ratization of Serbian society was only on the surface, hiding the regime of Slobodan 
Milošević characterized by powerful sultan-like attributes. Among other things, this 
resulted in Serbia’s poorly developed democratic potentials and underdeveloped rule of 
law. After almost three years of accelerated transition (2000–2003), democratization 
came to a standstill following the assassination of the Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić 
(March 2003). 
Wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and ﬁnally in Kosovo resulted 
in economic devastation, a nearly-total impoverishment of the general population, and 
a redeﬁned geopolitical position for Serbia. Additionally, the frustrations due to such a 
series of defeats were powerful and resulted in persons belonging to particular minority 
communities (mainly Croats, Bosniaks, and Albanians) distrusting public institutions. 
The absence of more comprehensive approach to come to grips with the past in Serbia, 
after 2000, aggravated the democratic recovery of the country. 
Finally, interethnic relations were in upheaval throughout the 1990s: severe ethnic 
turbulence among the communities led to much mistrust among particular national 
communities. For example, policies were very often “ethnicized” and segregation was 
strong among particular minority communities, especially among the Roma. The nearly 
decade-long absence of any integration policy for persons belonging to national minor-
ity communities in Serbian society further complicated the process of stabilization of 
interethnic tensions. 
Concerning the formal and legal framework on minority issues—similar to other 
countries at the beginning of the transition in the 1990s—there was legal chaos. In 
particular, at that time Serbia still did not have a constitutive element meeting con-
temporary legal standards. The Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted as late 
as 1990, was inadequate in a large part of its provisions. Another signiﬁcant feature 
of its unharmonized legal framework was that rights under the Framework Conven-
tion for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe (which Serbia 
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signed) was not properly regulated by the law. The absence of the rule of law gave rise 
to impunity: it was not uncommon thing for public and elected oﬃcials to disregard 
regulations. Finally, persons belonging to minorities were not even informed or aware 
of their right to exercise their rights.
Another major characteristic has been Serbia’s largely unregulated institutions, 
partly explained by Serbia’s late and slow transformation from an authoritarian to a 
democratic country. Therefore, a large number of unregulated and incomplete legal 
rules and institutional solutions, made room for improvisations and ad hoc approaches 
to solving problems. 
Here, the institutional role previously held by the monopolist Communist Party 
was not replaced by an emerging democratic political system but by a totalitarian one. 
Furthermore, resources existing within civil society and non-governmental organizations 
in local communities were not always utilized in an adequate manner. Representatives 
of local communities were more inclined to “rule” rather than “manage” communities. 
At the same time, one should also bear in mind that Serbia was highly centralized state 
and that local self-governments had relatively limited competences. In the process of 
exercising human and minority rights at the local level, a further aggravating circumstance 
was the overlapping tiers of government (central, regional, and local). 
Cooperation Goals
On the basis of such initial facts and assumptions, as well as characteristics of Serbian 
society relevant to the management of multiethnic communities, project activities were 
planned either with the main purpose to eliminate the existing, detected deﬁcits or to 
alleviate their negative impacts. This required that all actors involved in that complex 
process become empowered by diﬀerent means to create and implement such local poli-
cies that are essentially ethnically-sensitive. From the very beginning of this preliminary 
project the Serbian Fund for an Open Society was aware of the restricted character of 
the initiatives coming from the civil society towards the authorities.
The main project goals were deﬁned, as follows: 
 • establishment and development of new policies in local communities, to im-
prove management in multiethnic local communities in Serbia and thereby 
contributing to increased social cohesion at the local level;
 • enhancement of intercultural capacities of public authorities, particularly with 
regard to promotion of the principle of multiculturality in multiethnic local 
communities;
 • articulation of interests and exercising the needs of all citizens in the local com-
munity through the local administrative authorities and in an institutionalized 
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manner, with a special focus on interests and needs of minority communities 
at the local level;
 • development of systematic solutions for problems relevant to the life of minority 
communities, particularly in the ﬁeld of participation in decision-making at the 
local level, as well as in exercising individual rights to education, information, 
fostering of one’s own culture, oﬃcial use of languages and alphabets in a local 
community;
 • contribution to the development of sustainable and equitable model of manag-
ing multiethnic local communities in a transition country.
The project represents a classic form of partner cooperation among civil society or-
ganizations with the state and public administration bodies. Naturally, this partnership 
required autonomy, independence, and equality of each institution and organization that 
was involved. They all gathered around the same endeavors and project goals, and the 
project implementation presumed interactive relations between the speciﬁed actors. 
Civil organizations, think tanks, and individual experts were the driving force of 
this initiative, for beyond sharing experiences in the sphere of local minority policies, 
the representatives of local authorities and minority self-governments were most often 
participants in the various round tables, seminars, and trainings. They also implemented 
local policies. Furthermore, they were used as powerful resources for promotion and 
exchange of achieved results (e.g., policy on Roma integration into local communities), 
as well as for particular lobbying and advocacy activities, elaborated within the project 
(e.g., amendments of particular legislative solutions).
Synergy of Numerous Participants
As far as the issues of project organization and management are concerned, the leading 
holder of all activities was the Fund for an Open Society–Serbia (FOSS),2 which at the 
same time was the major donor. Activities of direct implementation were entrusted to 
the executive director the Center for Regionalism3 from Novi Sad. It was selected as 
a main partner in the implementation since it previously had an extensive experience 
of work in this ﬁeld (e.g., nearly a decade of successful implementation of the project 
“Agreement on Multiethnic Tolerance,” which now has expanded regionally to include 
more western Balkan countries). What is more, the Center for Regionalism had cred-
ibility in local communities, as well as well-developed human resources. All speciﬁed 
characteristics were necessarily required for the organization that was engaged in direct 
implementation of this kind of activity. The Open Society Fund signed the special 
Cooperation Agreement with implementing parties, which more speciﬁcally deﬁned 
mutual rights and responsibilities.
A C T I V I T I E S  O F  T H E  F U N D  F O R  A N  O P E N  S O C I E T Y — S E R B I A  A N D  T H E  C E N T E R  F O R  R E G I O N A L I S M
187
Apart from implementing parties some form of cooperation was also established 
with other civil society organizations that also have similar resources and orientation: 
the Belgrade Open School, the PALGO Center, the Center for Civil Society Develop-
ment, the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities, local NGOs, minority 
organizations present in the local communities, local media, etc. Similarly, particular 
emphasis was placed on the involvement of established experts in the ﬁelds of minority 
rights, public administration, local communities’ management, etc., in implementa-
tion of speciﬁc project tasks. Furthermore, a signiﬁcant contribution from minority 
representatives was counted on, like the members of National Minority Councils and 
representatives of other minority institutions and organizations.
Particular attention was given to establishment of links with other similar projects 
that were underway at that time in Serbia. Synergy of all activities aimed at promoting 
the position of minorities and improved exercising of human and minority rights was 
made possible. For instance, one such project implemented by the NGO Civil Initiatives 
was “Minority Rights in Practice in South Eastern Europe 2004–2006,”4 supported by 
the King Baudouin Foundation in partnership with the Charles Stewart Mott Founda-
tion and the Soros Foundations in South Eastern Europe. The project was aimed at 
promoting the position of minority communities and improving the full exercise of 
human and minority rights at the local level through building capacities of minority 
institutions and local self-governments. 
Project Locations: Diversity as a Selection Criterion
The project itself was implemented across three municipalities of diﬀerent size in Vojvo-
dina, the northern, autonomous region of Serbia with an ethnically mixed population. 
Throughout the selection process of municipalities, it was taken into account that one of 
them has a low population and that its ethnic majority at the general state level represents 
a quantitative minority within the territory of the municipality. Accordingly, the munici-
pality of Senta was selected, that is, a municipality with a population of a little more than 
25,000, in which Hungarians are the majority and Serbs are the minority population, 
along with a smaller number of Roma. The second municipality was supposed to be a 
cross-border municipality of medium size, in which the majority population is Serbian 
and in which a signiﬁcant number of citizens from several minority communities lives. 
As a result, the municipality of Sombor was selected, which is the municipality with the 
population of more than 90,000 where the Serbs make up the majority (a little more 
than 50 percent), but there is a signiﬁcant percentage of Hungarians and Croats, whereas 
the Roma population accounts for a lower percentage. Finally, the selection criteria for 
the third municipality envisaged a big municipality with a dominant number of citizens 
belonging to the national majority at the state level and a smaller number of citizens 
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belonging to ethnic minorities. Thus, the municipality of Zrenjanin was selected, that 
is, a municipality with a population of over 130,000, whereas the minority population 
is much lower (up to 20 percent), including: Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, and 
Roma. The justiﬁcation for this selection was the assumption that particular solutions 
in managing multiethnic local communities may not be identical, keeping in mind the 
diﬀerences among local communities. 
The whole project was managed by a project council—the highest managing authority 
comprised of nine members. It was chosen upon a proposal put forward by the donor 
and implementing party and according to the agreement of all actors involved in the 
project. In terms of staﬀ, it was comprised of the donor and implementing organization 
(three members), an independent expert responsible for minority issues (one person), 
one representative of each local self-government in which the project was implemented 
(three members in total), one representative of executive branch of the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina, as well as one representative of the National Minority Councils 
from the participating local self-governments. The council meetings were at least ﬁve 
times a year and it also worked on continuous deﬁnition of the project activities. The 
council was headed by its president who chaired the sessions, which were prepared and 
organized by the employees of the implementing organization.
MAIN ACTIVITIES
Considering that the project goals were extremely demanding, the varied and complex 
activities were implemented over three years. Therefore, it was not possible to envisage 
all the activities during the planning stage. It was deliberately planned that a number 
of activities would be deﬁned by the project council in the course of the project imple-
mentation. Accordingly, this project had the attribute of structural openness.
Preparations: Institutionalization and Introduction of 
All Stakeholders
Before the commencement of the project implementation, all necessary preliminary 
actions had been taken. For instance, the project’s structure was developed to deal 
with the organization and communication between the project holder (FOSS), the 
project implementing party (Center for Regionalism), and all stakeholders (local self-
governments, minority institutions and organizations, NGOs). In addition, each par-
ticipating institution and organization appointed a person to be responsible for the 
project implementation. Such management structure was viewed as being crucial to 
the project implementation process.
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In parallel, the relevant project stakeholders (provincial authorities, representatives 
of the three municipalities, representatives of National Minority Councils, NGOs, 
experts) were introduced to the initiative and they were informed about their expected 
contribution. Finally, the consent for their participation in the project implementation 
was also requested. This was carried out by the representatives of the project holder (the 
donor). In addition, the representatives of the relevant international institutions and 
organizations in Serbia (e.g., the OSCE Mission to Serbia, the Council of Europe, the 
European Agency for Reconstruction and Development) were also informed about the 
project. Upon completion of the preparatory activities, the project council was consti-
tuted, the president was appointed, and the role of the council was deﬁned. 
Understanding the Current Situation in the Field 
The ﬁrst major project activity was research-based. Speciﬁcally, it was necessary to inves-
tigate the situation in the ﬁeld of managing multiethnic communities and gain a clear 
insight into the characteristics of the local minority policies in the three municipalities in 
Vojvodina. In other words, interdisciplinary research aimed to obtain a snapshot of the 
legal and institutional frameworks, development plans and local self-governments’ capaci-
ties in the ﬁeld of managing multiethnic communities. The research questions focused 
on staﬀ capacities, kinds and characteristics of the pursued policies, how the rights of the 
persons belonging to minorities are exercised, what are the employment policies, what is 
the relationships between central and local authorities, were there any problems and of 
what kind, and what are the methods of possible solution to interethnic relations.
To accomplish this job, a think tank, the Center for Civil Society Development, was 
engaged from Zrenjanin. It conducted a survey that covered the following issues: 
 • the normative and legal aspects and institutional arrangements that regulate the 
issues relevant to exercising minority rights at the local level;
 • the possible legal and functional gaps between public administration and self-
government bodies, that is, between diﬀerent management levels; 
 • the division of competences and management methods in the resolution of 
regular and extraordinary issues in multiethnic communities; 
 • the actual and desired management policies; 
 • the ethno-cultural aspects of policies in these municipalities; 
 • the means of funding the activities relevant to the development of ethno-cultural 
identity; 
 • the policies for multiethnic funding, particularly with regard to the funding 
policy for minority communities and organizations; 
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 • possible diﬀerential treatment of particular national communities in this respect 
and funding or lack of funding for persons belonging to national communities 
and their needs; 
 • development of multiethnic policies in the selected communities; 
 • presence of the minority issue on the public agenda. 
Survey results were published in four separate monographs, with a volume of 150 
pages for each municipality, whereas the fourth volume synthesized and compared the 
obtained results in all three municipalities. 
Organization of four round tables followed, when the survey results were presented 
and discussed (Zrenjanin, Sombor, Senta, and Novi Sad). All round tables were attended 
by the highest representatives of local self-governments, oﬃcials from administration 
both at central and local level, representatives of councilors’ groups, institutions in the 
ﬁeld of culture, information, and education, people from institutions dealing with 
minority issues, political parties, representatives from the non-governmental sector, as 
well as distinguished individuals from the public life of each speciﬁc local community. 
Each participant of the round table received the publication with the survey results seven 
days in advance, so that the discussions were of an excellent quality, and in terms of the 
content, they were governed by the problems of respective local communities. 
These discussions, also evaluated by two independent experts, were very important 
for the future of this project, since, not only the survey results were reviewed, but they 
also served the purpose of deﬁning the further steps with respect to the content of 
this project. In addition to signiﬁcantly contributing to more reasonable insights into 
the situation and problems in the ﬁeld of multiethnic local community management, 
the survey results were useful in amending the policies in speciﬁc segments (e.g., the 
municipal administration in Sombor allocated twice as many funds in its 2006 budget 
intended for the organizations dealing with minority culture based on the insight and the 
comparison with the methods that were employed by the municipality of Zrenjanin).
Capacity Building Activities
The start of the project was based on the assumption that the capacities for the creation 
and implementation of minority policies at the local level were insuﬃciently developed. 
This assumption was conﬁrmed by the survey. With the view to eliminate established 
deﬁciencies, diﬀerent education programs were organized and were intended for vari-
ous target groups such as local political oﬃcials, employees in public administration, 
educational institutions, news agencies, political parties’ activists, political youth, civic 
organizations (NGOs), minority political and cultural organizations, and similar ac-
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tors. The knowledge and skills, necessary for establishment and implementation of the 
minority policies at local level, were transferred by means of round tables, symposiums, 
conferences, education through trainings and seminars, as well as through study tours 
and exchanges of best practices. As they were—to a certain extent—skilled people who 
had their point of views on these issues, the program tried to develop each educational 
concept in an interactive manner. 
First the three-day seminar on “Writing Eﬀective Policy Papers” was held (developed 
by LGI’s expert team). The guidebook under the same name was translated into Serbian, 
so each participant could receive a copy. The Belgrade Open School issued training 
certiﬁcates. Both of these actions guaranteed the successful outcome of the seminar. 
The seminar participants, 40 of them in total, were appointed and elected representa-
tives of the local authorities from all three municipalities in which project had been 
implemented as well as representatives of the provincial administration. The reason for 
this theme having been chosen for the training were the deﬁciencies detected among 
the representatives of local authorities in the course of conducted survey, particularly 
a lack of skills in deﬁning actual proposals for resolution of speciﬁc problems in the 
process of local communities’ management. 
A second three-day training addressed the topic of “Managing Diﬀerences.” The 
training involved the project council members, the representatives of the municipal 
administrations of Zrenjanin, Senta, and Sombor, NGO representatives from the three 
municipalities, and the provincial administration—the Secretariat for Administration, 
Regulations, and National Minorities and the Oﬃce of the Provincial Ombudsman. This 
training was aimed at raising awareness, understanding, and knowledge about identity, 
diﬀerences, and interethnic relations, thus improving the capacities of municipal and 
provincial administration to work and increase their sensitivity to the issues concerning 
persons belonging to minority groups and interethnic relations. 
Additionally, two symposiums were held, which were focused on the diﬃculties of 
two new institutions—the Ombudspersons in local communities and the Interethnic 
Relations Councils at municipal assemblies. Immediate actors (i.e., Ombudspersons, 
members of Interethnic Relations Councils), as well as representatives of administration, 
experts, and others directly involved in the project implementation participated in the 
activities of these symposiums. Debates were aimed at gaining a comprehensive insight 
into the place, role, function, and signiﬁcance of those new institutions, both in the 
process of local communities’ management and in exercising minority rights. 
In addition to pointing to theoretical and formal and legal aspects, special emphasis 
was placed upon the elaboration of previous experiences. The most important segments 
were documented by independent evaluators. This material was later used by a focus 
group to draft the two policy documents: “Recommendations for Building the Institution 
and Work of the Ombudspersons (Citizens’ Defender) in Multiethnic Local Commu-
nities” and “Recommendations for Establishment and Work of Interethnic Relations 
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Councils.”5 [These documents were oﬀered later to all multiethnic local communities 
through the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities. At the same time, the 
Ombudspersons used these recommendations for launching the activities aimed at the 
establishment of these institutions in six municipalities in the Serbian part of Sandžak, 
which ensured dissemination of good practice developed in Vojvodina, whereas recom-
mendations on the Interethnic Relations Councils were used in trainings of councils’ 
members in a number of municipalities in Sandžak and Vojvodina. 
At one point, it occurred to the project council members that the texts of two rec-
ommendations may be used as a basis for potentially better, more precise wording of 
those articles in the law that refers to municipal interethnic relations councils and local 
ombudsperson institutions. This was quite necessary because the new Constitution of 
the Republic of Serbia, which was adopted in the meantime, also included more speciﬁc 
regulations on minority rights. Accordingly, a working group was established, which, 
after a number of meetings, drafted new articles to the Law on Local Self-Government. 
These proposals were concerned with deﬁning the competences of local self-governments 
when it comes to exercising rights of the persons belonging to national minorities, as 
well as institutions of local ombudsman and municipal interethnic relations councils, 
also providing detailed exposition of the initiative. 
Models of Minority Policies in Local Communities
Activities also were aimed at improving how citizens can demand to exercise the right to 
information in one’s own mother tongue at the local level. Here, activities were focused 
on a more consistent application of the existing laws, and furthermore on deﬁning and 
supporting documents upon the adoption of new laws in 2003 and 2004. This initia-
tive was developed in three steps and its implementation took over two years. The ﬁrst 
step involved empirical research on how and within what scope this right is exercised. 
The second step included launching of public debate on the existing situation and the 
opportunities for and sustainability of new solutions. The third step envisaged diﬀer-
ent activities aimed at building an optimal and sustainable model of supporting the 
use of minority languages in the public sphere (recommendations targeting legislative 
authorities, funding policies for the media). 
The program also worked to develop local policies for Roma integration. The situ-
ation of the Roma community in Senta was the least favorable, in the sense that there 
are no inclusive local policies targeted at the Roma population. In cooperation with the 
Roma Educational Center from Subotica, an initiative was launched to empower the 
local Roma community and to improve their position and how they can independently 
articulate their interests. Responding to the speciﬁc position and needs of the Roma com-
munity, further work has been planned on the development of the relevant policies. 
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The practices transferred to Senta from Subotica were successful, and the ﬁrst Roma 
non-governmental organization was established in the municipality of Senta. It drew 
up and implemented its ﬁrst project, and a whole set of measures for more eﬀective lo-
cal Roma integration was developed (in the ﬁeld of healthcare, preschool and primary 
education, social assistance, and housing conditions). The ﬁnal round table agreed to 
establish permanent communication between the representatives of Roma community 
and aforementioned institutions.
Public Advocacy 
Media coverage has played an important role in the activities that were implemented 
so far. However, this coverage was deemed insuﬃcient since the attainment of speciﬁc, 
more demanding goals also required typical lobbying activities. The steps in lobbying 
and public advocacy of this legislative initiative were agreed and targeted at the widest 
circle of relevant domestic institutions, as well as at international institutions concerned 
with the issues of human and minority rights. 
To this end, a Proposal for the Amendment of the Law on Self-government was 
submitted to a wide segment of government institutions at the central and provincial 
level: assembly bodies and deputies’ groups in the National Assembly of the Republic of 
Serbia and the Assembly of Vojvodina; the competent Ministry for Public Administra-
tion and Local Self-government, the oﬃces of the Prime Minister and President; to the 
Oﬃce of Citizens’ Protection; to at the national provincial Ombudspersons; National 
Minority Councils; and the wide circle of domestic and international, governmental 
and non-governmental organizations. Intensive consultation, monitoring, promotion, 
and lobbying activities followed, mainly aimed at ensuring that these proposals are 
submitted for consideration by the Assembly and ﬁnally introduced into the new Law 
on Self-government. 
By the beginning of December 2007, this proposal of legislative solutions6 was 
supported by a number of international institutions, ﬁrst of all by OSCE Mission in 
Belgrade and the Council of Europe. It was also supported by the Assembly Committee 
on Interethnic Relations, more speciﬁcally, the proposal received a positive judgment 
and was accepted by all the committee members and passed for further Assembly con-
sideration. Some of the proposed articles were introduced into the new Law on Local 
Self-Government. 
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SUMMARY AND RESULTS
Alongside the Center for Regionalism, the Fund for an Open Society has conceived, 
initiated , and implemented the three-year project “Minority Policies in Local Commu-
nities—Situations and Perspectives of Managing Multiethnic Communities,” the main 
goal of which was to assist the multiethnic local communities in transition countries in 
the process of building and developing a good management model. 
The goal was attained through implementation of numerous activities like capacity 
building for local self-governments, building and development of new institutions, up-
grading the legal framework, and development of ethnically sensitive public policies at the 
local level. Particularly eﬀective was the creation of a policy proposal aimed at establish-
ing and operating the Ombudsperson in multiethnic local communities, the Interethnic 
Relations Councils, and the right to use minority languages at the local level.
The results achieved throughout the project implementation were disseminated not 
only around other parts of Serbia with multiethnic populations (ﬁrst of all the area of 
Sandžak and in the south of Serbia), but also to Montenegro. Furthermore, a number 
of countries from Central Asia also expressed their interest in the methodology and the 
content of activities (for instance, LGI supported sharing these experiences with local 
government oﬃcials in Kyrgyzstan). 
At the ﬁnal phase, the proposal for new articles to the Law on Local Self-government 
was drawn up, which refer to the competences of local self-governments with respect 
to the issues of exercising the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, and 
establishing local ombudspersons and municipal Interethnic Relations Councils. Fol-
lowing several months of lobbying and advocacy activities, a number of articles from 
this draft were introduced into the new Law on Local Self-Government in Serbia.
NOTES
1 Unquestionably, these minority groups are neither closed categories, nor homogenous. Rather, 
they are internally heterogeneous. 
2 Visit the Fund for an Open Society-Serbia online, at http://www.fosserbia.org.
3 See the Center for Regionalism homepage, at http://www.centarzaregionalizam.org.rs.
4 For more on this initiative, visit: http://www.kbs-frb.be/call.aspx?id=209762&LangType=1033.
5 Institution of Ombudsperson is not obligatory in the Law on Local-Self Government, but it can 
be founded on a local level. The State has established a central level Ombudsperson, and Province 
level as well. Central level Ombudsperson has the right to establish its local oﬃces in municipalities 
where needed.
6 The Center for Regionalism has proposed legal provisions and amendments to Law on Local 
Sef-Government regarding the role of Interethnic Relations Councils and local Ombudspersons, 
models of selection of their members, competences and functioning in general.
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ANNEX 2
AGREEMENT ON INTERETHNIC TOLERANCE 
 Aware of the fact that post-socialist transition of the economic and political 
system, state of law and stabilization of democracy are essentially dependent on the 
culture of peace, tolerance, trust and stable interethnic relations, 
 Committed to the European system of civic values, to the realization of the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and integration in the EU institutions, and to 
the policy of respect, neighborly relations and cooperation between the states to the 
beneﬁt of their citizens, regions and local self-governments, 
 Adherent to the philosophy and legacy of civilization of inalienable human 
rights and freedoms, including the idea that the extent of democracy in modern political 
orders is measured by the majority’s relation to the minorities, 
 In accordance with the standards of the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe, 
in relation to the protection of rights and freedoms of national and ethnic minorities, 
 Being of opinion that borders between the neighboring states and regions 
safeguard the preservation of self-distinctiveness, but deeming that those borders are not 
there to disregard the likeness and the need for inter-communication and free exchange 
of commodities, people and ideas, 
 Hoping that minorities will no longer be used as an “apple of discord” between 
nations and states, 
 Conﬁdent that the time is coming when the old and new national minorities, 
with guaranteed rights and freedoms to cherish and develop their cultural identity, will 
become the important lever in the overall cooperation, 
 Intending to preserve the multicultural wealth of their environment, to 
develop the direct and most eﬃcient participation of citizens of all nationalities in the 
decision-making process related with issues of any interest to their communities, as well 
as to contribute to the stabilization of the region, communication and cooperation among 
citizens and institutions of neighboring countries, regions and local self-governments,
 Pursuant to the European Charter on Local Self-government, and in the 
spirit of the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
and the European Charter on Regional and Minorities’ Languages, 
 Realizing the importance of the process of regional cooperation initiated in 
the triangle Novi Sad–Osijek–Tuzla,  
 
Citizens, non-governmental organizations and political representatives of the local 
self-governments (municipal and city) of multicultural cities in South Eastern Europe 
(West Balkans) hereby accede to the
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 AGREEMENT ON INTERETHNIC TOLERANCE
 
Article 1
 
Signatories of the Agreement on Interethnic Tolerance (hereinafter: the Agreement) 
hereby declare their adherence to the following objectives, principles and action pro-
grams:
I .  OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE AGREEMENT
 
Article 2
 
Agreement objectives and principles are as follows:
 1. To establish the social framework for the activities of local self-government 
bodies, local public institutions, non-governmental organizations and citizens 
of multicultural cities of South Eastern Europe, in all social, cultural and edu-
cational ﬁelds, committed to the development of liberal democracy, ethnic and 
religious tolerance and to the protection of human rights, in accordance with 
the authentic citizens’ needs and with the European system of social values; 
 2. To preserve cultural diversity, to protect the rights and freedoms of national 
and ethnic minorities, to cherish the civic virtues and the good tradition of 
coexistence; 
 3. To promote the European principles and experiences in the ﬁeld of human rights, 
freedom, multiculturalism and interculturalism, as essential pre-conditions of 
democracy; 
 4. To oppose to the language of hatred, xenophobia, prejudices, inﬂexibility and 
all forms of ethnic and religious intolerance; 
 5. To develop the civil society, democratic public, social criticism and atmosphere 
where reason, creativity, competence and responsibility become the main attri-
butes of public debates, political initiatives and decision-making process related 
with issues of local and regional importance; 
 6. To create the conditions that facilitate and encourage the use of regional and 
minority languages, both orally and in writing, in public and in private life; 
 7. To encourage the mass media to re-aﬃrm the tradition, culture and languages 
of national and ethnic minorities on the local territory; 
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 8. To develop the communication and cooperation between the citizens, non-gov-
ernmental organizations and bodies of local and regional self-governments of all 
countries of South Eastern Europe in accordance with the ratiﬁed international 
treaties and multilateral and bilateral (inter-state) political agreements as well; 
 9. To improve the culture of law, including the respect for the state, constitutional 
and legal norms, general deed and local regulations, on the part of members 
of national and ethnic minority, as well as the respect for the rights of other 
national minorities and members of the majority who are a minority in certain 
parts of the state’s territory; 
 10. To aﬃrm the European tradition of open cities and to expand the freedom of 
market communication, cooperation between the public and private sector for 
the purpose of prosperous economy, healthy society and sustainable ecological 
development;
 11. To join the processes of euroregional cooperation, those being the important 
factor of the overall development of Europe as a sustainable union of democratic 
countries and nations, all ethno-national minorities and old and new regions 
as well; 
 12. To strive to make borders against the political violence, organized crime and 
terrorism the only borders in this “Europe without borders” (“Europe of Na-
tions,” “Europe of Citizens,” “Europe of Regions,” “Europe of Minorities”);
 13. To solve the problems of communication between the citizens of neighboring 
countries and members of national communities in the Region of South Eastern 
Europe which will be created through the potential earlier accession of other 
countries to the European Union and the so-called Schengen visa regime;
 14.  To develop the “triangles” of cooperation into concentric “circles” of cooperation, 
while respecting the given state of aﬀairs or speciﬁc traits of each environment, 
with a desire to ﬁnd an area of joint activities, likely and realistically acceptable 
for each local and regional community.   
II .  PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES
 
Article 3
In the ﬁeld of education, according to their own abilities, rights and competencies, the 
signatories of the Agreement will: 
 — Monitor the realization of state education programs dealing with issues of 
cultural identity in preparatory schools, elementary and secondary schools and 
universities;
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 — Pay special attention to the contents of following subjects: language and litera-
ture, history, arts, music and other subjects that are related with vital issues of 
rights of national minorities to the preservation and development of their own 
tradition and cultural identity
 — Initiate or support activities aimed at training teachers and their assistants and 
associates in institutions of education, to develop the culture of peace, tolerance 
and multiculturalism; 
 — Support the existing programs, or initiate activities in cooperation with the educa-
tional authorities and other institutions of alternative education to provide learning 
of local community languages and introduction of culture of other nationalities 
and ethnic minorities to the children and adults who are interested in it, 
 — Take steps to strengthen the trust and prevent the behavior that threatens to 
spoil the atmosphere of interethnic tolerance and the right to be diﬀerent within 
the institutions of education; 
 — Organize meetings of students and teachers to help them to get to know each 
other better, to develop creativity, competition and education for tolerance and 
interculturality. 
 
Article 4
 
In the ﬁeld of culture, according to their abilities, rights and competencies, the signa-
tories of the Agreement will: 
 — Take steps to enable wide-ranging cultural development for the members of all 
national communities, including the improvement of conditions for freedom 
of expression and development of tradition and culture of national minorities 
and ethnic communities;
 — Periodically organize meetings and manifestations (art, music, ﬁlm, television 
and video, eco-cultural manifestations, sports etc.) to promote, particularly 
among the young, advantages of multiculturality and interethnic tolerance;
 — Organize and support all activities aimed at protection of cultural goods and 
prevent activities that are detrimental to cultural goods of nationalities, national 
minorities and ethnic communities;
 — Cooperate with all cultural institutions, organizations and associations in the so 
called civic sector, committed to tolerance and development of multiculturality 
and particularly with organizations and cultural associations of national and 
ethnic minorities. 
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 Article 5
 
In the ﬁeld of social organizing, signatories to the Agreement will:
 — Incite and develop social organization and coordination of activities of non-gov-
ernmental (non-proﬁt and proﬁt) organizations that promote multiculturality 
and interethnic tolerance and protection of minority rights and cherish tradi-
tion and development of the culture of each nationality individually and all 
together;
 — On the basis of public calls for proposals and quality of oﬀered programs, 
provide ﬁnancial support to multicultural projects and permanent activities of 
non-governmental organizations and cultural and educational associations of 
all national and ethnic communities;
 — Help non-governmental organizations to obtain oﬃces and fulﬁll other working 
conditions, according to their aptitude and results they achieved.
 
Article 6
In the ﬁeld of implementation of administrative power and organization of public city 
services, the signatories to the Agreement will:
 — In accordance with state, constitutional and legal regulations, ratiﬁed European 
conventions, as well as in accordance with local regulations, improve conditions 
for realization of national minorities’ rights to the free use of their language 
in private and public (oﬃcial) communication, orally and in writing, includ-
ing the right to use family names and names in the language of the respective 
minority;
 — In accordance with current conditions and to the reasonable extent, provide 
and encourage the use of oﬃcially recognized minority languages and writing 
systems when it comes to contacts between the citizens and the authorities of 
the local community and regional authorities, and in printing oﬃcial documents 
in corresponding minority languages and so on;
 — Respect historical multicultural heritage and requirements of the social en-
vironment when it comes to putting up and giving names to the cities and 
settlements.
 
Article 7
In the ﬁeld of public communication and program policy of the media which serve as 
a public service, the signatories to the Agreement will:
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 — Exert inﬂuence on local media to inform their citizens in corresponding minor-
ity languages as well;
 — Encourage or facilitate founding newspapers, radio stations and TV channels 
in minority languages;
 — Encourage promotion of multicultural values, interethnic tolerance and rights 
of minorities and particularly promote individual achievements, prominent 
authors and proven human rights activists; 
 — Oppose to all forms of discrimination, to the language of hatred and to all 
manifestations of inter-national and religious intolerance.
 
Article 8
1. In keeping with the Article 16 of the European Convention on Protection of National 
Minorities, Signatories to the Agreement will refrain from measures that change the 
ethnic structure of the population in areas populated by national minorities and 
which lead to constriction of rights and freedoms implied by this Convention; 
2. In accordance with norms of state of law and demands of justice, they will make 
eﬀorts to help the citizens who had left their homes during the past wars in former 
SFR Yugoslavia and who are not in violation of law, to fulﬁll their civil and propri-
etary rights, including freedom to choose their own place of residence. 
 
Article 9
In accordance with European standards, signatories to the Agreement will make eﬀorts 
to utilize the opportunities provided by the current bilateral and multilateral agreements 
on cooperation in the ﬁeld of economy and social life, as well as to initiate drafting 
and realization of new agreements with the purpose of improvement of cross-border 
communication and cooperation between countries, regions and cities, i.e. economical, 
political and civil subjects in the Region.
 
Article 10
1. In keeping with the liberal principle of free private enterprising, as well as with 
experiences of cooperation between the private and public sector in local commu-
nities of the countries with stable market democracy, signatories to the Agreement 
will encourage all activities that strengthen the small and middle scale business;
2. Signatories to the Agreement will pay special attention to the establishment of 
wide-ranging communications between the subjects in economy, including the 
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periodical meetings and fairs, being aware that in doing so they improve the mate-
rial preconditions of local democracy: production, ﬂow of goods and capital, local 
border traﬃc, understanding between people and nationalities, as well as chances 
for the return of young experts and entrepreneurs from abroad.
Article 11
Through their public actions on the local, regional and national level, non-governmental 
organizations which are signatories to the Agreement will promote and develop the spirit 
of multiculturality, especially in the ﬁeld of: 
 — Stabilization of preconditions for peace and security in the Region of South 
Eastern Europe;
 — protection of individual and collective rights and freedoms, especially for the 
members of national minorities and ethnic communities;
 — Providing information and education to the citizens aimed at encouraging their 
active participation in the process of post-socialist democratic transition;
 — Education of citizens, both young and adult, about European standards, prin-
ciples and experiences of multiculturalism; 
 — Cooperation with local government bodies on speciﬁc projects, as well as the 
necessary control and social criticism in the process of decision-making and 
implementation of public decisions;
 — Cooperation and coordination of activities of citizens’ associations on projects 
of public, cultural and political importance;
 — Civil dialog between the citizens, NGOs, expert and professional associations 
in the cities and regions of countries of South Eastern Europe.
Article 12
In order to improve interethnic tolerance and realization of rights and freedoms of 
national minorities, and in keeping with European standards and recommendations of 
the High Commissioner for National Minorities at OSCE and respective expert groups, 
city authorities will make eﬀorts to set up advisory bodies comprised of representatives 
of local authorities, national communities and non-governmental organizations, to 
permanently monitor the state of international relations and advise respective institu-
tions of the administration system of public aﬀairs. 
 
206
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
Article 13
Municipal Councils and City Halls or Municipal and City Assemblies will look into 
problems and conditions of the improvement of international relations in accordance 
with their working programs and current situation. In doing so, they will make an eﬀort 
to put these issues once a year in the agenda of the bodies of local authority.
  
Article 14
In all ﬁelds and forms of mutual cooperation, signatories to the Agreement will express 
their adherence to the principles and solutions of the European Charter on Local 
Self-government, continuously exchange experiences and promote positive examples 
of decentralization of power and prepare the local administration to serve as a public 
service for citizens’ interests.
Article 15
1. In accordance with their role and inﬂuence, institutions of autonomous govern-
ment and representatives of citizens’ interests in country’s capitals, as well as in large 
urban environments, political, cultural and university centers of regions in South 
Eastern Europe, are especially important for realization of ethno-cultural justice 
and development of multiculturality.
2. For the above mentioned reasons, we will regard the accession of the government 
and civil sector of capitals of countries and regions to the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance as an important encouragement to the overall process of cooperation initi-
ated by this Agreement, as well as to the stabilization of conditions in the Region 
of South Eastern Europe (West Balkans).
Article 16
1. Through their representatives, all participants, signatories to the Agreement, will 
once a year review the realization of the Agreement and issue a draft plan of future 
joint activities.
2. As a constituent part of cultural manifestations and actions in “triangles”, i.e. “circles” 
of cooperation, these working-consultative meetings will be held each year in a dif-
ferent city, and periodically, there will be meetings of all cities signatories to the 
Agreement.
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Article 17
Signatories to the Agreement agree to the idea to launch an initiative to form a Joint 
Award Committee to reward the contribution of individuals and organizations to the 
improvement of relations between nationalities and cooperation between people, towns, 
regions and countries. The Award will be called: “Charter of Interethnic Tolerance”.
 
III .  ACCESSION OF OTHER SOCIAL SUBJECTS 
TO THE AGREEMENT
 
Article 18
1. Agreement signatories wish to reaﬃrm and expand the cooperation initiated in the 
Novi Sad-Osijek-Tuzla triangle, through the inclusion of new social protagonists. 
2. Apart from the Administrative bodies of multicultural cities, countries’ capitals 
and regional (entity, canton, zupan, province) centers, and neighboring cities of 
cross-border regions as well, new subjects and equal participants in the process of 
cooperation initiated by this Agreement may include NGOs, cultural and profes-
sional associations, media and other social institutions and organizations which 
promote human rights, interethnic tolerance and interculturality. 
 
Article 19
Stepping out of the process of cooperation deﬁned by the Agreement on Interethnic 
Tolerance may occur:
 a) In case of public acting against the standards of UN, OSCE and Council of 
Europe
 b) In case of continuous absence from every activity related with realization of the 
Agreement
 c) In case of the oﬃcial request for stepping out.
 
Article 20
1. For the purpose of coordination of activities, signatories to the Agreement will form 
permanent and temporary coordination bodies.
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2. Forms of organization, tasks, competencies and operations of coordination bodies 
will be regulated by special acts adopted by representatives of all Agreement signa-
tories.
IV.  AGREEMENT SIGNATORIES
In 
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ANNEX 3
Table 1.
Members of the Association of Multiethnic Cities of South Eastern Europe
No. Local Authorities NGO’s
1. Alexandria (RO) [in association process] 
2. Arad (RO) [in association process] Millennium [in association process]
3. Bač (SRB) ΔΔ Center  for Local Democracy ΔΔ
4. Bačka Palanka (SRB) ΔΔ Society for Tolerance ΔΔ
5. Baja (HU) ΔΔ
6. Bajina Bašta (SRB) ΔΔ Agora ΔΔ
7. Banja Luka (BH) ΔΔ Helsinki Citizens Parliament ΔΔ
8. Bar (MNE) ΔΔ Center for Local Community Development ΔΔ
9. Belgrade (SRB) Δ Δ European Movement in Serbia ΔΔ
10. Bihać (BH) ΔΔ Women from Una ΔΔ
11. Bijelo Polje (MNE) Δ
12. Bijeljina (BiH) ΔΔ Helsinki Board for Human Rights Δ
13. Bitola (MK) Δ Biosphere, IMOR Δ
14. Bor (SRB) Δ Multiethnic center for Development 
of Danube 21 Δ
15. Brčko (BH) Δ Organization for Return Δ
16. Budva (MNE) [in association process]    Festa Djuna [in association process]    
17. Calafat (RO) ΔΔ
18. Cluj (RO) Δ
19. Craiova (RO) [in association process]
20. Csongrad (HU) ΔΔ
21. Delčevo (MK) Δ Humanitarian Charity Society of Roma Δ
22. Djirokaster (AL) [in association process]
23. Dubrovnik (CRO) ΔΔ
24. Elbasan (AL) [in association process]
210
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
No. Local Authorities NGO’s
25. Florina (GR) [in association process]
26. Gostivar (MK) Δ
27. Gyla (HU) Δ
28. Herceg Novi (MNE) ΔΔ Media center of youth, Civil informational 
Educational Center ΔΔ
29. Inđija (SRB) ΔΔ Women Initiative Indjija ΔΔ
30. Jimbolia (RO) ΔΔ Banat Ripensis ΔΔ
31. Karlovac  (CRO) Δ Step Δ
32. Kecskemet (HU) Δ Future of Europe Association Δ
33. Kikinda (SRB) ΔΔ District 0230 ΔΔ
34. Koprivnica (CRO) Δ
35. Kotor (MNG) ΔΔ Anima ΔΔ
36. Kladovo (SRB) Δ
37. Kula (SRB) ΔΔ
38. Kumanovo (MK) ΔΔ Kolo Srpskih Sestara ΔΔ
39. Mako (HU) Δ Roma Association Mako Δ
40. Mostar (BH) ΔΔ Cupido ΔΔ
41. Novi Bečej (SRB) ΔΔ PAAD ΔΔ
42. Novi Pazar (SRB) Δ
43. Novi Sad (SRB) ΔΔ Center for Regionalism ΔΔ
44. Novi Vinodolski (CRO) Δ
45. Niš (SRB) ΔΔ Trag ΔΔ
46. Osijek (CRO) ΔΔ Center for Peace, Non-Violence and Human        
Rights ΔΔ
47. Pančevo (SRB) Δ Center for Interethnic Tolerance Δ
48. Pecs (HU)                     [in association process]
49. Pljevlja (MNE) Δ Bonum Δ
50. Plovdiv (BG) Δ
51. Podgorica (MNE) Δ ASK, ELSA ΔΔ
52. Preševo (SRB) ΔΔ Center for Multicultural Education ΔΔ
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No. Local Authorities NGO’s
53. Prespa (MK) Δ
54. Prijedor (BH) ΔΔ Don ΔΔ
55. Prijepolje (SRB) Δ Center for Politics Research Argument Δ
56. Priština [in association process] Mother Teresa, Pristina Δ
57. Pula (CRO) ΔΔ HOMO ΔΔ
58. Resen (MK) Δ
59. Sarajevo (BH) ΔΔ Helsinki Board for Human Rights ΔΔ
60. Senta (SRB) ΔΔ
61. Sjenica (SRB) ΔΔ Flores Δ
62. Shkoder (AL) Δ Malteser Δ
63. Skopje (MK) ΔΔ Center for Interethnic Tolerance and 
Refugees ΔΔ
64. Sofia (BG) ΔΔ Balkan Political Club ΔΔ
65. Sombor (SRB) ΔΔ Open Lycee ΔΔ
66. Split (CRO) Δ Split Group ToD ΔΔ
67. Srebrenica (BH) ΔΔ Citizens Forum Srebrenica ΔΔ
68. Sremska Mitrovica (SRB) ΔΔ Center for Regional Development 
of Srem ΔΔ
69. Strumica (MK) Δ
70. Subotica (SRB) ΔΔ Open University ΔΔ
71. Szeged (HU) Δ Istvan Bibo Foundation Szeged ΔΔ
72. Szentes (HU) ΔΔ Local Association of the Hungarian 
Red Cross ΔΔ
73. Thesaloniki (GR) [in association process] Karamanlis Institute [in association process]
74. Timisoara (RO) ΔΔ Euroregional Center for Democracy ΔΔ
75. Tirana (AL) [in association process] Mjaft [in association process]
76. Trebinje (BH) ΔΔ League for Protection of Private 
Ownership and Human Rights ΔΔ
77. Turnu Severin (RO) [in association process]
78. Tuzla (BH) ΔΔ Citizens Forum Tuzla ΔΔ
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No. Local Authorities NGO’s
79. Ulcinj (MNE) Δ Kronika Δ
80. Vidin (BG) ΔΔ Priateli za Vidin ΔΔ
81. Vrace (BG) [in association process]
82. Vršac (SRB) ΔΔ Community Center Agora ΔΔ
83. Vukovar (CRO) Δ European Home Δ
84. Zagreb (CRO) Δ Citizens Board for Human Rights ΔΔ
85. Zaječar (SRB) ΔΔ Dobro Drvo ΔΔ
86. Zrenjanin (SRB) ΔΔ Center for Civil Society Development ΔΔ
Δ founders
ΔΔ associate members
213
Index
214
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
215
I N D E X
216
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
217
I N D E X
218
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
219
I N D E X
220
M A N A G I N G  M U LT I E T H N I C  C I T I E S  I N  S O U T H  E A S T E R N  E U R O P E

OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE
Local Government
and Public Service
Reform Initiative
ISBN 978-963-9719-17-0
7 1 9 1 7 07 8 9 6 3 99
Bringing together a team of scholars 
from across the continent, Territorial 
Consolidation Reform in Europe 
presents the struggles by politicians, 
technocrats, and the public to agree on 
the optimum size of government that 
balances good performance with good 
services, and the relevant arguments 
for the fragmentation, consolidation, or 
cooperation of government. 
Edited and introduced by Pawel 
Swianiewicz, this 15-chapter anthology 
presents the major reforms of municipal 
government that were implemented 
in Europe in the last decade. Covering 
much of Central and Eastern Europe, as 
well as detailing the experiences of “old” 
EU member states of Denmark, England, 
France, Germany, and Greece, this book 
investigates how territorial reforms 
have impacted local public affairs, 
public service delivery, local identity and 
autonomy, and what political and public 
debates have accompanied or been 
responsible for success or failure. 
